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Abstract:
This thesis invesƟ gates the potenƟ al eﬀ ects of a 7.2 magnitude earthquake in San Francisco City, 
parƟ cularly the implicaƟ ons on San Francisco’s residenƟ al housing stock and impacts on the con-
strucƟ on and demoliƟ on waste stream. The study uses System Dynamics methodology to analyze 
the feasibility of recycling disaster debris as new construcƟ on material to rebuild the diminished 
housing stock. A meta-analysis idenƟ fi es capacity requirements for transport and processing 
material, and seeks to project a Ɵ me frame for refurbishing lost housing. Simulated scenarios 
of policy measures provide the basis for recommendaƟ ons on improving San Francisco’s post-
disaster recovery as related to debris handling and reoccupaƟ on of housing. Results show that 
an increased use of recycled content products diverts upwards of 1.6 million tons of debris from 
landfi ll, with an addiƟ onal two years of delay in overall recovery. Under this hypothesis, and 
considering residenƟ al housing recovery as a proxy for city-wide recovery, the eﬀ ects of a large-
scale earthquake would require an esƟ mated recovery Ɵ me of 6.8 years. Future work will address 
addiƟ onal infl uencing variables of economics while honing exisƟ ng factors within the dynamic 
model, as well as applicaƟ ons to other vulnerable ciƟ es in a domesƟ c and internaƟ onal context. 
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Summary
 InvesƟ gaƟ ons have shown that the cause for unprecedented ramifi caƟ ons from recent earth-
quakes, especially for Japan, is that the city and state did not plan for the consequences of such an 
earthquake- it far overshadowed their expectaƟ ons and preparedness.1 San Francisco has taken 
many resilient-city iniƟ aƟ ves, some more technical and others more community based, as a basis 
to be able to bounce back eﬃ  ciently from the next earthquake to shake up the Bay Area. Contem-
porary case studies of managing recovery from the string of earthquakes to have struck the Pacifi c 
Rim of Fire within the last two years have provided our state and other vulnerable ciƟ es a guide to 
necessary preparedness protocols. One of the greatest aspects of resiliency that is currently being 
tested in the aŌ ermath of the Japanese Earthquake from March 2011 is that of debris management, 
which is evidenced to be a massive impediment to recovery and rehabilitaƟ on. 
Debris removal is a criƟ cal acƟ on that must be taken immediately aŌ er a disaster. Ambu-
lances are not able to reach injured ciƟ zens if roads are blocked, uƟ lity companies cannot reach 
power staƟ ons and emergency workers must be able to reach those in need of assistance within the 
heart of the stricken community. “Thus, emergency debris-removal work occurs fi rst, usually when 
crews- and even emergent ciƟ zen groups- move debris to the side of the road. Debris-removal work 
then symbolizes, both literally and in reality, key eﬀ orts to jump-start the recovery process.”2
This research focuses in recovery eﬀ orts for San Francisco aŌ er a scenario 7.2 magnitude 
earthquake on the San Andreas fault. It oﬀ ers an innovaƟ ve perspecƟ ve on disaster debris manage-
ment, which perceives the millions of tons as potenƟ al to be reintroduced into distressed material 
supply streams within San Francisco. The simulaƟ on bridges debris removal and material end-life 
streams to that of new construcƟ on material necessary to refurbish lost housing units. Because a 
high percentage of buildings in San Francisco are comprised of residenƟ al housing units, ciƟ zens 
face risks in units that may not be robust enough to withstand a large-scale disaster. Such housing 
vulnerabiliƟ es along with access impediments must be considered inclusively such that intercon-
necƟ ons can be made between variables impacƟ ng city-wide hazard miƟ gaƟ on and recovery man-
agement. 
In simulaƟ ng a post-disaster scenario in San Francisco, noƟ ons of debris recyclability for 
new building materials link emergency response stages and long-term redevelopment. Results show 
that great potenƟ al exists in recycling disaster debris, but not without compromising an increased 
recovery phase. With macro-level improvements as well as granular educaƟ on of local residents 
and contractors, San Francisco can maintain its tradiƟ on of landfi ll diversion following the next big 
disaster. Generally, waste management aŌ er a disaster is underesƟ mated or wholly neglected; how-
ever, waste with potenƟ al can be harnessed as usable construcƟ on material given a comprehensive 
pre- and post-disaster management plan for the City of San Francisco. This research is a means to 
strengthen disaster miƟ gaƟ on and management plans, in order to encourage the “build-back-bet-
ter” philosophy through self-eﬃ  cacious recovery in San Francisco and the greater Bay Area. 
1  Associated Bay Area Governments, Shaken Awake, (2011), 1-2. 
2  Phillips, Brenda D. Disaster Recovery. (Boca Raton, London, New York: CRC Press, 2009), 35-37
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“For major natural disasters, debris removal operaƟ ons can account for more than 25% of the 
disaster recovery costs. Although rapid removal of debris is the fi rst priority, concern should be 
taken for the impact that various kinds of debris will have on the environment and the logisƟ cs 
of handling debris before it reaches a landfi ll”
 San Francisco Recovery Annex, 2010
01
INTRODUCTION
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1.0 Background and Problem Statement
San Francisco is vulnerable to earthquakes as a peninsula city lying on the Pacifi c Rim of Fire. 
This area bordering the Pacifi c Ocean is subject to constant tectonic plate moƟ on resulƟ ng in many of 
the world’s largest earthquakes, including the recent Japan and New Zealand catastrophes. According to 
the United States Geological Survey, the chance of a 6.7 or greater magnitude earthquake hiƫ  ng the Bay 
Area in the next 30 years is about 63%, with a 99% probability of such an earthquake aﬀ ecƟ ng greater 
California.1  
Given this vulnerability, the local governments of San Francisco and the Bay Area have invested 
Ɵ me and eﬀ ort in creaƟ ng preparedness and recovery plans for their respecƟ ve counƟ es. However, liƩ le 
interconnecƟ on has been drawn among debris removal, lifelines, bulk material processing capacity and 
housing refurbishment, presenƟ ng a great weakness in disaster recovery planning. The thesis seeks a 
meta-analyƟ c approach in combining several important plans, reports and invesƟ gaƟ ons to provide a ho-
lisƟ c understanding of post-earthquake repercussions and re-development. A meta-analyƟ cal approach 
synthesizes results of several studies that address related hypotheses in order to understand potenƟ al 
feedback loops in the recovery process for a more sustainable return to pre-disaster condiƟ ons in San 
Francisco.
1.1 MoƟ vaƟ on
Witnessing the string of recent earthquakes on the Pacifi c Rim of Fire and learning from case 
studies has moƟ vated further invesƟ gaƟ on of San Francisco’s preparedness and recovery measures. 
OŌ en, Japan is used as an analogously vulnerable region, suscepƟ ble to earthquakes and tsunamis. 
Japan’s management of the volumes of debris generated by the March 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and 
1  United States Geological Survey, < hƩ p://earthquake.usgs.gov/regional/nca/ucerf/> (accessed May 10, 
2012)
Figure 1A. Pacifi c Rim of Fire
Source: United States Geological 
Survey
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tsunami has made evident the need for greater understanding of San Francisco’s disaster debris manage-
ment protocols. Researchers who have studied disaster waste management have suggested that, “when 
responding to a disaster, [debris] management has emerged as a signifi cant weakness internaƟ onally. 
This is despite solid waste and disaster debris being idenƟ fi ed as the most criƟ cal environmental prob-
lem faced by countries following the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. Waste management is a considerable 
challenge for naƟ onal and local insƟ tuƟ ons during both the rehabilitaƟ on and reconstrucƟ on stages. It is 
important to focus on long-term ecological and economic debris management strategies that are sustain-
able and therefore increase a community’s resilience when facing future hazard events. Thus, it is crucial 
to maximize sustainable environmental values while also minimizing disaster waste generaƟ on. 
This research hopes to elucidate some of the key variables related to debris management and 
housing needs following the next earthquake to aﬀ ect the Bay Area.”2
Preparedness for a large scale earthquake has involved mulƟ ple stakeholders, such as poliƟ cal 
enƟ Ɵ es and non-profi t organizaƟ ons, that are aƩ empƟ ng to fully engage ciƟ zens and inform them of vul-
nerabiliƟ es in the City. Yet preparedness must go beyond tradiƟ onal emergency kits in a household level. 
Instead, a broader dialogue prior to the inevitable must be developed and maintained. This will provide 
San Francisco with a sense of clarity and consensus for reconstrucƟ on in a chaoƟ c post-disaster situa-
Ɵ on. However, dialogue comes with expected complexiƟ es and diﬃ  cult compromises, one of the most 
profound being the decision to rebuild faster versus rebuild beƩ er when aƩ empƟ ng to return to nor-
malcy.  History shows that recovery eﬀ orts are oŌ enƟ mes polarized between speed and quanƟ ty versus 
quality of redevelopment. This research has parƟ cular interest in comprehending potenƟ al reconciliaƟ on 
of recovery quality with recovery speed, using debris management as a primary driver and representa-
Ɵ ve of recovery alternaƟ ves. It by no means provides an overarching statement for complete recovery 
standards, but pushes the noƟ on of the compromises San Francisco will invariably face to inform the City 
of ways in which it can build-back-beƩ er.  
2 PilapiƟ ya et al., 2006; Srinivas and Nakagawa, 2007; Baycan and Petersen, 2002; Mensah, 2006; Blakely, 
2007 as cited by Karunasena et al., Sustainable Post-Disaster Waste Management: ConstrucƟ on and DemoliƟ on 
Debris, (Chichester, West Sussex, UK Ames, Iowa: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 259.
Figure 1.1A. Debris generated by Tohoku Earthquake, 2011. 
Source: M. Arias, 2011
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San Francisco is no stranger to preparedness and miƟ gaƟ on acƟ vity. The City has taken great 
strides in hazard miƟ gaƟ on acƟ vism, and has an impressive number of iniƟ aƟ ves for disaster prepared-
ness, nearing 190 safety projects since the Loma Prieta earthquake in 1989. Along with concern for life 
safety following a potenƟ al disaster, San Francisco’s vigor for environmental protecƟ on and local job 
creaƟ on has helped to achieve the highest recycling rate of any city naƟ onwide – 77% diversion rate as 
of 2010.3 Realizing a general lack of research on best pracƟ ces for disaster debris management in the Bay 
Area, and in conjuncƟ on with San Francisco’s spirit of environmental accountability, the need for innova-
Ɵ ve pracƟ ces in disaster debris treatment has inspired this research.  An objecƟ ve is for the City of San 
Francisco and other similarly vulnerable ciƟ es is to consider disaster debris as more than an impediment 
to recovery, and to tenaciously harness its potenƟ al in rejuvenaƟ ng local economies and populaƟ ons. 
Despite the evident benefi ts of involving mulƟ -parƟ san dialogue for preparedness and recovery 
planning, Olshansky et al. have highlighted the importance of  “local government in facilitaƟ ng a lasƟ ng 
recovery”4 such that democraƟ zed conversaƟ ons can subsequently inform necessary and swiŌ  top-down 
decision making following a disaster. This thesis intends to provide meaningful opƟ ons for disaster and 
reconstrucƟ on management for any city prone to hazards. The hope is that it will allow San Francisco to 
plan with sensiƟ vity to the needs of many, but be able to provide the best soluƟ on for the majority with-
out further damaging its environmental context. Some of the more pressing issues the City must deal 
with are discussed in detail in the following secƟ ons. 
1.1.1 Housing
 As Mary Comerio aﬃ  rms, “urban disasters are always housing disasters.”5 This fact is parƟ cularly 
important for San Francisco as the second most densely populated city in the US, “A major earthquake 
will cause signifi cant damage to the region’s housing. IniƟ ally, displaced residents may stay in their 
homes, even if they are damaged, move in with relaƟ ves or friends in undamaged housing, whether in 
the Bay Area or outside the region, or move to a shelter. UlƟ mately, the return of displaced residents 
to their communiƟ es is criƟ cal to ensuring the long-term viability of the region.”6 Currently, 75% of San 
Francisco’s housing can be used as Shelter-in-place for its residents, with nearly 13,000 residents of a 
total 750,000 needing temporary or interim shelters. San Francisco’s recovery plan Ɵ meline esƟ mates 
that these residents can spend up to 3 years in alternate housing while homes that were completely 
destroyed are replaced. With the assumpƟ on that residents will want to return to their neighborhoods 
and will prefer not to re-locate away from their neighborhoods, schools and jobs, it becomes increasingly 
exigent for San Francisco to repopulate quickly, making housing refurbishment a high priority.
The Community AcƟ on Plan for Seismic Safety (CAPSS) project reports that residenƟ al buildings 
3  City and County of San Francisco, “San Francisco Achieves 77% Landfi ll Diversion Rate, The Highest of Any 
U.S. City, August 30 2010 (accessed November 1, 2011)
4 Olshansky et al., Opportunity in Chaos: Rebuilding AŌ er the 1994 Northridge and 1995 Kobe, Earthquakes, 
Web-Published, 2011, 11-1
5  Comerio, Mary. UCSF, Learning from Japan: One year later, March 2012
6  San Francisco Recovery Annex, 2008, 9-12
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are expected to suﬀ er signifi cant damage following a 6.7+ magnitude earthquake. For this reason, this 
research focuses on damages to residenƟ al housing due to shaking and ground failure, but not including 
impacts from fi re. Although many earthquake scenarios could be examined, a 7.2 magnitude is used as a 
control case because it would produce a level of shaking in many parts of San Francisco that corresponds 
to the level of shaking that the building code requires new structures be designed to resist without major 
structural damage.7 
The Community AcƟ on Plan for Seismic Safety has suggested the following in regards to housing 
condiƟ ons following a large-scale earthquake in San Francisco:
 About 25,000 residenƟ al buildings and 85,000 (74,000 “Repairable, Cannot be Occupied” and 
11,000 “Not Repairable”) residenƟ al units out of a total of San Francisco’s 330,000 total dwelling 
units would not be usable aŌ er the scenario earthquake. 
 Thousands of units would necessitate demoliƟ on, meaning that many people would be displaced 
unƟ l housing is reconstructed.8
Table 1.1.1A explains housing damages aŌ er suﬀ ering a 7.2M shock.
7  Applied Technology Council (ATC), Here Today- Here Tomorrow: The Road to Earthquake Resilience in San 
Francisco, Report 52-1, 2010
8  Ibid, 2010
Table 1.1.1A. Building Damage, San Francisco. Cited from CAPSS Report 52-1, Table 15
ESTIMATED DAMAGE TO CITY’S HOUSING 
FROM 7.2 M SAN ANDREAS SHAKING AND GROUND FAILURE
Type of Housing 
Usable, Light 
Damagea 
Usable, Moderate 
Damagea,b 
Repairable, Cannot 
be Occupieda 
Not Repairablea,c 
No. of 
Bldgs 
No. of 
Dwelling 
Units 
No. of 
Bldgs 
No. of 
Dwelling 
Units 
No. of 
Bldgs 
No. of 
Dwelling 
Units 
No. of 
Bldgs 
No. of 
Dwelling 
Units 
Single-Family 45,000 45,000 54,000 54,000 11,000 11,000 1,700 1,700 
Two unit residences 8,200 16,000 7,400 15,000 3,200 6,400 290 580 
Three or more unit 
residences 7,200 57,000 7,500 59,000 7,200 56,000 1,100 8,400 
Totald 60,000 120,000 69,000 130,000 22,000 74,000 3,000 11,000 
a. Building functionality categorizations are derived from HAZUS® damage states. For more 
information, please see the companion technical volume, Potential Earthquake Impacts: 
Technical Documentation (ATC 52-1A Report). Functionality categories are defined in 
section 3.2.   
b. This level of damage can be referred to as “shelter in place”. 
c. Some of these buildings have collapsed.  Others are standing but damaged beyond 
repair. None can be occupied. 
d. Numbers in table have been rounded, which can make totals differ from sum of columns 
or rows. 
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The type of building determines the characterisƟ c of the debris generated due to structural 
damage. CAPSS has determined that 26% of the housing units cannot be occupied following the 
disaster, with nearly 89% of damaged housing being wood frame residenƟ al construcƟ on resulƟ ng in 
vast quanƟ Ɵ es of woody debris. This data does not include fi res or water damage, and is solely due 
to shaking and ground failure.
 Figure 1.1.1B highlights housing damage by residence type, and illustrates the immense im-
pact on unusable mulƟ -family housing, the largest consƟ tuents of the soŌ -story construcƟ on in San 
Francisco. 9  This provides pressing reason to focus on residenƟ al housing resiliency in the City.
Rebuilding housing is not a linear phase of populaƟ on recovery in a post-disaster context. 
Olshansky et al. describe some variables regarding post-disaster reconstrucƟ on. “These are:
• Property ownership and parcel characterisƟ cs
• Sources and types of fi nancing
• Eﬀ ects of pre-exisƟ ng plans
• InsƟ tuƟ onal framework
• Government intervenƟ on and regulatory framework”10
This abridged list makes evident the mulƟ -factorial and poliƟ cal nature of reconstrucƟ on, 
requiring pre-determined collaboraƟ on and consensus-driven acƟ vity for recovery. The San Francisco 
Regional Emergency CoordinaƟ on Plan proposes logical constraints in such recovery, mainly associ-
ated with compeƟ Ɵ on for housing resources, fi rst responders and insurance adjustors. CompeƟ Ɵ on 
for materials, contractors and other resources will prolong overall reconstrucƟ on as mulƟ ple jurisdic-
Ɵ ons will look to the same sources for private contractors.
9 SoŌ -story and other vulnerable construcƟ on types explained in Chapter 3, Appendix B
10 Olshansky et al., 11-2
Figure 1.1.1B. Breakdown of Unoccupiable Dwelling Units by Structural Type
Cited from CAPSS Report 52-1, Figure 12
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1.1.2 RepopulaƟ on
The quality and speed of recovery is highly dependent on housing refurbishment, which infl u-
ences the repopulaƟ on of the city aŌ er the occurrence of an earthquake. “If most residents can be back 
in their homes quickly aŌ er an earthquake, it would greatly speed all aspects of the city’s recovery. 
Residents would be able to contribute to helping their neighbors and neighborhoods recover, and would 
remain close to their jobs, schools, businesses, and services. On the other hand, if many residences can-
not be occupied for months or years aŌ er an earthquake, neighborhoods would have vacant buildings 
for extended periods, people may permanently relocate to new areas, perhaps outside the city, and the 
neighborhood businesses and services that depend on local customers would suﬀ er.”11 This repopulaƟ on 
issue is sƟ ll being faced by many neighborhoods in New Orleans since Hurricane Katrina in 2005. 
As explained, repopulaƟ on is a funcƟ on of housing renewal, which depends on two factors: the 
quality of the home pre-disaster and the momentum of recovery. If homes are built to withstand heavy 
ground shaking, shelter-in-place can reduce relocaƟ on of residents. Shelter-in-place is defi ned as “a 
resident’s ability to remain in his or her home while it is being repaired aŌ er an earthquake- not just for 
hours or days aŌ er an event, but for the months it may take to get back”12 to pre-earthquake normalcy. 
An eﬀ ecƟ ve recovery can re-shelter households faster, provided that reconstrucƟ on is within a reason-
able number of years. A magnitude 7.2 San Andreas fault scenario is expected to damage 25 Ɵ mes as 
many residences than the Loma Prieta.13 Due to this, CAPSS esƟ mates recovery in San Francisco to take 
upwards of 10 years.14 Case studies suggest that a 10% loss in populaƟ on can be recaptured in 3 years, 
while a 50% loss can be regained in 7 years.15 Therefore, comprehensive disaster planning ensures higher 
probabiliƟ es of repopulaƟ on, further sƟ mulaƟ ng holisƟ c city recovery. 
 There is strong evidence for acceleraƟ on of pre-disaster trends in recovery. Stated diﬀ erently, 
rapidly growing ciƟ es recover rapidly, whereas stable, stagnant or declining ciƟ es recover slowly and 
may even have their decline accelerated.16 For example, New Orleans had gradually been losing popula-
Ɵ on and business preceding the 2005 disaster. The post-Katrina recovery was parƟ cularly arduous likely 
due to the city’s pre-disaster circumstances, and recapturing of displaced residents for neighborhood 
re-planning became especially challenging. Therefore, great iniƟ aƟ ve and eﬀ ort has been taken to draw 
back residents in order to revitalize New Orleans, some neighborhoods being widely successful in this 
endeavor. 
1.1.3 Debris
 As with any natural disaster, including earthquakes, hurricanes, tsunamis, and tornados, a key 
11  ATC 52-1, 40
12 San Francisco Planning and Urban Research AssociaƟ on, Safe Enough to Stay, 2012, 3
13 Comerio and Blecher, EsƟ maƟ ng DownƟ me from Data on ResidenƟ al Buildings aŌ er Northridge and Loma 
Prieta Earthquakes, 2010
14  ATC 52-1, 40
15  Haas and Kates, ReconstrucƟ on Following Disaster, 1977
16 Ibid,  pp. 19
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recovery issue is managing the bulk debris that is generated in the wake of the catastrophic event.  A 
reoccurrence of the 1906 earthquake on the San Andreas Fault would generate 50 million tons of debris 
in the Bay Area, much of it construcƟ on and demoliƟ on debris from damaged structures.17 The California 
AcƟ on Plan for Seismic Safety projects that 6.8 million tons of debris generated in the City and County 
of San Francisco alone, making debris removal in the 46.87 square mile of land criƟ cal for immediate 
response.18 
 A comparison of manmade and natural disasters in Figure 1.1.3A shows the overwhelming 
amounts of debris generated. Since these are raw values and have not been normalized by the square 
areas that are aﬀ ected, a graphic showing the residenƟ al housing debris (amounƟ ng to nearly 3 million 
tons) as placed on the Moscone center parcel in downtown San Francisco is shown in Figure 1.1.3B. The 
debris would reach over 870 feet high, taller than the Transamerica Pyramid, which indicates the severity 
of debris accumulaƟ on in San Francisco, requiring thorough consideraƟ on and planning prior to a disas-
ter.
17  Department of Emergency Services, San Francisco Bay Area Regional CoordinaƟ on Plan, Recovery Annex,
2008, 63
18  ATC 52-1
Figure 1.1.3A. Comparison of Debris by Disaster, 1999-2011
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Figure 1.1.3B. Debris on Moscone Center Parcel, Waste 
CharacterizaƟ on of Debris.
Source: California Integrated Waste Management Board
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 Disaster debris in this research is considered as inert construcƟ on and demoliƟ on debris only, 
although this debris is comprised of other elements as well, such as e-waste and hazardous household 
wastes.19 Blakely describes the phases of disaster debris management as commencing “immediately 
following a disaster and conƟ nues during longer term reconstrucƟ on. The fi rst phase of debris manage-
ment is dedicated to immediate disaster relief and is focused on removing debris from access routes and 
residenƟ al and commercial areas. The second phase of debris management is the long-term removal of 
debris, which assists reconstrucƟ on. In the short term, removal of debris is necessary to facilitate recov-
ery of a geographic area, whereas in the long term, it should not pose future threats to health or envi-
ronment.” Alameda County’s Disaster Waste Management Plan from 1998 highlights “the need to design 
early stage strategies to manage debris in the most environmentally sound manner, through maximizing 
source reducƟ on and recycling opƟ ons while minimizing land disposal.”20 However, even with instated 
plans, debris management is oŌ en weakened by other issues that take precedence immediately follow-
ing a disaster event. 
 In many cases, management of disaster waste is also hindered by lack of preparedness, result-
ing in clean-up delays, cost escalaƟ on, and adverse environmental impacts. Given the magnitude of the 
cleanup eﬀ orts aŌ er the Northridge earthquake in 1994 and the fi res in Oakland in 1991, a clear neces-
sity for having a methodical debris removal operaƟ on exists. According to the California Integrated Waste 
Management Board, “the key to a successful disaster debris management program is advance planning. 
In the aŌ ermath of a disaster, the primary focus is restoring and maintaining public health and safety. 
Consequently, debris diversion programs such as recycling and reuse can quickly become secondary, to 
be established only if there are Ɵ me and staﬀ  to undertake eﬀ ort, if at all. Preparedness will assist the 
State in diverƟ ng signifi cant amounts of valuable materials that would otherwise be disposed of. Further-
more, there will be the added benefi t of preservaƟ on of the State’s landfi ll capacity.”21
 Though preserving landfi ll capacity through material diversion seems to be a logical mode of 
debris removal, challenges exist for Ɵ mely material recovery. “Local governments have idenƟ fi ed tem-
porary storage sites as the primary obstacle in establishing a debris management program. Without the 
ability to stockpile or store the disaster debris unƟ l such Ɵ me as a jurisdicƟ on can turn its aƩ enƟ on to 
processing and markeƟ ng the materials, the debris is probably desƟ ned for the landfi ll. Securing storage 
sites is best done before a disaster so that arrangements, such as leases and permits for the land, can be 
accomplished quickly.”22 Material recovery is only suitable if markets for recycled content products exist, 
otherwise Ɵ me and money spent in reprocessing disaster debris will outweigh its potenƟ al benefi ts. The 
following diagram illustrates post-disaster acƟ viƟ es concerning the recycling and disposal of debris. 
 Figure 1.1.3C illustrates the processes of post-disaster waste management that are generally  ap-
plicable to all earthquake contexts. 
19 More disaster debris waste descripƟ ons in Appendix C
20 Blakely, 2007. As cited by Karunasena et al. 2011, 255
21 California Integrated Waste Management Board, Integrated Waste Management Disaster Plan, 1997, ES 1
22 Ibid, 12
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 Possibly the most important instrument for suﬃ  cient debris diversion rates and material recov-
ery is the environmental regulaƟ ons set by the respecƟ ve city. San Francisco is certainly exemplar for its 
high waste diversion standards, despite the City’s generally high waste per capita. In the aŌ ermath of a 
disaster, the issue of regulaƟ on relaxaƟ on is a great danger to harnessing the potenƟ al of the disaster 
debris. AƩ enƟ on must be paid to include within a debris plan the pre-disaster standard and account-
ability for waste diversion, not to be jeƫ  soned in its enƟ rety following the event. Exaggerated easing of 
the 65% material recovery mandated by the City’s Environmental Code will cause severe environmental 
impacts due to nearsighted and quick emergency phase resoluƟ ons.
1.2 Sustainable CiƟ es in Recovery
Recognizing that sustainable and vital local economies are essenƟ al to healthy recovery, regional 
industries must be diversifi ed and thus less easily disrupted by disasters. A sustainable economy does 
not shiŌ  its externaliƟ es onto another region, nor is it predicated on unlimited populaƟ on growth, high 
consumpƟ on, or dependence on nonrenewable resources. Especially for a disaster scenario, regional, 
naƟ onal and internaƟ onal cooperaƟ on and mechanisms will be needed to ensure that costs are deter-
mined accurately and distributed fairly,23  resulƟ ng in immense poliƟ cal, cultural and social barriers.
 Social processes and decisions lead to unforeseeable vulnerabiliƟ es that have increasingly         
disastrous eﬀ ects when met with environmental hazards. MileƟ  states that the “contemporary per-
23 Ardani et al., 2009
Figure 1.1.3C. Post Disaster AcƟ viƟ es Concerning Recycling and Disposal of Debris
Source: Disaster Planning, Structural Assessment, DemoliƟ on and Recycling, E.K. 
Lauritzen, C. de Pauw, 1994 
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specƟ ve is that recovery is not just a physical outcome but a social process that encompasses decision 
making about restoraƟ on and reconstrucƟ on acƟ viƟ es. This perspecƟ ve highlights how decisions are 
made, who is involved in making them and what consequences those decisions have on the community. 
This approach also stresses the nature, components, and acƟ viƟ es of related and interacƟ ng groups in a 
systemaƟ c process and the fact that diﬀ erent people experience recovery diﬀ erently. Rather than view-
ing recovery as a linear with ‘value-added’ components, this approach views the recovery process as 
probabilisƟ c and recursive.”24  Therefore, decisions made prior to a disaster are inherently linked with the 
outcomes following a disaster, leading to a somewhat cyclical evoluƟ on of hazard communiƟ es. 
The social and health implicaƟ ons of recycling disaster debris are signifi cant and should not 
be diluted. Many communiƟ es that have coped with a catastrophe are hesitant to re-circulate disaster 
debris back into the construcƟ on stream due to psychological, physiological or cultural concerns. For 
this reason, decision making must be community based such that singular, top-down decisions do not 
encumber overall recovery if countered by widespread disapproval.  
1.3 Hypothesis
Debris clearance becomes a great priority in the aŌ ermath of an earthquake, second to life 
safety. How debris is managed lays the foundaƟ on for infrastructure and development paƩ erns. This 
research posits that disaster debris recovery can potenƟ ally supply the majority of the building materi-
als required for reconstrucƟ on, while simultaneously diverƟ ng reusable material from landfi lls. Regional 
reprocessing of disaster debris will also sƟ mulate local economies in producing new materials with the 
benefi ts of self-eﬃ  cacious recovery and environmental protecƟ on. Although San Francisco mandates 
65% of its construcƟ on and demoliƟ on debris to be recovered in all contracted projects, the danger of 
a moratorium on such a mandate following an earthquake would guarantee dumping potenƟ ally use-
ful material. Maintaining such a direcƟ ve and providing incenƟ ves to producers and buyers for recycled 
content building products will create a second life for disaster debris. Reprocessing such material has the 
capability to foster sustainable construcƟ on, to sƟ mulate local industries and refurbish lost housing, but 
not without compromise in housing recovery Ɵ me. Recovery in this research is determined as the refur-
bishment of all 85,000 housing units that are deemed uninhabitable following the earthquake. Housing 
is used as a proxy for overall recovery for this thesis. 
 To test this hypothesis, the study is interested in understanding fl ows of material through San 
Francisco following an earthquake.  Only the eﬀ ects of shaking and liquefacƟ on on residenƟ al single- and 
mulƟ -family housing is considered since these make up the largest percentage of buildings in San Fran-
cisco. Various policies and cases are studied for the amount of waste that is landfi lled versus recovered, 
as well as housing refurbishment Ɵ melines. To reiterate, the material fl ow under examinaƟ on is that of 
construcƟ on and demoliƟ on material only, which is analogous to inert disaster debris.  Figure 1.3A is a 
snapshot of the research scope, with the specifi ed inclusions and exclusions of the thesis scope. 
24  MileƟ , Disasters by Design Disasters by design a reassessment of natural hazards in the United States. 
(Washington, D.C: Joseph Henry Press, 1999) 229-230
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1.4 Lessons from Previous Disasters
Understanding the impacts of historical earthquakes specifi cally in the respecƟ ve of debris 
management provide useful examples and retrospecƟ ve for recovery eﬀ orts following large scale urban 
disasters. 
1.4.1 Northridge Earthquake, California, 1994
 The city of Northridge was impacted with a 6.7 magnitude earthquake on January 17, 1994. 
Los Angeles did not have a pre-disaster debris arrangement plan, and debris was iniƟ ally directed to 
three landfi lls. Within two days of the earthquake, the city contracted waste handlers that were able to 
recover nearly 80% of disaster material.  Following this, and in collaboraƟ on with FEMA, supervising oﬃ  -
cers developed and implemented a recycling program with the capacity to recycle 50% of the earthquake 
debris collected weekly, which totaled over 1.5 million tons by the end of the removal period. However, 
it took approximately one month before the disaster debris began being diverted from the landfi ll to 
recycling faciliƟ es. A year aŌ er the earthquake, the city had remarkably established 18 recycling faciliƟ es 
and reduced the total number of landfi lls from three to one.25 
25 Ardani, Kristen B., Charles C. Reith, C. Josh Donlan. “Harnessing Catastrophe to Promote Resource Recov-
ery and Eco-industrial Development.” Journal of Industrial Ecology (2009): 579-591.
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1.4.2 Japan, 2011
 The earthquake oﬀ  the Pacifi c coast of Tōhoku was a 9.0 magnitude earthquake followed by a 
tsunami with waves that reached up to 40.5 meters.  As of summer 2011, no comprehensive plan to 
dispose of the overwhelming amount of debris existed. At fi rst, the Self Defense Forces assisted with 
the debris removal because the immediate need was search and rescue of possible survivors. Now local 
municipaliƟ es are leŌ  to fi gure out the best way to deal with the piles. Most local governments hope to 
use contractors, funded by the naƟ onal government, to perform the remainder of the debris removal 
and sorƟ ng.
 Iwate Prefecture plans to complete the cleaning, sorƟ ng, and disposal of its disaster debris in the 
next three years. Private land is currently being uƟ lized as temporary sorƟ ng sites for debris; however, 
space is limited, so some of the rubble from this prefecture is being taken by barge to temporary sorƟ ng 
sites in a northern prefecture.26
 Local oﬃ  cials in Japan claim that the disaster debris will be recycled as much as possible. How-
ever, in Fukushima, the debris contaminated by radioacƟ vity has proven to be problemaƟ c for debris 
staging and recycling. Many prefectures are unwilling to stage or process this debris, and radioacƟ vity 
will require complex screening prior to any thought of recycling. 
1.4.3 HaiƟ , 2010
The 7.2 magnitude earthquake that struck HaiƟ  in January 2010 accumulated nearly 10 million 
metric tons of debris mainly due to non-engineered structures. With a land area of just less than 11,000 
square miles, roughly the size of Maryland, and a populaƟ on of 10 million, the populaƟ on density in 
HaiƟ  is high. As a result, studies believe that landfi lling this volume of debris is nearly impossible. This 
debris has created a logjam in reconstrucƟ on, since land cannot be cleared, and streets are obstructed. 
Research at Georgia Tech University recommends that the Government of HaiƟ  consider the benefi t of 
recycling rubble debris as aggregate for concrete structures, ensuring systemaƟ c recovery of material 
and the “building-back-beƩ er” of Port-au-Prince.27
1.4.4 New Orleans
 Hurricane Katrina’s damage to New Orleans resulted in a signifi cant increase in the amount of 
waste fl owing into New Orleans East, resulƟ ng in nearly 22 million tons of debris. Due to the intensity 
of the fl ooding and the severity of housing damage, material recovery could not be expedited as in an 
earthquake scenario since search and rescue operaƟ ons lasted weeks. Combined with the lack of a com-
prehensive disaster debris management plan, mountains of debris had lined the streets of New Orleans. 
Quick decision making opened two new landfi lls in eastern New Orleans, which subsequently received 
38 million cubic yards of debris, enough to fi ll the Superdome three Ɵ mes. In addiƟ on, environmental 
26  Earthquake Engineering Research InsƟ tute, The March 11, 2011, Great East Japan (Tōhoku) Earthquake 
and Tsunami: Societal Dimensions, August 2011
27  American Ceramic Society, Vol. 90, No. 1, Breaking the ReconstrucƟ on Logjam, March 2011
 29
regulaƟ ons limiƟ ng and restricƟ ng landfi lling of hazardous materials were relaxed in the days and weeks 
aŌ er the Hurricane, incenƟ vizing contractors to dump as much material as possible.  
 Table 1.4A summarizes the housing loss and damages incurred in these and other disaster struck 
ciƟ es. 
In hindsight, the low recovery of material can be aƩ ributed to poor staging of disaster debris. 
“The New Orleans long-term rebuilding eﬀ ort was likely impeded by the failure to sort staged materials 
throughout the immediate disaster relief phase of the debris management program. Immediate debris 
management eﬀ orts included 343 large staging sites around the metropolitan area. However, those sites 
failed to separate recyclable materials suitable for use in reconstrucƟ on eﬀ orts,”28 leading to high rates of 
landfi ll dumping. 
 This case provides an interesƟ ng insight on debris management that provides a short-term, and 
oŌ enƟ mes, the ostensibly best pracƟ ce soluƟ on- landfi ll dumping. Ardani et al. argue that New Orleans 
missed an opportunity to capitalize on a resource recovery program and to establish eco-industrial rela-
Ɵ onships, both of which could have resulted in new jobs and environmental improvement. Eco-industrial 
planning is the “matchmaking of adjacent industries around shared or exchanged resources, which 
results in job creaƟ on and fosters a more diversifi ed web of enterprises to facilitate rapid and eﬃ  cient 
recovery from future disasters.”29 30 
 Disasters oŌ en present opportuniƟ es to increase a region’s recycling acƟ vity and advance eco-
industrial development by creaƟ ng secondary materials. Although opportuniƟ es for debris diversion and 
recycling are typically limited throughout the immediate aŌ ermath of a disaster, later phases of disaster 
recovery present enhanced prospects for material reuse. With adequate pre-planning and community 
based dialogue, San Francisco can set up eco-industrial partnerships with local foundries, lumber manu-
facturers and waste contractors to ensure appropriate salvaging and recovery of inert debris material 
28  March and Wiley, 2007, as cited by Ardani et al., 2009
29 Ardani, Kristen B., Charles C. Reith, C. Josh Donlan. “Harnessing Catastrophe to Promote Resource Recov-
ery and Eco-industrial Development.” Journal of Industrial Ecology (2009): 579-591.
30  Deutz and Gibbs, 2004, as cited by Ardani et al., 2009
Hurricane 
Katrina (2005) China (2008) Hai  (2010) Chile (2010)
New Zealand 
(2010-11) Japan (2011)
Damage 
Value $80B to $150B $150B $12B $30B $40B
Housing 
Units Lost 400,000 5 million 300,000 200,000 10,000
190,000 plus 
radia on area 
evacua on
$300B
HOUSING LOSS AND DAMAGE ESTIMATES
Table 1.4A. Comparison of Debris by Disaster, 1999-2011, Adapted from Comerio, 
PEER Research Center, The Great East Japan Earthquake and Disasters: One Year Later, 
UCSF, March 19 2012
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such that landfi lling becomes the last opƟ on and not a primary, rapid-acƟ on soluƟ on. 
 The cases described can provide promising lessons for other ciƟ es and communiƟ es facing 
similar hazards from natural events. The diﬃ  culty is in applying a tacƟ c or methodology of miƟ gaƟ on, 
emergency management, or recovery planning from one locale to the next. One of the major setbacks 
in comparing vulnerable ciƟ es is that the contexts of each disaster is conƟ ngent on enough factors that 
it cannot provide a one to one example for another context. Local government structures, economic 
states, social and housing condiƟ ons as well as execuƟ on of recovery can vary dramaƟ cally, someƟ mes 
within the same country. In this way, it is useful to recognize the isolated issues communiƟ es face when 
exposed to a disaster, but great cauƟ on must be taken in implemenƟ ng or avoiding the strategies of one 
municipality to another. Previous cases can enable comparability to current situaƟ ons with integrated 
analyses through methods of non-linear understandings of certain cause and eﬀ ects through applicaƟ on 
of an industrial ecological perspecƟ ve. 
1.5 Industrial Ecology
 Housing refurbishment and debris recovery operaƟ ons as a material fl ow analyses can be de-
scribed as a study of industrial ecology, which is defi ned as a “concept in which an industrial system is 
viewed not in isolaƟ on from its surrounding systems but in concert with them. Industrial ecology seeks 
to opƟ mize the total materials cycled from virgin material to fi nished material, to component, to prod-
uct, to waste product, and to ulƟ mate disposal.”31 The approach strives to understand the lifecycle of 
products or materials as in a natural ecosystem in order to develop methods to restructure economies 
into a sustainable system.32 This report takes approaches of industrial ecology in dissecƟ ng a quesƟ on of 
urban sustainability following a signifi cant disaster that derails its normal funcƟ oning. Therefore, prin-
ciples of industrial ecology push for the use of a material fl ow analysis in the following ways:
• Controlling pathways for materials use and industrial processes
• CreaƟ ng loop-closing industrial pracƟ ces
• Dematerializing industrial output
• SystemaƟ zing paƩ erns of energy use
• Balancing industrial input and output to natural ecosystem capacity
The results of a material fl ow analysis reveal the most important processes during the life cycle 
of a material in its economy and environment for interconnecƟ ons between variables or factors. Such 
analyses is able to show losses to the environment as fi nal sinks with mapping of recycling loops. Mate-
rial fl ow analysis in the context of an urban metabolism describes the transfer, storage, and transforma-
Ɵ on of materials within the system and the exchange of materials with its environment. Metabolism can 
be applied to anthropogenic systems to invesƟ gate and evaluate material balances of complex urban 
31  Jelinski et al. Industrial Ecology: Concepts and Approaches, (AT&T Bell Laboratories, Murray Hill, NJ), 1994
32  Brunner, P and H. Rechberger, A PracƟ cal Handbook of Material Flow Analysis, (Boca Raton, FL: CRC/
Lewis, 2004)
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condiƟ ons.33
AŌ er numerous disasters in the Pacifi c Coast, resulƟ ng in great volumes of debris, emergency 
management must consider the need for a systems approach to debris handling. Fields that address ur-
ban sustainability have generally understudied the parƟ cular environmental and resource consequences 
of disasters, an area in which tools of material fl ow and Life Cycle Analyses could be applied more di-
rectly to the issues that arise as a result of disasters. Therefore, a systemaƟ zed approach emphasizes the 
interdependency and connecƟ vity of all aspects of debris management, and the circularity of seemingly 
disparate variables. A system based material fl ow analysis within an urban context can unpack complexi-
Ɵ es and reveal behaviors of infl uenƟ al factors leading up to and following a disaster. This approach has 
moƟ vated the methodology of this study, and is explained in the following chapter. 
33 Ibid
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SYSTEM DYNAMICS FOR POST-DISASTER MATERIAL FLOW ANALYSIS
Impacts of an Earthquake, Chiang and Jin, 1994
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2.0 Research Methodology 
This chapter overviews the applicaƟ on of System Dynamics methodology. The fi rst secƟ on intro-
duces key concepts in systems theory and the following subsecƟ ons illustrate the topic with examples of 
debris management as part of a broader disaster debris recycling model. 
2.1 System Dynamics 
System dynamics is a methodological approach to policy analysis and design, applicable to com-
plex social, managerial, economic or ecological systems. It is most eﬀ ecƟ vely applied to mulƟ -variable 
scenarios characterized by interdependence, mutual interacƟ on, informaƟ on feedback, and circular 
causality.1  System dynamics can assist in strategy assessment and provides insights into possible changes 
in the system during policy implementaƟ on.2 This theory is best applied to a quesƟ on about the behavior 
of a system rather than an eﬀ ort to model the enƟ re system; therefore, delineaƟ ng a defi ned boundary 
of the quesƟ on in concern is essenƟ al. 
 The methods of systems thinking provides tools for beƩ er understanding of complicated prob-
lems or situaƟ ons, and requires looking away from isolated events and their causes to examine the 
scenario as a system made of interacƟ ng parts.3 Given the various components infl uencing post-disaster 
recovery, a systems analysis is an apposite means of invesƟ gaƟ ng potenƟ al outcomes in a defi ned Ɵ me 
frame. 
 The system dynamics approach involves:
 “Defi ning problems dynamically, in terms of graphs over Ɵ me.
 Striving for an endogenous [internal], behavioral view of the signifi cant dynamics of a system, 
a focus inward on the characterisƟ cs of a system that themselves generate or exacerbate the 
perceived problem. 
 IdenƟ fying independent stocks or accumulaƟ ons (levels) in the system and their infl ows and 
ouƞ lows (rates).
 Deriving understandings and applicable policy insights from the resulƟ ng model. 
 ImplemenƟ ng changes resulƟ ng from model-based understandings and insights.”4 
2.1.1 Feedback Loops and Causal Loop Diagrams
 Each system is made of elements that make up the whole. These elements form relaƟ onships 
that go beyond linear cause-and-eﬀ ect chains, instead within a system involving circular chains of 
cause-and-eﬀ ect. When an element of a system indirectly infl uences itself, the porƟ on of the system 
1 “Overview” <www.Systemdynamics.org> (accessed November 8, 2011)
2 Sterman, John. Business dynamics : systems thinking and modeling for a complex world. Boston: Irwin/
McGraw-Hill, 2000.
3 Kirkwood, Craig W. “System Dynamics Methods: A Quick IntroducƟ on.” (College of Business, Arizona State 
University, 2010), 1-5
4 Systemdynamics.org
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involved is called a feedback loop or a causal loop. Feedback is defi ned as the transmission and return 
of informaƟ on,5 and a feedback loop is a closed sequence of causes and eﬀ ects, that is, a closed path of 
acƟ on and informaƟ on.6  Feedback structures oŌ en explain causes of system behavior, and are key in 
understanding circularity within the system. 
 To map feedback systems, a causal loop diagram (CLD) is a starƟ ng point for analyzing what may 
cause a parƟ cular paƩ ern of behavior. This diagram includes elements and arrows, called causal links, 
which connects the elements together using a sign (+ or -) on each link. 
 These signs have the following meanings:
 + : A causal link from one element A to another element B is posiƟ ve. If either (a) A adds to B or (b) 
a change in A produces a change in B in the same direcƟ on. 
 - : A causal link from one element A to another element B is negaƟ ve if either (a) A subtracts from B 
or (b) a change in A produces a change in B in the opposite direcƟ on.
 In addiƟ on to the signs on each link, a complete loop is also given a sign. The sign for a parƟ cular 
loop is determined by counƟ ng the number of minus signs on all the links that make up the loop. Specifi -
cally,
 A feedback loop is posiƟ ve, or reinforcing, if it contains an even number of negaƟ ve 
causal links
 A feedback loop is called negaƟ ve, or balancing, if it contains an odd number of negaƟ ve 
causal links
A posiƟ ve, or reinforcing, feedback loop reinforces change with even more change, and can lead 
to rapid exponenƟ al growth.  As growth speeds up, it may become diﬃ  cult to solve the problem this 
growth is creaƟ ng. Some examples that fall under this category include polluƟ on and populaƟ on growth. 
PosiƟ ve feedback loops are called vicious or virtuous cycles, depending on the nature of the change that 
is occurring. 
5 Richardson, George and Alexander Pugh. IntroducƟ on to system dynamics modeling. (Waltham, MA: Pega-
sus CommunicaƟ ons, 1981) 
6  Ibid
Figure 2.1.1A. Causal Loop Diagram Example, Balancing and Reinforcing Loops
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A negaƟ ve, or balancing, feedback loop seeks a goal. If the current level of the variable of inter-
est is above the goal, then the loop structure pushes its value down, while if the current level is below 
the goal, the loop structure pushes it up. Typically, outcomes of balancing loops show oscillaƟ ng behav-
ior, by overshooƟ ng then recovering to goal levels.7 
Figure 2.1.1A8 is an example of a causal loop diagram with both a reinforcing and balancing 
loop. This example shows a basic understanding of problem solving. Fixing a problem ideally reduces or 
removes the problem, creaƟ ng a goal seeking balancing loop, “B1.” In aƩ empts to solve a problem, un-
foreseen consequences may actually reinforce the problem, aŌ er some delay in Ɵ me, shown by “R2” in 
the model. In this example, the reinforcing feedback loop of unforeseen consequences creates a vicious 
cycle that may lead to more problems iniƟ ally, but with some Ɵ me steps, a shiŌ  of polarity may cause 
the balancing loop to take eﬀ ect and lead the goal in miƟ gaƟ ng problems. This combinaƟ on produces an 
s-shaped paƩ ern of behavior in the system.9 
2.1.2 Endogenous and Exogenous Variables
 The concept of endogenous (internal) change is fundamental to the system dynamics approach, 
and dictates how the model is formulated. Exogenous (external) disturbances to the system are seen 
as triggers of system behavior, like the displacement a pendulum. The causes that are contained within 
the structure of the system itself (such as the interacƟ on of a pendulum’s posiƟ on and momentum that 
produces oscillaƟ ons). 
7 Kirkwood, 1-5
8 Adapted from Wikimedia Commons, Author Svarnyp
9 See Appendix A
Figure 2.1.2A. Endogenous System
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 Those aspects that arise from relaƟ onships within the system itself uncover paƩ erns of behavior 
when provoked by an external, exogenous force. Therefore, policy levers signifi cantly aﬀ ect endogenous 
perspecƟ ves. Figure 2.1.2A10 is an example of an endogenous system, whereby nearly all factors are 
infl uencing each other and creaƟ ng a complex web of interdependencies.
 Figure 2.1.2B shows an exogenous system, where outside forces are infl uencing landfi ll accu-
mulaƟ on. It is important to note that exogenous variables are relaƟ ve to the invesƟ gator’s defi niƟ on of 
system boundary. A fi guraƟ ve line must be drawn between the landfi ll accumulaƟ on and Ɵ pping fees 
such that the fees are not circularly aﬀ ected by the landfi ll. In reality, this may not be the case; it may be 
possible that as landfi ll space is nearing its limits, Ɵ pping fees may subsequently increase. However, the 
model builder decided that this is a one way eﬀ ect, naming Ɵ pping fees, trucks and populaƟ on as exog-
enous variables. 
 An endogenous model aﬀ ected by an earthquake can have numerous repercussions, oŌ enƟ mes 
leading to arduous  modes of recovery. A conceptual causal loop model by Chiang and Jin in Figure 
2.1.2C11 shows the web-like nature of post-disaster scenarios, with mulƟ ple variables aiming to correct to 
a predetermined recovery goal state.
2.1.3 Stock and Flow Structures 
 Stocks are considered levels and the fl ows, or rate per unit Ɵ me, that aﬀ ect them are essenƟ al 
components of systems structure. A map of causal infl uences and feedback loops is not enough to deter-
mine the dynamic behavior of a system. A constant infl ow yields a linearly rising stock and a linearly ris-
ing stock creates a system behaving parabolically. Stocks are accumulaƟ ons and provide snapshots of the 
state of the system at any given Ɵ me period being examined. Figure 2.1.3A shows a simplifi ed example 
of a stock and fl ow structure relevant to this research.
10 “A Model for Cost-Benefi t Analysis of ConstrucƟ on and DemoliƟ on Waste Management Throughout the 
Waste Chain”, Resources, ConservaƟ on and Recycling Volume 55, Issue 6, April 2011, pp. 604-612
11 Ho, Yufeng, Chienhao Lu and Hsiao-Lin Wang. Dynamic model for earthquake disaster prevenƟ on system: a 
case study of Taichung City, Taiwan. Thesis. Taichung, (Taiwan: Graduate School of Architecture and Urban Design, 
2006), 1-23
Landfill
Accumulation
Population
Tipping Fees
Diversion
Trucks
Neighboring
Landfills Recycling
-
+ -
-
+-
Figure 2.1.2B. Exogenous System
 39
 The infl ow to “Debris AccumulaƟ on”, whether it be increased populaƟ on or increased construc-
Ɵ on and demoliƟ on work, for example, is aﬀ ected by an exogenous factor. This infl ow increases the 
“Debris AccumulaƟ on” stock while the ouƞ low decreases it. A possible infl ow could be construcƟ on and 
demoliƟ on debris rates, while an ouƞ low could be landfi lling or salvaging debris on site. 
 The ouƞ low creates a feedback loop with an endogenous variable aﬀ ecƟ ng the ouƞ low. As is 
noted, endogenous variables arise from within the system (in this case, from the stock “Debris Accumu-
lated”) and infl uence the system through internal relaƟ onships (the ouƞ low rate). An example in this 
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case would be a transfer rate of material based on the total accumulaƟ on aﬀ ecƟ ng ouƞ low. An exog-
enous variable in this case would be an external eﬀ ect, such as an earthquake, infl uencing total infl ow 
rates. The clouds represent an infi nite source or sink of values and material. 
2.1.4 Delays
 A material delay is a delay in physical fl ow, while an informaƟ on delay is a delay in percepƟ on. 
Material delays are perƟ nent to understanding material fl ow following a disaster, and have large impli-
caƟ ons on recovery Ɵ mes. A fi rst order delay is one that involves a single stock aﬀ ecƟ ng a fl ow which 
is dually infl uenced by a delay Ɵ me. For example, in the diagram below (Figure 2.1.4A) “Landfi ll” stock 
accumulaƟ on is aﬀ ected by ouƞ low, which is postponed by a fi rst-order delay of “Debris AccumulaƟ on.” 
The ouƞ low is calculated by dividing “Debris AccumulaƟ on” by the Delay Ɵ me.
  
 The graphical behavior shows a slow exponenƟ al growth of landfi lled material since there is no 
ouƞ low from this stock. If for any reason the delay Ɵ me is increased, or the “Debris Accumulated” is 
decreased, the overall ouƞ low leading to “Landfi ll” will reduce in rate. This is shown in Figure 2.1.4B; the 
decreased ouƞ low with greater delay (red) causes a slower landfi ll accumulaƟ on than a higher ouƞ low 
rate (blue). 
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2.1.5 System Dynamics for Recovery Analysis 
 Few studies have used system dynamics to evaluate post-disaster environmental and social sys-
tems for recovering communiƟ es, either in the emergency phase or in long-term development. However, 
systems models are becoming increasingly valuable for understanding complicated post-disaster contexts 
and behavior of factors. Every system modeler must create a specifi ed boundary because the eﬀ ort is 
meant to model a quesƟ on, or scenario, rather than modeling the full system. The scope should focus on 
several feasible aspects rather than aƩ empƟ ng to model the enƟ rety of the situaƟ on.  
 Disaster recovery research has explained the uƟ lity of applying system dynamics to condiƟ ons of 
reconstrucƟ on. “Systems theory relies on the idea that several sectors, or systems, interact to produce a 
disaster event. For disasters, three systems emerge as important: the built, physical and human systems. 
A misfi t of these sectors will result in stronger possibiliƟ es for damage. From a systems perspecƟ ve, 
disasters occur when the connecƟ ons among the natural, built, and human systems are disrupted. How 
we rebuild our physical environment to withstand such hazards maƩ ers. Equally important, we must 
connect the physical environment with the potenƟ al human and environmental impacts.” Figure 2.1.5A 
illustrates this phenomenon. 
 Past researchers that have pursued dynamic modeling of post-disaster scenarios have been able 
present policy analyses miƟ gaƟ ng post-disaster eﬀ ects of an encountered hazard. InvesƟ gaƟ ons follow-
ing the 2003, 6.7 magnitude earthquake which struck the city of Bam in southeastern Iran are interested 
in dynamic behavior of disaster management in the country. Ramezankhani and Najafi yazdi12 conducted 
the fi rst dynamic analysis of disaster management in Iran, focusing on several factors following an earth-
quake that lead to the demise of nearly 45,000 inhabitants.13 The research considered eight block cases, 
each with its own dynamic model, and all interrelated in the post-earthquake scenario. Figure 2.1.5B dia-
grams the feedback structure between the eight cases in quesƟ on. Importantly, this work focuses heavily 
on post-disaster emergency relief and humanitarian logisƟ cs, and posits useful management goals by 
comparing original-case and a best-case scenario.
12  Ramezankhani, Atefe and Najafi yazdi, Mostafa. “A System Dynamics Approach on Post-Disaster Man-
agement: A Case Study of Bam Earthquake.” (InternaƟ onal Conference of the System Dynamics Society. Athens, 
Greece, 2008), 1-34
13 Ibid 2
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Figure 2.1.5A. Systems Theory for Disaster Recovery
Source: Phillips, Adapted from Figure 21
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 Another related research is that on the Taichung City earthquake in Taiwan conducted by Ho, Lu 
and Wang, a 7.3M quake that occurred in 1999. This work also pursues a mulƟ -level simulaƟ on with sev-
eral subsystems linked in an intricate feedback structure to gain insight on an urban disaster prevenƟ on 
system in Taiwan. InteresƟ ngly, debris management is menƟ oned topically and is included in the broader 
“Environmental ProtecƟ on” subsystem.14 The authors are interested in understanding eﬀ ects of debris 
from damaged buildings as a consƟ tuent of polluƟ on to the water resources in Taichung City, and map 
the refuse and water streams simultaneously to test outcomes. 
Post-disaster reconstrucƟ on is complex to understand mainly because accurate esƟ maƟ on of 
reconstrucƟ on processes and materials are diﬃ  cult to ascertain. Quinn appropriately uses systems 
methodology to idenƟ fy the material, labor and energy infl ows required to restore housing in New 
Orleans aŌ er Hurricane Katrina devastated the city in 2005.15 This research explores a full life cycle ap-
proach of housing construcƟ on to destrucƟ on in order to analyze resource requirements for rebuilding 
New Orleans. ParƟ cularly valuable for this study are the observaƟ ons on demoliƟ on and deconstrucƟ on 
strategies, housing construcƟ on processes and landfi ll Ɵ pping policies, which are befi ƫ  ng precedence in 
providing similar analyses to San Francisco. 
Though this research uƟ lizes methodologies of previous studies on systemaƟ c disaster analysis, 
it departs from them in its projecƟ on of San Francisco’s recovery for an earthquake that has yet to hap-
pen, with over 63% chance of it occurring within the next three decades. The benefi t is the applicaƟ on of 
results to anƟ cipatory planning by lending itself to disaster managers for improved preparedness.  
2.2 Modeling an Earthquake in San Francisco
Every system dynamics model begins with a causal loop diagram (CLD) with a defi ned boundary. 
The driving CLD for this research (Figure 2.2A) illustrates factors that infl uence housing demand, which 
eﬀ ectually circle around to increase demand for housing. For example, an external force of a disaster 
14 Ho, Lu and Wang, 2006 
15 Quinn, David. Modeling the Resource ConsumpƟ on of Housing in New Orleans using System Dynamics.
(Cambridge: MassachuseƩ s Insitute of Technology, 2008)
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will presumably hurt housing stock, increasing demand for new housing. Subsequently, a push towards 
reconstrucƟ on will require more material, increasing material needs as housing is reconstructed, a 
desire to build back communiƟ es and housing in an improved manner will again relate back to housing 
demand. This reinforcing loop would be considered virtuous in the way it has been described, but could 
also work in the opposite direcƟ on, decreasing housing demand if no exogenous factors are inciƟ ng the 
system. Each variable within has its own eﬀ ecƟ ve variables, causing greater complexity in the model. 
For example, “Housing Stock” in Figure 2.2A will have components of construcƟ on rate and delays that 
impinge on the “virtuosity” of this cycle. 
 Focusing mainly on the factors of housing stock and material consumpƟ on, two stock and fl ow 
models have been generated respecƟ vely and connected via causal links, shown in Figure 2.2B. This 
dynamic model seeks to test the implicaƟ ons of reprocessing disaster debris material as new material for 
construcƟ on of a weakened housing stock, specifi cally in terms of overall delays and accumulaƟ ons. The 
housing stock model diagrams housing unit construcƟ on to end-of-life streams, where the material fl ow 
Figure 2.2A. Research Causal Loop Diagram
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model specifi cally monitors construcƟ on and demoliƟ on waste streams in San Francisco, under which di-
saster debris will be included. The connectors between the seemingly independent streams link destruc-
Ɵ on of housing to construcƟ on and demoliƟ on debris generated, and recycled content product materials 
being sold as construcƟ on materials for refurbishing homes. The earthquake impulse is the consequen-
Ɵ al exogenous factor sƟ mulaƟ ng this housing recovery reinforcing loop.
 A comprehensive model will be explained in Chapter 4, including all infl uencing variables and 
more detailed descripƟ ons of important stock and fl ow structures. 
2.3 Debris Management
The Rio DeclaraƟ on of 1992 described the environmental challenges for the 21st century, im-
ploring that disaster waste be managed according to principles of best available technologies and not 
incure excessing costs. Related to this, Lauritzen comments on debris handling by staƟ ng that,  “it is very 
important to remember that emergency acƟ on and short term acƟ viƟ es based on rapid reacƟ ons might 
not comply with long term consideraƟ on and environmental policies. In parƟ cular, uncontrolled handling 
and mixing of wastes can be very diﬃ  cult to sort out later”16  Therefore, pre-disaster planning for post-
disaster debris management becomes a fundamental condiƟ on of overall recovery and environmental 
protecƟ on. Many classes of issues exist in disaster planning, making it a convoluted and oŌ enƟ mes un-
predictable aspect of disaster planning. Debris management is greatly predicated on the type of disaster 
and the urban fabric of the suscepƟ ble city, along with other factors further complicaƟ ng maƩ ers. The 
Community AcƟ on Plan for Seismic Safety esƟ mates 14 years of rouƟ ne solid waste management to clear 
the debris generated from one 7.2 magnitude earthquake.17 The following subsecƟ ons describe compo-
nents that infl uence disaster debris management and recyclability. 
2.3.1 Emergency DemoliƟ on
 “In the emergency phase immediately aŌ er an earthquake, all eﬀ orts are concentrated on rescu-
ing lives, knowing that persons may survive up to 7 days and nights trapped in ruins. It becomes neces-
sary to choose the demoliƟ on methods that are rapid to eﬀ ecƟ vely rescue people. On the other hand, 
care should be taken that no future uncontrolled collapse is provoked, thus increasing risk to trapped 
people. It is recommended that local authoriƟ es make long-term strategies for the disposal of all wastes, 
including wastes from the emergency demoliƟ ons. If waste streams are not planned and controlled 
iniƟ ally, a number of problems will arise later in reconstrucƟ on and much eﬀ ort will be expended on 
moving waste from one locaƟ on to the next.”18 19 
2.3.2 TransportaƟ on 
 The movement of emergency vehicles, equipment for debris removal, and collected debris is a 
16 Lauritzen, E.K. “Emergency ConstrucƟ on Waste Management .” (Safety Science, 1998: 45-53., 1998), 52
17 ATC 52-1, 2010
18 Ibid, 50-52
19  Appendix C for more informaƟ on on waste management
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pressing issue proceeding a disaster. According to the Associated Bay Area Governments, traﬃ  c in San 
Francisco was paralyzed for three months following the Loma Prieta earthquake. Personal travel will cer-
tainly be aﬀ ected following a disaster, but the movement of freight will be a major issue for an eﬃ  cient 
and Ɵ mely recovery operaƟ on. IdenƟ fying the type of debris generated may aid in prioriƟ zing this trans-
port. While inert C&D debris are the direct result of an earthquake, the indirect wastes such as spoilage 
of foodstuﬀ s and generaƟ on of waste at the response sites may become a high priority to ensure public 
health. Variables that must be evaluated in assessing transport opƟ ons include the amount of debris 
generated, damaged infrastructure, region, land use and the type of debris generated. In understanding 
these variables and the resources required to remove debris, landfi ll and recycling facility capaciƟ es as 
well as hauling Ɵ mes should be determined.20 
 “The greatest transportaƟ on issue will be mobility in terms of road outages and boƩ lenecks 
which will encumber debris removal. In most cases, Ɵ mely debris removal is accomplished by transport-
ing the collected material to a temporary storage site where separaƟ on operaƟ ons may or may not take 
place and then to a recycling or disposal site. While this may be the most eﬃ  cient for quick removal of 
debris, it is not as cost eﬀ ecƟ ve as direct transport from the point of collecƟ on to the recycling or dis-
20  Reinhart, 16-28
Figure 2.3.2A. Windshield Survey Priority Lifelines, San Francisco
Source: Disaster Debris Management Plan, San Francisco, 2010
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posal site.”21 A thorough explanaƟ on of debris processing is described in SecƟ on 2.5.  
 The Debris Management Plan for San Francisco has delineated the following lifelines map (Figure 
2.3.2A) for primary, secondary and terƟ ary roads required for accessing criƟ cal points in the city. These 
indicate the priority of road clearance.22 
2.3.3 Case Studies of Disaster Debris Recycling 
 Reports on debris removal following Hurricane Andrew in South Florida which struck in 1992 
have shed light on problems of waste hauling and dumping logisƟ cs.23 Area landfi lls reached permit-
ted capaciƟ es and the operaƟ on of eighty burn sites was chosen over opening more landfi lls. This was 
implemented in aƩ empts to avoid the landfi ll crisis created in North Carolina by Hurricane Hugo where 
14 years worth of waste was landfi lled during the cleanup eﬀ orts.24 
 Los Angeles is another case where proacƟ ve recycling operaƟ ons were conducted by Hayden 
Brother Engineering following the Northridge earthquake in 1994. Coke describes the bold eﬀ orts in 
recovering material through quick and eﬀ ecƟ ve decision making aŌ er the disaster, and incenƟ vizing con-
tracts for debris recovery:
“The contract required that 80% of the debris processed be recycled. It sƟ pulated a base rate of $25/ton 
of earthquake debris with provisions to pay $27/ton for achieving a 90% recovery rate. The contract fur-
ther specifi ed recovery of specifi c items, including dirt, yard waste, metals, concrete block and wood. The 
Los Angeles SanitaƟ on District uƟ lized the dirt, crushed concrete, and yard waste at the landfi ll while the 
contractor must market the remaining materials. During the startup phase, the operaƟ on was able to pro-
cess 500 tons per day and eventually reached a 1500 tons per day processing rate with consistent recovery 
rates of over 90%. During the fi rst six months of operaƟ on, an average recovery rate of 93% was recorded 
with the diversion of 554 tons of metal, 1911 tons of wood, 47,437 tons of dirt, 41,873 tons of concrete, 
1,532 tons of green waste and 31 tons of cardboard.”25 
 These case studies provide important lessons on waste management for San Francisco, 
including economic incenƟ ves, environmental concerns, and supply-driven contracƟ ng. The following 
secƟ on further examines disaster debris recycling and potenƟ al values from material recovery in the 
aŌ ermath of a disaster. 
2.4 Disaster Debris Recycling
 Though disaster debris recycling is the environmentally responsible approach in managing build-
ing debris following an earthquake, its viability depends on several factors:
21  Reinhart, 27
22 City and County of San Francisco, Public Works and Engineering Annex. Appendix B: Disaster Debris Man-
agement Plan. (San Francisco: City and County of San Francisco, 2010)
23  Donovan 1992 as cited by Reinhart,11
24  Reinhart, 11
25  Coke, 1995 as cited by Reinhart, 15
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 “The existence of established local debris processors and infrastructure
 The exisƟ ng recycling programs and reducƟ on strategies
 The distance between the disaster area and the debris processors and infrastructure
 Market demand for debris on a product basis
 The quality of the debris, which is a funcƟ on of the type of disaster, demoliƟ on tech-
niques and handling
 Local re-usability and recycling  policies, especially for parƟ cular material specifi caƟ ons
 The sorƟ ng faciliƟ es or the ability to provide separate collecƟ on and transportaƟ on from 
non-inert debris.” 26
 Processing prior to recycling of debris includes de-nailing and chipping for wood, removal of 
mortar for bricks, crushing for concrete, and grinding for gypsum. More in-depth descripƟ ons of  debris 
processing can be found in the Appendix C. Prior to processing, it is necessary to screen the material for 
hazardous household waste or other non-recyclable products such as asbestos. Other types of debris to 
be screened are vegetaƟ ve debris, putrescible waste and e-wastes, to name a few. This report treats di-
saster debris as analogous to construcƟ on and demoliƟ on debris, and therefore excludes the previously 
menƟ oned debris since they cannot be easily recycled, and must be treated in other ways when aƩ empt-
ing disposal. 
 Not all disasters produce the same class of debris. Hurricane debris is diﬀ erent from earthquake 
debris (excluding confl agraƟ on) since the former is typically adulterated by water deposits, which tend to 
cause bacteria growth rendering much of the debris non-recyclable. Earthquake debris is primarily inert 
debris such as concrete and steel, and heavily resembles construcƟ on and demoliƟ on wastes.27 
2.4.1 Landfi lls
 “The most common pracƟ ce for disposing of disaster waste is using landfi ll. Although landfi lling 
might be warranted immediately following a disaster, conƟ nued use of landfi lls throughout the recon-
strucƟ on period exacerbates environmental hazards such as methane generaƟ on and ground water 
contaminaƟ on. Landfi lls can oŌ en hinder sustainable development and cause signifi cant economic and 
environmental damage. Despite these warnings, most construcƟ on and demoliƟ on waste goes to land-
fi lls, thereby increasing the burden on landfi ll loading and operaƟ ons.”28  
“Although landfi ll capacity is available naƟ onwide, specifi c areas report problems with the lifespans of 
their landfi lls. The total number of landfi lls appears to have declined in recent years. Disasters can claim 
that life span overnight. Thus, careful use of permanent landfi lls has to be ensured so that disaster prone 
ciƟ es do not shortchange the rouƟ ne solid waste disposal. GeneraƟ on of municipal solid waste increases 
annually, and evidence suggests that the per-person amount of waste generaƟ on has risen over the past 
26  Solis et al. as cited by Reinhart 
27 Appedix C
28 Baycan and Petersen, 2002; Peng et al., 1997; Ajayi et al., 2008 as cited by Karunasena, 2011, 257
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several decades.”29 
 San Francisco is contracted with Altamont Landfi ll in Livermore, California, nearly 60 miles east 
of the City. 
2.4.2 Transfer StaƟ ons 
 A Transfer StaƟ on is a short-term material staging site, typically a midpoint between the origin of 
waste and the landfi ll site for dumping. It is the only means to salvage materials aŌ er it has been col-
lected by waste trucks. As menƟ oned above, transfer staƟ ons and reprocessing faciliƟ es play a central 
role on the fate and quality of disaster debris. Staging sites (empty sites such as parking lots) in the urban 
context become overfl ow for transfer and processing centers, but must be created and maintained with 
extreme cauƟ on. These sites fall under danger of environmental implicaƟ ons if the debris remains staged 
for long periods of Ɵ me with no chance for removal. In these cases, it becomes criƟ cal that disaster de-
bris recycling plans consider transferability and processing of material following its staging. 
 “Regarding the recycling of debris, the assessment and classifi caƟ on of the damage to buildings 
can give an idea of the amount and quality of the building waste and what is to be expected. This infor-
maƟ on is necessary for planning and dimensioning the recycling plants, providing opƟ mal equipment 
and choosing the best locaƟ on to implement the plants.”30 A FEMA directed methodology for examining 
potenƟ al or past disaster eﬀ ects, along with the Community AcƟ on Plan for Seismic Safety, has provided 
signifi cant informaƟ on on building vulnerabiliƟ es, probable destrucƟ on and debris generated. This infor-
maƟ on has been used as raw data for this research. 
 The quality of debris is also important in that it aﬀ ects the quality of the recycled products, and 
thereby the possibiliƟ es for reuse. Although the type of buildings indicate the quality of the debris, it is 
also determined by demoliƟ on work and site clearance. TradiƟ onally, disaster debris is collected quickly 
without sorƟ ng so reconstrucƟ on can start immediately; however, this causes the building debris to 
become mixed with other debris, and thereby impedes debris recyclability.31 Although sorƟ ng on site is 
largely diﬃ  cult when debris must be cleared with immediacy, the uƟ lity of transfer staƟ ons and staging 
sites become an essenƟ al fi rst step in material recovery. If bypassed, opportuniƟ es for recycling are lost; 
in other words, planning and managing of transfer staƟ ons should not be understated if landfi ll diversion 
is desired.  
2.4.3 Material Recyclability and Markets 
 Recycling is a desirable opƟ on for waste management and is pracƟ cal if it is the alternaƟ ve that 
minimizes the environmental impact as a whole, including the new recycled product life.32 InformaƟ on 
29 Environmental ProtecƟ on Agency, 2006 as cited by Phillips 2009, 124
30 Lauritzen, E.K. and C. de Pauw. Disaster Planning, Structural Assessment, DemoliƟ on and Recycling (Rilem 
Report, 9). (London: Spon Press; 1st ediƟ on, 1994).
31 Ibid
32  Tukker and Gielen, 1994, as cited by Woolley, G.R., Goumans, J.J.J.M and P.J. Wainwright; Waste materials 
in construcƟ on WASCON 2000. 
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from the San Francisco Debris Management Plan33 has revealed that woody debris will be the predomi-
nant material generated from destroyed housing. Thus, for purposes of debris processing and planning, 
understanding the second life products of disaster debris is important for the feasibility of recycling. 
Addis has described recyclability potenƟ al of Ɵ mber, concrete and steel comprehensively, as cited in the 
following.34 35
Timber / Woody Debris
 “Timber can be used in a wide variety of construcƟ on components and building elements and is 
used in many diﬀ erent forms, varying from substanƟ al structural Ɵ mbers that may be hundreds of years 
old, to modern products such as chipboard and medium density fi berboard (MDF), which are made from 
small parƟ cles of Ɵ mber bonded with resin glue. The funcƟ on of Ɵ mber products also ranges widely, 
from substanƟ al beams and roof trusses to fi nishing elements. 
 The opportuniƟ es to reuse Ɵ mber in construcƟ on vary greatly according to the type of Ɵ mber 
product and its intended use. SoŌ woods are highly suscepƟ ble to damage in the deconstrucƟ on or 
demoliƟ on process, either through the breaking of slender lengths of Ɵ mber or surface damage and 
implementaƟ on. Nevertheless, reclaimed Ɵ mber does present many opportuniƟ es for reuse and recy-
cling depending on its form. Timber can be:
 Sold by length of volume for reuse as structural or non-structural Ɵ mber
 Reuse for making formwork and shuƩ ering in concrete construcƟ on
 Recycled to make chipboard for use in furniture of kitchen manufacture
 Recycled as wood chippings and used as soil improver
 While there is a ready market for clean, used Ɵ mber, contaminants that can easily become mixed 
with the load will result in the Ɵ mber being rejected as a recyclable. The eﬀ ort required to selecƟ vely 
separate Ɵ mber from all its contaminants may be deemed too expensive to jusƟ fy the returns. 
There exists a growing market for chipped Ɵ mber, however, it is highly sensiƟ ve to market forces- as 
supplies increase, demand can quickly be saƟ sfi ed resulƟ ng in a rapidly falling price for the raw material. 
The waste Ɵ mber is separated from other waste streams and collected from demoliƟ on and construcƟ on 
sites. AŌ er delivery to factories where it is reduced to chips of various sizes, it is used to make a range of 
‘forest products’ including chipboard, MDF, and hardboard, and can be used as mulch or bio-fuel. Some 
materials like MDF can only be made from post-industrial waste, others from post-industrial or post-con-
sumer waste. The environmental disadvantage of this process is the relaƟ vely high environmental impact 
of the resins used to bond the wood parƟ cles. Such forest products are used mainly for non-structural 
purposes. Following an earthquake scenario, salvaging Ɵ mber is not as likely as the chipping and process-
ing for second life, the laƩ er as a driving assumpƟ on of this case. 
33 Appendix C
34 Addis, William. Building with Reclaimed Components and Materials: A Design Handbook for Reuse and 
Recycling.(9London Sterling, VA: Earthscan, 2006).
35  Appendix D for more informaƟ on on material recyclability
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Concrete
 The major use of recycled crushed concrete as an aggregate replacement (recycled aggregate or 
RCA) in buildings is for making low strength in-situ concrete, typically replacing 20 percent of the gravel 
aggregate, such as for concrete slabs for the foundaƟ ons of houses and ground-level car parking areas. 
RCA can also be used to make precise concrete blocks and other lightly loaded units. Pulverized fuel ash 
can be used to replace around 20% cement used in concrete.36
Steel
 There is a wide-established recycling market for most steel goods. The scrap value of iron var-
ies according to the parƟ cular alloy. Ordinary mild steel is a liƩ le less expensive than stainless steel. All 
prices are highly dependent on market condiƟ ons. There are clear environmental benefi ts in reusing 
steel beams and columns since energy is saved twice, fi rst in the energy that would be needed to treat 
the steel in a furnace, and second in the energy saved by not needed components made from new steel. 
 Figure 2.4.3A  explains several management techniques for disaster debris handling. This sample 
classifi caƟ on scheme for post-earthquake disaster debris is based on the waste source, degree of separa-
Ɵ on and potenƟ al disposal opƟ ons. It is general descripƟ on of how disaster debris is typically managed 
by municipal authoriƟ es. 
36  Collins and Sherwood, 1995, Collins et al., 1998; BRE, 1998 as cited by Addis
Figure 2.4.3A. Sample Post Earthquake Disaster Waste Classifi caƟ on
Priority for Handling
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Adapted from Post-Earthquake Solid Waste Management Strategy, Vancouver 1997
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2.5.4 Recycled Content Products and Imported Building Materials
 A leading concern in understanding San Francisco’s recovery is how and where construcƟ on 
material will being acquired following a disaster, when building materials will be in great demand. It is 
assumed that San Francisco tradiƟ onally purchases imported construcƟ on material, either from outside 
the country or outside the locale, for its building construcƟ on needs. Contrarily, recycled content prod-
ucts (RCPs) are assumed to be locally processed, generaƟ ng local revenues and local demand for housing 
construcƟ on. Causal loop diagrams explain the noƟ ons and assumpƟ ons of RCPs versus imported prod-
ucts. 
  
 The visuals in Figures 2.4.4A and 2.4.4B show the reinforcing cycle of using imported material 
goods as decreasing the Ɵ me to construct, since this is a familiar method of acquiring building products, 
to increasing new housing and decreasing material demand. However, it prevents damaged local econo-
mies from benefi Ɵ ng through economic sƟ mulus by means of producƟ on and supply chains manu-
factured regionally. Therefore, decreasing the amount of imported materials and increasing the RCP 
inventory shiŌ s power to the local economy, but not without the cost of a slower recovery. The benefi t 
for providing more jobs, being eco-responsible and sƟ mulaƟ ng growth in a damaged city may provide 
enough incenƟ ve to tolerate a longer recovery period. More details on such policy noƟ ons are explained 
in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Local Material
Processing
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Material Demand
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Time to Construct
Imported Material
-
+
+
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Local Suppliers
+
Local Profit
+
+
Figure 2.4.4A. Causal Loop Diagram, Imported Materials
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Figure 2.4.4B. Causal Loop Diagram, Recycled Content Products
Local Benefi ts Imports
Local Benefi ts Imports
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 It should be clarifi ed that not all disaster debris is recyclable, meaning that some percentage will 
always be either unrecyclable or lost in processing or maneuvering. For this research, a maximum per-
centage of recyclability is calculated to be 72.5%37. It is important to highlight that this value is aggregate; 
diﬀ erent materials have signifi cantly diﬀ erent recycling rates, but the collecƟ ve recyclability percentage 
is nearly 72.5%. Material that is not salvaged or reprocessed is then dumped to landfi ll. Also, care must 
be taken to separate materials containing household hazardous waste, asbestos, treated wood and lead-
based paint for reasons of contaminaƟ ng mixed and recyclable debris material. In the simplifi ed models 
used for this study, debris handling is described to have two immediate end-life opƟ ons, either these 
are sent to landfi ll or sent to be reprocessed as new material. However, some debris material can be 
used as fuel, which has historically been a viable alternaƟ ve of waste management. Urban woody debris 
is oŌ enƟ mes chipped and used as biofuel, creaƟ ng opportunity for waste-to-energy streams. For the 
purposes of this simplifi ed study, this opƟ on for waste management is defi ned to be beyond the scope of 
this research, but can certainly be applicable in post-disaster cases. 
2.4.5 Problems with Disaster Debris Recycling
 Though the benefi ts of recycling debris seem obvious, problems do exist in actualizing recovery 
of disaster debris. These include the following:
 “TransportaƟ on and installaƟ on of the recycling plants and other necessary equipment.
 Local condiƟ ons such as climate, infrastructure, building culture, etc.
 The absence or the lack of skilled local labor.
 The urgency of the site clearance which many lead to the temporary disposal of the debris 
mixed with other waste.
 The covering of mixed debris with earth, lime, etc. to avoid epidemics. This makes the debris 
unsuitable for recycling.
 PoliƟ cal, social and cultural barriers for the acceptance of the idea of recycling disaster 
 debris.”38
 In San Francisco, a prevailing challenge is the lack of space for staging and recyclability, which 
must be accounted for in draŌ ing a debris plan. Also important to note is that a proposed 7.2 M earth-
quake will not be isolated to San Francisco, but will aﬀ ect the greater Bay Area, thereby inundaƟ ng land-
fi lls, staging and transfer sites throughout the region. Another challenge is the number of waste manag-
ers and industries that could potenƟ ally support the meƟ culous processes of debris sorƟ ng, processing, 
reprocessing and supplying. According to the CAPSS Report 52-1, 11% of the Bay Area works in construc-
Ɵ on39, an occupaƟ on that has high correlaƟ ons with the success of implemenƟ ng the disaster debris 
recycling trajectory. If local contractors are not convinced or willing to leverage locally supplied recycled 
products into new construcƟ on, and if externally contracted workers are equally biased, the chances of 
re-inserƟ ng recycled products into construcƟ on streams is infeasible. 
37 Appendix D
38 De Pauw and E.K. Lauritzen, 114-116
39 CAPSS 52-1,  45
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Yet with forethought, substanƟ al city-wide dialogue, and industry buy-in, understandings can be 
made and plans draŌ ed such that these issues are addressed prior to the next earthquake. Though it 
is impossible to accurately predict outcomes following a disaster in an urban environment, involving 
stakeholders, analyzing variables of infl uence, and implemenƟ ng mandates for sustainable recon-
strucƟ on can provide for a community-driven and integrated approach to recovery. The following 
chapters defi ne these aspects, and invesƟ gate the eﬀ ects of policy levers on the behavior of the 
post-disaster system. 
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re·cov·er·y   [ri-kuhv-uh-ree] 
noun
1. The regaining of or possibility of regaining something lost or taken away. 
2. RestoraƟ on or return to any former and beƩ er state or condiƟ on. 
Random House DicƟ onary
adapted from Bruneau, et al, 
2003
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3.0 Defi niƟ ons and Methodology for Data Gathering 
Contents of this chapter will cover essenƟ al variables used as part of the systems methodology 
that has been employed to model a post-disaster San Francisco. DescripƟ ons of these factors will verify 
the complexiƟ es of not only creaƟ ng such a model, but also of the challenges the City will face in the 
aŌ ermath of an earthquake. 
3.1 Area of Focus
This research invesƟ gates the repercussions of the next large-scale earthquake in the City and 
County of San Francisco and speculates on waste handling and housing reconstrucƟ on. Since rigorous 
studies have been completed in the past on the earthquake eﬀ ects in SF, a large quanƟ ty of empirical 
data is available for public peruse. Therefore, this work leveraged accessible informaƟ on through various 
research and non-profi t enƟ Ɵ es, to be able to conduct a specifi ed analysis. In the future, this thesis could 
be expanded to the larger Bay Area, given that localized data on housing and debris generaƟ on is made 
available. 
 Impact analysis and debris generaƟ on studies have been conducted by FEMA’s HAZUS method-
ology to esƟ mate the amount and types of damage that could occur in an earthquake scenario. HAZUS 
soŌ ware is a risk assessment methodology for analyzing potenƟ al losses from fl oods, hurricane, and 
earthquakes. In HAZUS, current scienƟ fi c and engineering knowledge is coupled with graphic informa-
Figure 3.1A. Geographic Boundary of Research, City and County of San Francisco
City and County of SF
Oakl
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Ɵ on systems (GIS) to produce esƟ mates of hazard-related damage before or aŌ er a disaster occurs.1 The 
analysis using HAZUS has been greatly customized to represent the unique buildings and condiƟ ons in 
San Francisco.2 The Community AcƟ on Plan for Seismic Safety has conducted an in-depth overview of the 
report as it relates to damages in San Francisco following four specifi c scenario earthquakes.3 The analy-
sis of magnitude 7.2 San Andreas case provides the baseline data for the breadth of this research.  
3.2 Challenges
 A few challenges arose in searching for required data in conducƟ ng the simulaƟ on analyses; 
namely, that of debris classifi caƟ on and tonnage of construcƟ on material per housing unit.  Though 
HAZUS has provided overall esƟ maƟ ons of light-weight and heavy-weight debris,4 categorizaƟ on of the 
debris make-up has not been defi ned. However, since building debris is similar in composiƟ on to inert 
construcƟ on and demoliƟ on (C&D) debris, informaƟ on from the California Integrated Waste Manage-
ment Board5, along with C&D analysis of other counƟ es and states6 has been extrapolated to beƩ er 
inform the total make up of debris tonnage. Research shows that most C&D debris is woody waste (up to 
43%) with concrete and gypsum also making a large proporƟ on of the generated debris.7  
 Acquiring material tons per housing unit proved to be a diﬃ  cult set of data to obtain from public 
sources. This informaƟ on is criƟ cal in understanding how recycled content product (RCP) materials can 
be put back into use as construcƟ on material for devastated housing stocks, which infl uences the hy-
potheƟ cal recovery state. The author calculated tons per unit data with help from the Applied Techni-
cal Council reports and interpolaƟ on of single-family and mulƟ -family unit construcƟ on makeup, with 
applicaƟ on of RS Means cost and construcƟ on data. The applied value for average ton per housing unit is  
1 Federal Emergency Management Agency, <www.fema.gov> (accessed November 3, 2011)
2 ATC 52-1
3 ATC 52-1A
4 Appendix C
5 CalRecycle, 1997
6 DSM Environmental Services, Inc. 2007 MassachuseƩ s ConstrucƟ on and DemoliƟ on Debris Industry Study.
MassachuseƩ s Dept. of Environmental ProtecƟ on, 2008.
7 Appendix D 
Figure 3.2A. C&D Waste CharacterizaƟ on, California
Woody Debris
43%
Rock, Soiles, 
Fines
11%
Concrete,
10%
Gypsum
10%
Steel
8%
Asphalt
7%
Brick
5%
Other/
Composite
6%
59
34.5 tons8, using an average of standard single-family and mulƟ -family units.9 
3.3  DescripƟ on of Housing 
Assessment of building use and vulnerability is described in the following subsecƟ ons.
3.3.1 San Francisco ResidenƟ al Units 
 “San Francisco is comprised of approximately 160,000 buildings ranging from small homes built 
over a century ago to newly-constructed high-rises. DensiƟ es of buildings and their purpose is varied 
throughout the city, where many of the districts – including the Sunset, Twin Peaks, Ingleside, and the 
Excelsior are primarily residenƟ al. About 95% of all buildings in the city are residenƟ al, accounƟ ng for 
70% of all building value.”10 
 Table 3.3.1A classifi es the various types of buildings and the esƟ mated cost of replacement for 
each. As can be noted, single-family and mulƟ -family housing make up the largest percentage of building 
stock in San Francisco, which, when combined with inherent structural vulnerability, become extremely 
problemaƟ c in a disaster event. 
8 Assumed a 675 square foot average unit size of SF and MF unit, Appendix B
9 Appendix B for fl oorplan of typical unit
10 ATC 52-1, 1-15
Building Use Estimated Number of Buildingsa 
Estimated Replacement Value 
of Buildingsb ($ Billions) 
Single-family Houses  112,000 $53 
Two unit Residences 19,000 $22 
Three or more unit 
Residences  23,000 $45 
Other Residencesc 800 $13 
Commercial Buildings  5,000 $48 
Industrial Buildings 2,100 $7.7 
Otherd 700 $2.6 
Totale 160,000 $190 
a. These numbers are estimates for 2009. 
b. These figures represent an estimate of the cost to replace or reconstruct a building in 
2009. They do not include the value of the land the building sits on or a building’s 
contents. Replacement values are significantly different than real estate prices or 
assessed valuation. Building value is based on square footage from San Francisco 
Assessor’s Tax Roll, not the estimated number of buildings.  
c. Other Residences includes hotels, motels, nursing homes, and temporary lodging. 
d. Other includes religious and educational buildings listed in the Assessor’s Tax Roll. 
e. Numbers in table have been rounded, which can make totals differ from sum of columns 
or rows. 
Sources:  This study, San Francisco Assessor’s Tax Roll, Census data, San Francisco 
Planning Department, and San Francisco Department of Building Inspection. 
ESTIMATED NUMBER AND VALUE OF BUILDINGS USED FOR 
VARIOUS PURPOSES IN THE CITY
Table 3.3.1A. Building Classifi caƟ on, San Francisco. Cited from CAPSS Report 52-1, 
Table 2
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 For this research, wood frame edifi ces are concerning as they are the most vulnerable type of 
construcƟ on, and consƟ tute the largest proporƟ on of building stock in San Francisco City (see secƟ on 
3.3.2).  Table 3.3.1B indicates construcƟ on type and esƟ mated replacement value which esƟ mates that 
the replacement value for all buildings accumulates to a staggering $190 billion. This table is also used to 
approximate the percent of buildings that have a minimum standard of life-saving construcƟ on through 
retrofi ƫ  ng, totaling a dismal 10% of the enƟ re building stock. 
3.3.2 Structural Vulnerability
Buildings represented in Table 3.3.1A respond to earthquake shaking depending on the materials 
they are constructed from, size and shape of units, engineered design, quality of construcƟ on, main-
tenance and age. Some building types  are known to have specifi c weaknesses in earthquakes and are 
prone to concentrated damage aŌ er a quake. Since the San Andreas fault runs through the peninsula, 
a sizeable magnitude earthquake will likely have deleterious aﬀ ects for soŌ -story buildings, concrete 
Structural Type Estimated Number of Buildingsa 
Estimated Replacement Value 
of Buildingsb ($ Billions) 
Wood-frame single-family soft-story 60,000 $29 
Wood-frame two unit residential soft-story 10,000 $12 
Wood-frame three or more unit residential soft-storyc 13,000 $26 
Wood-frame single-family not soft-story 52,000 $24 
Wood-frame two unit residential not soft-story 9,000 $10 
Wood-frame three or more unit residential not soft-
storyc 
6,000 $12 
Concrete built before 1980d 3,000 $19 
Tilt up concrete 200 $0.8 
Modern concretee 600 $4 
Steel moment and braced frame 1,500 $21 
Unreinforced masonry, retrofittedf 1,500 $5 
Unreinforced masonry, unretrofittedg 400 $1 
Otherh 4,200 $27 
Totali 160,000 $190 
a.     The numbers of buildings are estimates for 2009 based on available studies and engineering estimates. 
b.     These figures represent an estimate of the cost to replace or reconstruct a building in 2009. They do not 
include the value of the land the building sits on or a building’s contents. Replacement values are significantly 
different than real estate prices or assessed valuation. Building value is based on square footage from San 
Francisco Assessor’s Tax Roll, not the estimated number of buildings.  
c.     The City is currently discussing a program to require evaluation and possible retrofit of residential wood-frame 
buildings with 3 or more stories and 5 or more residential units.  Some but not all of these buildings have a 
soft-story.  There are an estimated 4,400 of these buildings with an estimated replacement value of $14 billion.  
d.     Concrete built before 1980 includes concrete shear wall buildings and concrete frames with masonry infill 
walls.  The 1980 date was chosen to be consistent with the survey work of the Concrete Coalition (see 
footnote, next page, for a description of the Concrete Coalition). 
e.     Modern concrete buildings include concrete moment frame and shear wall buildings built after 1980.  
f.     This includes buildings retrofitted under the City’s program. 
g.     This includes buildings in the City’s retrofit program that have not yet received their certificate of completion, 
and buildings not included in the City’s retrofit program, such as buildings with fewer than five residential units.  
h.     Other includes steel frame with cast in place concrete walls or masonry infill walls, reinforced masonry 
buildings, and non-residential wood-frame buildings. 
i.     Numbers in table have been rounded, which can make totals differ from sum of columns or rows.  
Sources:  This study, Concrete Coalition, and San Francisco Department of Building Inspection. 
Table 3.3.1B. ConstrucƟ on Classifi caƟ on, San Francisco. Cited from CAPSS Report 
52-1, Table 4
ESTIMATED NUMBER AND VALUE OF BUILDINGS OF VARIOUS STRUCTURAL 
TYPES IN THE CITY
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buildings built before 1980, unreinforced masonry bearing wall buildings, welded steel moment frame 
buildings, concrete Ɵ lt-up buildings, older steel buildings with masonry infi ll walls, and hillside buildings. 
Given that the focus is on residenƟ al housing, which are typically of soŌ -story construcƟ on, vulnerability 
for such structures are described in detail. 
SoŌ -Story Buildings
 The fi rst fl oor in many San Francisco homes are signifi cantly weaker and more fl exible than the 
stories above. The weakness at the ground level usually comes from large openings in perimeter walls, due 
to garage doors or store windows, and/or few interior parƟ Ɵ on walls. During strong earthquake shaking, 
the ground level walls are unable to support the sƟ ﬀ  and heavy mass of the above fl oors. The walls may 
shiŌ  sideways unƟ l the building collapses, crushing the ground fl oor.
 This type of weakness, called a soŌ -story, is common in single-family homes, where the dwelling 
space sits over a garage, and mulƟ -family buildings, which may have parking or large and open commercial 
space at the ground level.”11 12
 These soŌ  story account for an esƟ mated 25% of buildings that are unusable aŌ er a disaster, 
meaning that damage is so heavy that residents must be relocated unƟ l the unit is repaired or recon-
structed. San Francisco Urban and Planning AssociaƟ on has anƟ cipated how housing will be impacted in 
various districts in the city.13 Figure 3.3.2B shows the unusable housing by district. 
 To fully understand repercussions on the construcƟ on and demoliƟ on waste stream proceed-
ing an earthquake, aggregate informaƟ on on the degree of unit damage is employed within the sce-
nario simulaƟ on.  CAPSS report 52-3 has compiled a survey of 2,800 residenƟ al units in San Francisco to      
project safety tagging for a subset of housing following a 7.2 earthquake. “In California, inspectors 
11 ATC 52-1, 9-10
12 See Appendix B for more informaƟ on on seismically vulnerable buildings
13 San Francisco Planning and Urban Research, Safe Enough to Stay, 2012, Table 3, 14
Figure 3.3.2A. San Andreas Fault, USGS
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use a system of red, yellow and green tags to evaluate the safety of structures aŌ er earthquakes. This 
system provides informaƟ on to owners or renters as to an iniƟ al assessment of the structural integrity 
of the building, as it provides local and state oﬃ  cials with a preliminary understanding of the extent of 
the damage.” However, Comerio notes that “tag color is not completely representaƟ ve of the degree of 
damage.”14 
 The various tagging-schemes are described by the Applied Technical Council 20-1 as follows15:
• Green Tag (Inspected): No apparent hazard is found although repairs might be required. 
Residents should be able to conƟ nue to occupy these structures.
• Yellow Tag (Restricted use): A hazardous condiƟ on exists or is believed to exist that re-
quires restricƟ ons on the occupancy or use of the structure. Residents might be able to conƟ nue to 
occupy some, but not all, of these structures, with restricƟ ons.
• Red Tag (Unsafe): Extreme structural or other hazard is present. There might be im-
minent risk of further damage or collapse from creep or aŌ ershocks. Occupants cannot use any of 
these buildings. Some are collapsed. Some would need to be demolished, but others can be re-
paired. 
 Red-tagged units are of parƟ cular relevance since these indicate that housing is damaged be-
14 Comerio, Mary. Disaster Hits Home: New Policy for Urban Housing Recovery. Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1998.
15 ATC 52-3, 15-16
Different neighborhoods have different housing stock and soil conditions, which means the degree of earthquake 
damage will vary across the city. After a Magnitude 7.2 earthquake on the San Andreas Fault, we expect the 
percentages of housing in red to be unusable, meaning not safe enough for residents to shelter in place.
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Figure 3.3.2B. Unusable Housing by Neighborhood, cited from SPUR 2012
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yond repair or completely collapsed. An assumpƟ on for this research is that red-tagged units are either 
completely collapsed, or must go through the deconstrucƟ on and demoliƟ on waste stream. Delays in 
housing repair may be shorter than rebuilding delays, but are much more ambiguous since levels of 
required  restoraƟ on per building are uncertain. For this reason, repair Ɵ mes have been addressed in 
research but are leŌ  exclusive to the invesƟ gaƟ ve model. See Chapter 4 for addiƟ onal details on housing 
unit life-cycle.
 Within the system model, it is calculated that 36% of the red-tagged units will be immediately 
collapsed buildings due to the violent shake, and 64% will be tagged for severe damage and will require 
complete rebuilding.16 
3.4 Road Closures and Transfer Delays
Debris becomes increasingly problemaƟ c when lifelines are blocked due to building collapse. 
The Associated Bay Area Governments (ABAG) have mapped out potenƟ al road blockages in the San 
Francisco Bay Area. ABAG esƟ mates a total of 335 road blockages will occur in a 7.2M incident, out of a 
total 866 road closures in the enƟ re Bay Area. Seventy-three percent of the closures in San Francisco are 
expected to be generated by building damage, due mainly to the degree of urbanizaƟ on within the City.17 
Using ABAG hazard maps and GIS extrapolaƟ on, an esƟ mated 25% of 1,220 road miles will be blocked 
immediately aŌ er the earthquake. ABAG also mapped the Ɵ meline of street and freeway closures aŌ er 
the Loma Prieta and Northridge Earthquakes, shown in Figure 3.4A and 3.4B. 
16 Appendix B
17 ABAG, Road Closures, 2003 < hƩ p://www.abag.ca.gov/bayarea/eqmaps/eqtrans/pastex.html>
County San Francisco Bay Area
Ground Shaking 10 90
FaulƟng 0 163
LiquefacƟon 7 40
Water Pipelines 5 38
Gas Pipelines 1 8
Landslides 7 66
Building Damage 246 278
Hazmat Incident 1 6
Structural Damage 5 41
Miscellaneous 52 135
Total 335 866
Table 3.4A. Road Closures, adapted from ABAG 2003
ROAD CLOSURES
SAN ANDREAS 7.2M
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According to ABAG, “the paƩ ern of closures over Ɵ me during the fi rst month increases, as public oﬃ  cials 
barricade areas deemed to be unsafe. At the same Ɵ me that these oﬃ  cials reopen streets that have 
been repaired or the hazard has been removed, they close streets to enable more complete repairs or as 
addiƟ onal hazards are discovered.”18 Both ciƟ es followed this procedure of road clearing, however, dur-
ing the fi rst month aŌ er the Northridge earthquake, sets of streets that had been closed were opened at 
the same Ɵ me that new sets of streets were closed, such that total streets closed never exceeded 60 at 
one Ɵ me. Comparing average number of closure days for both event, the Loma Prieta had a 134 day 
average while Northridge cleared roads at an average of 22 days. The former value has been used as 
basis for an appropriate delay Ɵ me aŌ er a future 7.2 magnitude earthquake. 
 Another factor infl uencing debris clearance and material transfer is truck capacity. Open fl at-bed 
solid waste trucks have a maximum capacity of around 15 tons. For the simulaƟ on model, it is suggested 
that 20,000 tons are transferable in two months. This is conƟ ngent on the number of trucks available 
in San Francisco, esƟ mated to have a ceiling of about 20 trucks.19  Transfer tonnage per month is conse-
quently variegated as per the aŌ er-eﬀ ects of the earthquake event. For example, in a tradiƟ onal post-
disaster scenario, the Army Corps of Engineers provides debris removal assistance, increasing the total 
amount of tonnage removed per day. This is captured in a table funcƟ on within system dynamics model 
via specifi ed output modes based on the Ɵ me scale. The output graph also illustrates the decline  of      
external support of debris removal and transference through slow reducƟ on of material transfer rates to 
the city standard of 10k tons / month. 
 While both the road clearance and truck capacity are inherently linked and contribute to overall 
reconstrucƟ on, another aspect not menƟ oned in this secƟ on is the processing capacity of debris at Ma-
terial Recovery FaciliƟ es (MRF). These are certainly a viable means of ensuring not only debris removal, 
but material reprocessing, and a crucial component of this invesƟ gaƟ on. MRF’s as they relate to the 
18 ABAG, hƩ p://www.abag.ca.gov/bayarea/eqmaps/eqtrans/pastex.html, 2003
19 Richard Valle, CEO Tri-Ced Recycling, 2011
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system model are discussed comprehensively in secƟ on 3.6. 
3.5 ReoccupaƟ on of Housing
The Community AcƟ on Plan for Seismic Safety approximates that San Francisco’s recovery from 
a large earthquake could take up to 10 years.20 Recovery in this analysis refers to the Ɵ me it takes to 
refurbish lost residenƟ al housing stock, which is determined mainly by degree of damage. Comerio and 
Blecher have esƟ mated San Francisco’s average rebuilding Ɵ me using the Loma Prieta and the North-
ridge earthquakes as case studies. Table 3.5A indicates the relaƟ ve number of months it will take to 
tear-down and rebuild housing for occupaƟ on. These values are also included as recovery delays in the 
dynamic model.
 Many factors infl uence the refurbishing of housing units and include some of the following: 
• “Amount of Building Damage. The amount of damage infl uences the length of Ɵ me required 
for buildings to recover. If there is a lot of damage in the city, all construcƟ on work will pre-
sumably take longer because many of the construcƟ on resources in the Bay Area would be 
overwhelmed. There may not be enough skilled design and construcƟ on professionals to do 
required work without  substanƟ al delay. AddiƟ onally, construcƟ on materials and equipment 
may be limited.
• Economy at Time of Earthquake. If the disaster strikes during a period of strong economy, 
rebuilding would happen at a faster pace than if it strikes during a weak economy.
• Insurance. Payments from insurance companies can help fi nance repair and rebuild-  
ing, but they can also lead to delays. Currently, only 6 to 7 percent of San Francisco residents 
carry earthquake insurance.21 This means that insurance payments would play a small roll 
20 ATC 52-1, 40
21 Marshall, 2010 as cited by ATC 52-1, 42
AVERAGE TIME REQUIRED TO REPAIR AND REBUILD HOUSING AFTER 
1989 LOMA PRIETA AND 1994 NORTHRIDGE EARTHQUAKES 
Building Damage 
Levela 
Loma Prieta 
Average Time to 
Reoccupyb 
(Months) 
Northridge 
Average Time to 
Reoccupyc 
(Months) 
San Francisco 
Average Time to 
Reoccupy After Loma 
Prietad (Months) 
Needed repair 11 25 7 
Needed rebuilding 34 36 46 
a. Only includes analysis of buildings with enough damage to be deemed unsafe to occupy. 
b. Analyzed data from San Francisco, Hollister, and Watsonville. 
c. Analyzed data from Los Angeles, unincorporated Los Angeles County, and Santa Monica.  
d. San Francisco Loma Prieta results are based on a small dataset, and detailed timing 
information was not available for all damaged buildings.  
Source:  Comerio and Blecher ( 2010). 
Table 3.5A. Projected Recovery Time for San Francisco, CAPSS Table 16
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in fi nancing San Francisco’s reconstrucƟ on. However, it is common for insurance payouts to 
take many months, and disputes increase the general delay in reconstrucƟ on.
• Building Use. MulƟ -family housing, parƟ cularly rental housing, is repaired and replaced 
signifi cantly slower than single-family housing. Owners have liƩ le incenƟ ve to rebuild if con-
strucƟ on costs cannot be recovered through rents. For units serving lower-income house-
holds, access to construcƟ on fi nancing becomes especially challenging. 
• Availability of ConstrucƟ on Professionals. A shortage of skilled workers can cause delays and 
make construcƟ on more expensive, which could lead to addiƟ onal delays for some owners. 
• ConstrucƟ on LogisƟ cs. Given the density of the urban city, many residences have liƩ le excess 
space to stage construcƟ on materials. Streets and sidewalks have tendencies to serve this 
funcƟ on, but because they are typically narrow and steep, construcƟ on takes longer than it 
would in a sprawled city. ConstrucƟ on equipment may also be in shortage, causing addiƟ ve 
delays.”  
 More rehousing delays may exist, however, these menƟ oned are encapsulated by the 7 months 
for rebuilding and the average of 46 months for reconstrucƟ on, which may include deconstrucƟ on and 
demoliƟ on delays as well. 
3.6  Material Recycling Facility (MRF) and Landfi ll Site
 As materials are diverted from landfi ll, these recyclable materials are prepared for shipment to 
markets in a facility called a materials recovery facility. An MRF is a special type of transfer staƟ on that 
separates, processes, and consolidates recyclable materials for shipment to one or more recovery facili-
Ɵ es rather than a landfi ll or other disposal sites.  A transfer staƟ on can be described as a processing site 
for temporary deposiƟ on of waste, and is oŌ en used as a place where local waste is deposited prior to 
loading into larger vehicles. It is at transfer staƟ ons and MRFs that material recovery is possible. Transfer 
StaƟ ons and MRFs are used interchangeably throughout this research. It is assumed that reprocessing 
of certain materials (such as crushing concrete for aggregate) occurs at the MRF, while other materials 
(such as wood waste or metal) is processed at local eco-industrial sites.  
 Transfer staƟ ons are a vital element in modeling this system in that they provide the required 
processing of disaster debris for new construcƟ on materials. Thus, understanding aƩ ributes of transfer 
staƟ ons as they apply to this research are important, especially those of capacity and locaƟ on.  
 The causal loop diagram for material recycling faciliƟ es (Figure 3.6A) shows a balancing loop of 
eﬀ ects following an earthquake. As the amount of debris on site is increased, the processing ability of 
the material is decreased requiring MRF capacity growth. Growth in this sense is in the addiƟ onal square 
footage of space for processing, and includes a proxy for labor and machinery. Once the MRF has more 
processing power, greater material handling and transference capabiliƟ es will allow for removal of the 
debris on site. This balancing causal loop diagram is translated in a stock fl ow structure of the driving 
model described in Chapter 4. 
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 Five transfer staƟ ons near the city of San Francisco have been analyzed for throughput volumes 
of disaster debris processing. All transfer staƟ ons in study are within a fi ve mile radius of  San Francisco, 
within San Francisco City, South San Francisco and Daly City. Figure 3.6B shows the locaƟ on of transfer 
staƟ ons, and Tables 3.6B, C and D have infor-
maƟ on on capacity per MRF. The San Francisco 
Debris Management Plan from 2010 has de-
scribed the various transfer staƟ on and landfi ll 
locaƟ ons in and around the Bay Area, which 
amount to about 20 faciliƟ es in a one hundred 
mile radius. The moƟ vaƟ on for choosing those 
MRFs within a close proximity to San Francisco 
is to explore the city’s ability to localize the 
debris processing, and promote self-eﬃ  cacious 
redevelopment following a disaster within the 
context of the hypotheƟ cal scenario. It should 
also be stated that a 7.2 magnitude earthquake 
will not only have disastrous eﬀ ects for San 
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Francisco, but the many Bay Area counƟ es. Therefore, the MRFs will be more burdened with material 
than this research model has suggested. For sake of simplifi caƟ on, however, the fi ve MRFs will provide 
informaƟ on on general capacity requirements for C&D material processing, aﬀ ecƟ ng system-wide recov-
ery Ɵ mes.
 Contrary but relevant to transfer staƟ ons are landfi ll sites, which are the boƩ om Ɵ er of the 
waste stream. From landfi ll, material recovery is impossible, therefore eﬀ orts to avoid dumping material 
with potenƟ al benefi t is widely desired. The Altamont Landfi ll in Livermore, CA is the contracted waste 
facility for the City of San Francisco. It is nearly 60 miles due east of the city, and has been accumulaƟ ng 
San Francisco waste for many years. 
 Landfi ll agencies typically have contracts with ciƟ es for a certain amount of years. Capacity is 
determined by throughput per unit Ɵ me, and therefore, allows total landfi ll capacity to be described in 
landfi ll-years. 
 Recology is a private waste-collecƟ on agency that collects waste from the city. It esƟ mates 
roughly 1,100 tons of non-recyclable garbage are being produced each day, over 400,000 tons per year 
from SF City alone. When contract with the Altamont landfi ll expires in 2015, a new agreement currently 
under discussion will allow for use of landfi ll disposal 130 miles north east of the city, with a throughput 
of 500,000 tons per year.22 This value is determined to be equivalent to one landfi ll year, and is used for 
calculaƟ ons of cost and capacity in this research. 
3.7 DemoliƟ on and DeconstrucƟ on
Two methods for building tear-down are tradiƟ onal demoliƟ on and hand-demoliƟ on, also 
known as deconstrucƟ on. DemoliƟ on is described as “any wrecking acƟ vity directed to the disas-
sembling, dismantling, dismembering of any structure.”23 DeconstrucƟ on as defi ned by the EPA is the 
“disassembly of buildings to safely and eﬃ  ciently maximize the reuse and recycling of their materials.” 
22  Higa, Lori. Neighborhood News. February 2011 <hƩ p://neighborhoodnewswire.net/index.php?opƟ on=com_con
tent&view=arƟ cle&id=116:garbage-companies-talk-trash-over-city-landfi ll-contract&caƟ d=40:recycling&Itemid=62> (accessed 
January 3, 2012)
23 Dept. of Energy, CN <hƩ p://www.ct.gov/dep/cwp/view.asp?a=2714&q=469620> (accessed Jan. 3, 2012)
TraŶsfer StaƟŽŶ CŽuŶty
PrŽcessiŶg 
(TŽŶs/MŽŶth) Acres
A West Coast Recycling Company San Francisco 27000 4.247
B
San Francisco Solid Waste and 
Recycling San Francisco 282000 47
C Mussel Rock San Mateo 15000 5
D Blue Line San Mateo 37500 10
E San Bruno San Mateo 6000 1
TŽtal 367500 67.347
TRANSFER STATION CAPACITY
Table 3.6D. Material Recycling FaciliƟ es, LocaƟ on, Acreage and Capacity
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In deconstrucƟ on, materials are source separated from each other during dismantling of the building, as 
opposed to co-mingling the materials that may end up in landfi ll. 
 DeconstrucƟ on can be separated into two categories: non-structural and structural.
• Non-structural deconstrucƟ on is also known as soŌ -stripping and hand-demo, which consists 
of reclaiming non-structural components including appliances, doors, windows, and fi nish or 
trim materials.
• Structural deconstrucƟ on involves dismantling the structural components of a building and 
removing the enƟ re building down to its foundaƟ on. 
 Many in the industry fi nd structural deconstrucƟ on to be a comprehensive approach to whole 
building disassembly, allowing the majority of materials to be salvaged for reuse.24 For this research, de-
construcƟ on will be defi ned as  structural, since damage to buildings will require parƟ al or total disman-
tling. 
 Figure 3.7A indicates the salvagability of materials via demoliƟ on and deconstrucƟ on. Demoli-
Ɵ on of material will have direct cost implicaƟ ons given that in the short-term, it seems to be less expen-
sive than whole house deconstrucƟ on. One of the criƟ ques of deconstrucƟ on is its relaƟ ve cost per ton 
compared to demoliƟ on; however these are slowly being countered with arguments for increasing de-
mand for recovered materials.  Reinhart states that, “sƟ mulaƟ ng demand for the materials that are gen-
erated and reducing the costs associated with their recovery could increase the diversion of demoliƟ on 
debris. Techniques that could be used to increase the demand for recovered debris materials include: 
• Inventorying the enƟ re building prior to demoliƟ on and noƟ ng material condiƟ on.
• Developing esƟ mates of the volume and tonnage of material that cannot be reused or   
recycled.
• AdverƟ sing the reclaimable material inventory to potenƟ al consumers.
• Specifying the use of recovered materials in new construcƟ on wherever possible.
24 Ibid
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• Providing subsidies and tax-incenƟ ves for the reclamaƟ on and re-use of materials.”25
 Factors of storage and processing space, labor, liability and machinery can increase both decon-
strucƟ on and demoliƟ on costs. “IdenƟ fying areas where recycling will increase and decrease costs is 
imperaƟ ve when aƩ empƟ ng to increase the rate of debris recovery. Systemized deconstrucƟ on will in-
crease material quality and revenue from materials. It will also decrease costs associated with separaƟ on 
acƟ viƟ es. However, systemized deconstrucƟ on requires more planning, management, and supervision 
than a tradiƟ onal demoliƟ on operaƟ on.”26
 For any debris management plan, deconstrucƟ on statutes should be addressed and recognized 
as a viable means for reducƟ on of landfi ll accumulaƟ on.  High Ɵ pping fees become a large disincenƟ ve 
for landfi lling materials in San Francisco, mainly because of the various tolls and distances required for 
dumping. When applying requisites for recovering materials, direct Ɵ pping costs as well as indirect emis-
sion costs from landfi lling must be compared with reprocessing costs of disaster debris material. Even if 
the costs for dumping are relaxed, the environmental implicaƟ ons are large, and harnessing second-life 
for many usable materials is lost. In assessing the “deconstrucƟ on policy” as shown in the causal loop 
diagram, results show that although fees may be compromised for deposiƟ ng in a MRF, the holisƟ c ben-
efi ts of deconstrucƟ on make it a viable opƟ on for dismantling housing, even in extreme condiƟ ons. The 
results in Chapter 4 describe these benefi ts and provide some economic basis in comparing deconstruc-
Ɵ on and demoliƟ on. 
 The assumpƟ ons for modeling housing deconstrucƟ on and demoliƟ on streams are:
• 64% of all housing following an earthquake must enter the demoliƟ on/deconstrucƟ on   
stream
• A surveying process of damage level causes delays in overall demoliƟ on/ deconstrucƟ on
• All housing units are either demolished or deconstructed 
• DemoliƟ on provides a 50% material recovery rate; deconstrucƟ on an 81% rate
• DeconstrucƟ on takes twice as long to accomplish
• Post-earthquake eﬀ ects on deconstrucƟ on and demoliƟ on will greatly slow all processes  
for the fi rst month, then accelerate with addiƟ onal external help and fi nally return to   
typical rates aŌ er three more months. 
3.8 Debris Generated
Based on HAZUS calculaƟ ons, an esƟ mated 6.8 million tons of debris will be generated from 
damaged buildings.27 As this research focuses only on residenƟ al units, the amount of debris produced 
must be appropriately reduced to refl ect generaƟ on from housing alone. Using data from the San Fran-
cisco Debris Management Plan, and interpolaƟ ng results based on debris maps, an approximate 3 million 
tons of debris would be created by residenƟ al housing.28 This can further be classifi ed as 600,000 tons of 
25 Reinhart, 8
26 Ibid
27 ATC 52-1, 59
28 SF Debris Management Plan, 2010
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brick and wood debris, and 2.3 million tons of concrete and steel debris.29  The proceeding table accu-
rately presents the results. The total residenƟ al housing debris is calculated by mulƟ plying the tons per 
unit by number of units (34.5 tons / unit x 85,000 units) equaling about 3 million tons of debris. This to-
tal is moderated in the systems model by the percentage of housing that will collapse on impact, nearly 
36%, as per CAPSS esƟ mates.30 This provides an accurate understanding of total debris generated by 
housing collapse, versus that from deconstrucƟ on and demoliƟ on material output. Table 3.8A simplifi es 
the classifi caƟ on of debris and provides totals and percentages of the nearly 3 million tons of residenƟ al 
building debris.  
 The following chapter includes these defi ned factors as they are applied within the system 
dynamics model to understand behaviors of San Francisco’s material streams following a future scenario 
earthquake. 
29 Appendix C
30 Appendix B
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4.0 System Dynamics Analysis of San Francisco
System dynamics models begin with a quesƟ on or problem, for which data must be mined and 
subsequently applied within a stock and fl ow structure such that results and model behaviors can be 
drawn. This secƟ on explains the fi nal step of the modeling process, and presents results in the form of 
accumulaƟ on and delays from the material waste stream and the housing construcƟ on stream.  
4.1 System Causal Loop Diagram
A conceptual understanding of the simulated model begins with a system causal loop diagram 
(CLD), which links end-of-life housing units to debris to new housing in a virtuous or reinforcing loop. 
Adding the exogenous factor of the 7.2M earthquake can accelerate these trends increasing new hous-
ing, conƟ ngent on several other factors further detailed in the driving system dynamics models.  This 
simplifi ed CLD shows potenƟ al for posiƟ ve growth of housing using recycled content products for build-
ing materials to arrive at pre-disaster habitaƟ on levels. Each variable within has its own set of infl uencing 
variables. For example, “New Housing” is also aﬀ ected by construcƟ on rates, construcƟ on delays, and 
contractor availability, for example. These inherent factors impede the “virtuosity” of this reinforcing 
loop, causing delays and complexiƟ es to the system at large. 
4.2 Driving Models
Two driving System Dynamics models exist in simulaƟ ng the hypothesis; housing units and 
construcƟ on and demoliƟ on waste.  These two streams are essenƟ al in understanding debris removal 
and material use condiƟ ons, as well as residenƟ al housing recovery. Boundaries have been established in 
defi ning the model, and the perceived criƟ cal endogenous and exogenous variables have been included. 
The following is a visual and verbal descripƟ on of the model with its various components. Using these 
models, a pre-earthquake equilibrium set of data is examined, along with a system impulsed by an earth-
quake disrupƟ on and further tested by subsequent sensiƟ vity analyses and policy implicaƟ ons (explained 
Figure 4A. Causal Loop Diagram of Simulated Systems
Debris Recycling 
for New Construction
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in chapter 5). In order that results are comparable, control variables are set with values and explanaƟ ons 
illustrated here for the base case models. Results are detailed in secƟ on 4.4.
Housing Units Base Case Model DescripƟ on (Figure 4B)
A. RepresentaƟ on of housing construcƟ on, with variable labeled “Local Recycled Content Policy 
Use Policy” for using specifi c amounts of imported material versus recycled content building 
products. ConstrucƟ on halt is the stopping and slow progression of residenƟ al construcƟ on 
following the earthquake. See following for more informaƟ on on “Local RCP Use Policy.”
B. End-of-life streams for housing, whether caused by “act of God” or old housing age.
C. RepresentaƟ on of “destrucƟ on” stream. These include a surveying process by which a unit 
is deemed safe or unsafe, and two consequenƟ al fl ows for destrucƟ on – that of demoliƟ on 
and that of deconstrucƟ on. Policy for deconstrucƟ on is a percentage of units that are decon-
structed, the rest assumed to be demolished. 
D. The earthquake pulse is an 85,000 housing unit decrease from 330,000 units at month 12. 
 “Local RCP Policy” in the construcƟ on fl ow represents the lever that adjusts between imported, 
virgin materials (tradiƟ onal construcƟ on) and Recycled Content Building Materials (debris reprocessing). 
The laƩ er variable is possibly the most essenƟ al in analyzing the hypotheƟ cal situaƟ on, that of sorƟ ng 
and processing debris as new building materials for housing refurbishment. “Local RCP Policy” is set as a 
percentage representaƟ ve of the amount of material that is imported for building construcƟ on.  In pro-
viding a control mode such that other variables can be tested and compared, an RCP policy measure of 
25% is maintained, meaning 25% of the construcƟ on material is imported material and 75% is recycled 
content from debris maƩ er. Assuming that some amount of imported material is required in all cases, 
25% represents that control value of imported building construcƟ on material, with trials of higher and 
lower values in addiƟ onal simulaƟ on runs. The upper and lower bounds observed for “Local RCP Policy” 
are 75% and 10%, respecƟ vely. 
“Policy for DeconstrucƟ on” is also a percentage represenƟ ng the amount of units to be decon-
structed, versus those that will be demolished. This is set at a control mode of 40%, indicaƟ ng that more 
units will typically be demolished. This value is an approximaƟ on based on the density of San Franciscan 
neighborhoods and city demoliƟ on requirements indicaƟ ng compacted and careful tear-downs of build-
ings.1 These tend to resemble deconstrucƟ on techniques more than tradiƟ onal, demoliƟ on-ball destruc-
Ɵ on methods.   
ConstrucƟ on and DemoliƟ on Waste Stream Base Model DescripƟ on (Figure 4C) 
E. AccumulaƟ on of ConstrucƟ on and DemoliƟ on waste on site. Within this micro- stock and 
fl ow are included construcƟ on and demoliƟ on generated from building collapse debris 
and that from demoliƟ on and deconstrucƟ on of units. A constant fl ow of construcƟ on and 
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demoliƟ on from source is esƟ mated to be 5,760 tons per month1, and is varied post-earth-
quake as one assumes that normal C&D generaƟ ng processes will be stymied or slowed in an 
extreme condiƟ on aŌ er a disaster. 
F. Capacity growth and total ConstrucƟ on and DemoliƟ on/Materials Recycling Facility Capacity 
stock and fl ow stream for fi ve transfer staƟ ons of concern. The amount of C&D Capacity var-
ies as the model is aﬀ ected by pulses and policies, and is useful in determining necessary ca-
pacity and processing requirements for debris removal.  As can be noted, an increase in C&D 
Capacity increases the amount of debris transfer since it is understood that debris transfer 
possibiliƟ es are accelerated as space for debris staging and processing, as well as labor, is 
increased. This eﬀ ecƟ vely speeds up of recovery Ɵ me, but by nominal amounts.
G. This porƟ on of the model describes the transfer and processing of debris and its ulƟ mate 
desƟ naƟ on –landfi ll or to recycled content material supply chains. The RCP materials are 
then used as construcƟ on material in the Housing Units model, and behave as a nexus be-
tween the two driving models. 
Two important elements within the site-to-sorƟ ng staƟ on transfer rate are “Road Clear-
ance” and “Transfer Delay”. Road Clearance is the amount of road impediment due to the 
debris generated aŌ er the seismic disrupƟ on. In its equilibrium state, the Road Clearance = 
1. Based oﬀ  of GIS calculaƟ ons and ABAG data, the total road mileage that is aﬀ ected due 
to the earthquake nears 25%.2 From the Loma Prieta earthquake, it is noted that on aver-
age, it took 134 days to clear the roads. However, since the 7.2M San Andreas earthquake is 
expected to generate far more debris than the Loma Prieta, this value has been increased to 
about a year’s worth of clearance Ɵ me. 
Transfer Delay is the amount of Ɵ me it takes for trucks to deliver debris to staging/material 
recycling faciliƟ es from sites of construcƟ on or demoliƟ on and debris. It is esƟ mated that it 
takes about 2 months to transfer 20,000 tons of material.3 
Also detailed in this segment is the fact that all recovered materials are not inherently recy-
clable. CalculaƟ ons show that about 72.5%4 of recovered construcƟ on and demoliƟ on debris 
can be recycled as building material, the rest having potenƟ al as biofuels or for landscaping 
and siƟ ng purposes. 
“Policy for Amount Processed per Month” in the C&D waste stream model accounts for the per-
centage of recovered material that can be processed per month. This is a funcƟ on of the kinds of eco-in-
dustrial businesses suitable for reprocessing in the San Francisco Bay Area, and is set at a control value of 
40% for the base earthquake scenario. This assumed value is based oﬀ  the City’s high material diverƟ ng.   
1 1600 tons per day, 12% of which is C&D Debris, CalReycle, 1997
2 Appendix E
3 ConversaƟ on with Richard Valle, CEO Tri-Ced Recycling, Union City, CA
4 Appendix D
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Another infl uenƟ al exogenous factor is “Percent C&D Recovered (Mandated),” which denotes a 
65% required recovery rate for all construcƟ on and demoliƟ on waste streams as per San Francisco Envi-
ronmental Code Chapter 14 and C&D Debris Recovery Ordinance5. In order that the hypothesis maintains 
any validity, this mandate must remain true throughout the Ɵ me frame in quesƟ on. Without preserving 
or increasing the 65% diversion rate, no recycled content processing is possible, disabling the premise of 
the research quesƟ on. This leads to an important point on relaxing of various ordinances, policies, and 
norms in a post-disaster seƫ  ng, which greatly infl uences how recovery is managed and the city is rebuilt, 
and is discussed further in secƟ on 4.4. 
The Ɵ me frame for simulaƟ ng both models is 120 months, with the pulse occurring at month 12. 
Not included in the models above are lookup tables that provide condiƟ onal output based on a specifi ed 
input. For example, in the Housing Units model, “Lookup for Transfer StaƟ on Capacity Increase” outputs 
a value between 0 and 16 when the “FracƟ on of ConstrucƟ on and DemoliƟ on waste to Transfer StaƟ on/
MRF Capacity” reaches a specifi c value. This output number behaves as a mulƟ plier captured in “Eﬀ ect 
of Capacity on Growth Rate” which is factored into the growth rate of the Transfer StaƟ on/MRF total ca-
pacity, thereby aﬀ ecƟ ng the aforemenƟ oned fracƟ on of debris to capacity. As the growth rate increases, 
the fracƟ on used decreases, providing an embedded balancing loop within the model. This loop provides 
informaƟ on on the Transfer StaƟ on/MRF Capacity required to process the infl ux of debris for fi ve trans-
fer staƟ ons of concern. It also allows simulaƟ on of recovery Ɵ mes if such capacity is locked to a certain 
number of tons if, for example, capacity growth is considered unrealisƟ c6. 
4.3  Results and Recovery Forecast 
Performing numerous simulaƟ ons of the base model with the policy alternaƟ ves described in   
chapter 3, graphs and descripƟ ons are provided to quanƟ fy the eﬀ ects of possible scenarios. To reiter-
ate, complete recovery is described in terms of reaching the pre-earthquake housing state of 330,000 
units, compared by the Ɵ me for such recovery. Also evaluated is the amount of landfi lled material versus 
recovered material, which will consequently serve as building material following processing. The overall 
results indicate 6.8 years of recovery following a 7.2M earthquake, with the benefi t of 1.5 million tons of 
debris being diverted from landfi ll.  Comparing the extreme cases, a larger percentage of locally supplied 
recycled material for construcƟ on slows total recovery by two years while saving more than three years 
of landfi ll space and upwards of 1.6 million tons of potenƟ ally usable debris from being disposed. 
 The following are graphical results explaining the above menƟ oned conclusions, including eﬀ ects 
of sensiƟ vity analyses. SituaƟ onal alternaƟ ves are detailed in the next chapter. 
4.3.1 Base Case Model Experiencing No Earthquake
 Under normal condiƟ ons, San Francisco would experience a normal growth rate of housing and a 
near stable transfer staƟ on/MRF capacity. A growth of about 0.89% in housing units occurs over the 
5  San Francisco Environmental Code Ch 14. 
6  Appendix
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10 year period examined, reaching 332,960 residenƟ al units. However, due to the in-built balancing loop 
formed, the transfer staƟ on capacity is shown to decrease signifi cantly. RealisƟ cally, however, square 
footage of the materials recycling faciliƟ es would not be decreased, but would rather stay constant or 
increase slightly given reasonable economic and space circumstances. The equilibrium level for fi ve 
transfer staƟ ons is esƟ mated to be 367,500 tons of storage and processing capacity per month.
4.3.2 Base Case Model Experiencing Earthquake
 With an earthquake pulse resulƟ ng in a defi cit of 85,000 housing units, a 25% imported material 
rate results in a 6.8 year, or 82 month recovery period, as indicated by the blue line on the Figure 4.3.2A. 
Varying the imported building material rate to a higher and lower value presents diﬀ ering recovery 
Ɵ mes. As imported material rate is increased, a faster housing refurbishment Ɵ me is observed since it is 
a convenƟ onal method of acquiring construcƟ on materials. It is assumed that local processing of mate-
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rial is limited in and near San Francisco, and a phase of learning and implementaƟ on by local producers 
following the earthquake will slow the RCP supply chain, further escalaƟ ng the recovery period. Figure 
4.3.2B shows “ConstrucƟ on Rate” as a fl ow from the Housing Units model indicaƟ ng the rate of change 
between housing starts to completed housing units. As can be noted, an increased import rate intensifi es 
construcƟ on rates, as well as further decreases total recovery Ɵ me. 
 Eﬀ ects on the internal balancing loop for transfer staƟ on capacity outputs an increase of 70,000 
tons/month of transfer staƟ on capacity required to achieve the subsequent results. Therefore at the 
point of recovery, the throughput capacity reaches a value of 445,500 tons per month of processing 
funcƟ on in order that a 6.8 year period is realized for the control case, a 21% increase from the original 
capacity. It is noƟ ced in the Transfer StaƟ on graph (Figure4.3.2D) that the amount of imported versus 
RCP material used does not aﬀ ect the total MRF capacity requirements. This is due to the delay in the 
processing of RCP to its actual implementaƟ on to the construcƟ on stream. In addiƟ on, the decision to 
deconstruct versus demolish aﬀ ects the landfi ll, recovered material and transfer staƟ on streams directly. 
Transfer staƟ on capacity value will change based on which factors are variegated.  Results from these ad-
diƟ onal cases are described in Chapter 5. 
 The usage of recycled content products diverts nearly 1.5 million tons of debris from landfi ll at 
the month of recovery, as shown in Figure 4.3.2C. Much material sƟ ll enters the landfi ll since bounded 
processing capacity and delays limit total divertability, totaling about 1.1 million tons of debris as refuse. 
The trade oﬀ  for a greater recovery period comes with the benefi t of nearly 3 years of landfi ll space that 
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is conserved with RCP applicaƟ on7, saving nearly $6.6 million dollars in landfi ll contracƟ ng.8 9 In addi-
Ɵ on, local markets of recovered content products will serve to generate income in order to lessen the 
economic impact on the City aŌ er disaster strikes, while simultaneously providing materials for recovery. 
An empirical jusƟ fi caƟ on of “building-back-beƩ er” is shown in Figure 4.3.2A. To ensure environmental 
protecƟ on in the recovery phase alongside the rebuilding of quality housing stock, a trade-oﬀ  in recovery 
Ɵ me must occur to allow necessary Ɵ me for preparaƟ on and planning of reconstrucƟ on.
7  Compared to 5 years of landfi ll space used if no recovery is instated.
8  San Francisco Chronicle, <hƩ p://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/arƟ cle.cgi?f=/c/a/2010/08/06/MNLN1ELPE1.
DTL> (accessed January 4, 2012)
9  Assuming 500,000 tons per year landfi ll capacity
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 Furthermore, the inerƟ a of recovery within the fi rst several months can be aƩ ributed to the 
learning and implementaƟ on of a new means of acquiring construcƟ on material via debris reprocess-
ing. This is so that local suppliers and waste managers can begin producing construcƟ on materials within 
their respecƟ ve industry, which is assumed to be non-convenƟ onal in ordinary circumstances. If most 
material today is being imported into the region, then a shiŌ  in processing RCP material in the Bay Area 
requires a steepened learning curve before results of higher RCP content use are witnessed. 
4.4 Conclusions
Results from the control case described in this secƟ on show clear incenƟ ve for harnessing the 
potenƟ al of debris as material for new construcƟ on. Comparing the extreme cases of a 75% import rate 
to a 10% import rate shows an increase in recovery of nearly 2 years (5.6 years versus 7.6 years, respec-
Ɵ vely). In spite of this, the compromising housing recovery delay is befi Ʃ ed with the enormous tonnage 
of debris that is recovered for use, reaching upwards of 1.6 million tons of material diversion. 
An important caveat exists in achieving any material recovery, which relies upon the mandated 
ordinance for landfi ll diversion. San Francisco’s Ordinance 27-06 requires contractors to recover at least 
65% of materials created on construcƟ on and demoliƟ on sites. This research envisions that this and 
similar direcƟ ves are kept in place, or opƟ misƟ cally increased, in Ɵ mes of post-disaster recovery, wherein 
they may otherwise be relaxed or jeƫ  soned enƟ rely. Without such a regulaƟ on, hopes for landfi ll diver-
sion are dismal and possibility for material extracƟ on from debris is diﬃ  cult.  
Finally, it is important to comment on the economic, social and environmental benefi ts of repro-
cessing debris for building construcƟ on materials. As is noted by the Community AcƟ on Plan for Seismic 
Safety10, economic impacts from a 7.2M disaster will result in direct costs of nearly $14 billion dollars in 
housing, property and material damage and loss. Secondary economic hardships would also ensue, re-
10  ATC 52-1, vi
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sulƟ ng in many residents being out of work unƟ l relocaƟ on and business restoraƟ on is managed. Though 
diﬃ  cult to esƟ mate explicit secondary losses in terms of employment defi cits, instaƟ ng a holisƟ c materi-
als recovery program will assist in boosƟ ng economic condiƟ ons and reviving local industry. 
Environmental benefi ts from landfi ll diversion include reducƟ on in causƟ c methane emissions 
from landfi ll sites, decrease in space required for landfi lling, provision of added allotment for commer-
cial or housing needs, and greater uƟ lizaƟ on of resource value salvaged from solid waste. Based on the 
results of this research, calculaƟ ons show the economic benefi ts of reliance on MRF for C&D waste man-
agement versus resorƟ ng to landfi lling as the only means of debris removal. A 70,000 tons/months MRF 
capacity growth is suggested for material recovery; this results in a savings of about $4.4 million dollars 
as compared to contractual costs for increasing years of landfi ll space.11 
Another important measure of landfi lling is the amount of CO2 emissions resulƟ ng in truck 
transport to Altamont landfi ll in Livermore, CA, a nearly 100 mile round trip over the Bay Bridge from San 
Francisco City. More than 73,000 truck loads would be necessitated to move all debris to landfi ll if recov-
ery is implemented, about 100,000 truck loads less than if diversion is ignored. This diversion not only 
avoids overall Ɵ pping costs of about $120 million (esƟ mated at $80/ton) but also controls the amount 
of CO2  emiƩ ed by a near 63,000 ton reducƟ on in noxious truck fumes, which is 23 Ɵ mes more emissions 
than a recovery scenario.12 These drasƟ c increases in cost trickle down to the resident level while emis-
sions aﬀ ect the aggregate health of ciƟ zens, proving an unsustainable recovery. Though increased prac-
Ɵ ce of material recovery following a disaster will not enƟ rely remove the described negaƟ ve impacts, it 
does aﬀ ord greater economic and societal advantage when compared to total landfi lling of debris. 
4.5 Insights
 The results and situaƟ onal alternaƟ ves (detailed in the following chapter) provide useful infor-
maƟ on on prevalent variables considered endogenous to the system. Some of these aspects should be 
interpreted with detail, including the transfer staƟ ons and retrofi t policies.
 Results from the transfer staƟ on sub-system modeled within the larger stock-fl ow structure al-
low for interpretaƟ on of values to realisƟ c suggesƟ ons. Transfer staƟ on capacity requires a 21% increase 
to stage and process construcƟ on and demoliƟ on debris only. Since construcƟ on and demoliƟ on waste 
comprises only 12% of California’s landfi ll content, the projected capacity increase will not be suﬃ  cient 
for the other types of debris that will be generated. Therefore, discussions about regional provisions for 
staging and processing is criƟ cal for material that is to be recovered, and that which is deemed harmful 
and must be disposed of in other ways. 
 AddiƟ onally, the fact that a relaƟ vely large delay (9 months) for transfer staƟ on capacity growth 
has not severely delayed the overall recovery results of the model is a point of interest. This means that 
even with slow and steady transfer staƟ on capacity growth, a great amount of material can be processed 
11  MRF cost comparison based on construcƟ on costs only; variable costs have not been included
12  Appendix B
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for reuse. The reason for this is that capacity increase is assumed to be coupled with increased labor and 
machinery for processing. Adding physical capacity alone will not progress the movement and recycling 
of debris; rather, addiƟ onal variables of labor and machinery are infl uenƟ al in waste management. 
 The retrofi t policy analysis (explained in Chapter 5) also aƩ ests to the large benefi ts from ret-
rofi ƫ  ng housing prior to a hazard event. Retrofi ƫ  ng has been a foregoing and prominent means of 
community resiliency, but is faced with fi nancial and societal complexiƟ es which hinder its widespread 
applicaƟ on. TesƟ ng the feasibility of retrofi ƫ  ng within the system bounds again prove its viability and 
necessity in a community prone to adverse environmental threats. Retrofi ƫ  ng is shown to cut overall 
recovery Ɵ me by nearly 2 years, which allows possibiliƟ es for greater life safety prior to a disaster event, 
as well as maintenance of ciƟ zens following an earthquake, both indicaƟ ve of a resilient city. 
4.6 Model CriƟ que
 As with any system dynamic model, the decision of bounding the model must always be ques-
Ɵ oned and pushed such that feasible insights are not excluded. In this case, the model boundary treats 
as exogenous the aspects of stakeholders, public decisions and societal concerns, land use and design 
and supply chain understandings of recycled content materials. For example, the design of housing is leŌ  
uncomplicated in this model, but can have large implicaƟ ons in a future recovery scenario. Also, noƟ ons 
of environmental equity are also leŌ  exclusive to the model; quesƟ ons of which communiƟ es will suﬀ er 
from new landfi lls that must be formed in or near their locales if debris is not diverted must be consid-
ered when forming disaster management plans. If intenƟ ons to recover material from damaged hous-
ing exists, then noƟ ons of designing for deconstrucƟ on should be studied and perhaps implemented in 
new construcƟ on of housing. This method of design includes parameters of end-life housing removal or 
destrucƟ on, and entails guidelines on how to best recover and recycle material from a home that is no 
longer of service. An addiƟ onal iteraƟ on would consider these and other variables as inclusive of the 
model bounds, as they have clear infl uence for the overall built environment and city recovery scenarios 
as defi ned by the scope of research.  
 AddiƟ onally, some results show sharp or precipitous growth/decline rates that may not fully be 
realisƟ c. For example, housing construcƟ on shows a sharp decline aŌ er all homes are refurbished. In the 
real world, contractors would slow down momentum as they saw housing reconstrucƟ on nearing its end, 
and perhaps send labor force to other tasks. In this case, and again for the sake of simplicity, the results 
are shown to be simplifi ed where they can be contrasted to other variables to understand relatedness. 
This method of resoluƟ on allows for comparison and linkage to other aspects of the model since relaƟ ve 
results per variable are the same. 
 Trade oﬀ  for such exclusions and simplifi caƟ ons are the levels of clarity and focus that the model 
can bring for early comprehension of the variables of interest and the hypothesis in quesƟ on. This allows 
for broader discussions about infl uenƟ al aspects of post-disaster recovery within the regional commu-
nity. The intenƟ on for such model simplifi caƟ on is to reach mulƟ ple audiences that are able add more 
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foreseeable variables and contexts to the impending issue of post-disaster recovery. Thus far, the model 
adequately provides the results and processes needed for the discussion the author set to sƟ mulate. It 
also speaks to the need of addiƟ onal research on a broader level, with components that must be linked 
to the exisƟ ng model to understand the vast interconnecƟ ons of variables aﬀ ecƟ ng hazard miƟ gaƟ on 
and disaster management. The hope is that future iteraƟ ons consƟ tute vantages beyond debris handling 
and housing stock refurbishment. 
 The following chapter provides situaƟ onal alternaƟ ves and policy recommendaƟ ons to further 
test the systems model and invesƟ gate diﬀ erent outcomes of the post-disaster context. 

 89
05
“AŌ er disasters, criƟ cal policy choices emerge, forcing unwelcome decisions on local government 
about whether to rebuild quickly or safely. Post-disaster recovery and reconstrucƟ on planning and 
management commonly refl ect an eﬀ ort to balance certain ideal objecƟ ves with reality. Recovery 
is characterized by wanƟ ng to (1) rapidly return to normal (2) increase safety and (3) improve the 
community.”
MileƟ , Dennis S., Disasters by Design, 1999
05
POLICY ALTERNATIVES AND SCENARIOS
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5.0 Policy Analysis
 System Dynamic modeling allows for simulaƟ on of a complex quesƟ on or hypothesis given a 
defi ned boundary. These simulaƟ ons provide projecƟ ons and behaviors of certain stocks and fl ows which 
inform decision making for a likely future event, or even a past event that may have had a diﬀ erent out-
come at present. One of the advantages of system dynamics is the ability to apply certain factors repre-
senƟ ng decisions or policies to test the repercussions on the system as a whole. As such, several policy 
alternaƟ ves are suggested to understand impacts on recovery periods and material salvage rates.  The 
policies suggested below are few of many, but have greatest infl uence on debris management.
5.1 SensiƟ vity Tests and SituaƟ onal AlternaƟ ves
The following subsecƟ ons describe exogenous and endogenous variables that were varied to 
understand the systems model, with intenƟ ons to provide recommendaƟ ons of improvement to the 
post-disaster case. 
5.1.1 Mandated Recovery Rates
As is menƟ oned in the earlier chapter, in order that this research quesƟ on argues for validity, 
a mandated ordinance of recyclability must be maintained or increased in San Francisco such that not 
all material is landfi lled in disaster debris management. San Francisco’s Environmental Ordinance 27-06 
enforces a 65% material diversion rate for all construcƟ on and demoliƟ on contractors. Examining the no-
Ɵ on of recyclability rates and landfi ll diversion with sensiƟ vity tests presents the following results: 
The percent policy refers to the percent of material that must be recovered from C&D sites. The 
diﬀ erences in recovered and landfi lled material vary proporƟ onally as the policy increases or decreases. 
The graphs indicate that a higher policy (or one that is enforced at 65%) will result in more RCPs             
Figure 5.1.1A. Impact on Landfi lled Material by Recovery
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to be used in housing construcƟ on. However, between the highest and lowest tested policy [10%, 100%] 
only a four month increase in housing recovery is aƩ ained due to the imported materials that take place 
of RCP defi cits. Nevertheless, the amount of localized construcƟ on material that is generated is greatly 
infl uenced by a more rigid policy concerning material recovery rates.
5.1.2 DeconstrucƟ on and DemoliƟ on Policy
In order that landfi lled and recovered materials are comprehensively analyzed, the base case 
model is slightly modifi ed to include all non-recovered materials into the appropriate landfi ll stock. The 
simpler base model contains only the three million tons of debris generated immediately by the quake, 
mainly from residenƟ al wood frame housing1. It does not incorporate addiƟ onal material generated via 
deconstrucƟ on and demoliƟ on processes, or residual unrecyclable material through other processes sug-
gested within the model bounds. Therefore, the outcomes of the simulaƟ ons in this secƟ on show graphs
that look slightly diﬀ erent than the original landfi lled versus recovered material comparisons, which con-
1  Appendix B
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Figure 5.1.1B. Impact on Recovered Material by Recovery
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sist of only the direct disaster debris management processes.  
 Building deconstrucƟ on and demoliƟ on as explained in chapter 3 and contrasted in chapter 4 
are two means of building destrucƟ on, which are represented in the “Housing Units” driving model.  This 
research leans favorably towards deconstrucƟ on since this mode of building tear-down provides greater 
material recovery than does tradiƟ on demoliƟ on (81% versus 50% recovery, respecƟ vely).  Therefore, 
modifying deconstrucƟ on policy correlates with the number of units that are deconstructed, which 
therefore translates to the amount of material landfi lled through destrucƟ on.  As the policy value is 
amplifi ed, more material recovery is possible, reducing overall material that is sent to waste (see Figure 
5.1.2B and 5.1.2C). The percent policy referred to in the graph are the percent of red-tagged or uninhab-
itable housing units that are deconstructed, the rest being demolished, via an esƟ mated control value of 
40% deconstrucƟ on.
A precipitous decline post month 42 can be aƩ ributed to the destrucƟ on of all red-tagged units 
deemed unsafe to live in and requiring complete rebuilding (see Figure 5.1.2D). AŌ er this point, the 
graphs in the landfi lled sensiƟ vity analysis converge, since the rest of the material traveling to landfi ll 
or being recovered is now conƟ ngent upon the disaster debris management downstream in the “C&D 
Waste Stream” model. The amplitude aŌ er the infl ecƟ on point in the graph can then be controlled 
by the transfer staƟ on processing capacity, as well as the recovery mandates by the City. This means 
that once the units to be deconstructed or demolished are cleared, the landfi ll and recovered material 
streams are directly aﬀ ected by the processing capacity of materials as well as the mandated recovery 
rate. 
The base case value of 40% deconstrucƟ on (60% demoliƟ on) is an assumpƟ on based on San 
Francisco density, labor costs, and Ɵ me constraints that may convince contractors to pursue demoliƟ on 
rather than deconstrucƟ on, regardless of environmental consequences. Using the control case, a com-
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parison is made between landfi ll and recovered material, shown in Figure 5.1.2E. The simulaƟ on shows 
that landfi lled material far overshadows recovered material aŌ er month 42. This is accredited to two 
factors: unit destrucƟ on method and mandated material recovery rates. The contribuƟ on of landfi lled 
material from demoliƟ on and deconstrucƟ on is sizeable, when considering that half of the material from 
demoliƟ on is deposited in landfi ll.  Therefore, a 60% unit demoliƟ on rate causes a signifi cant increase 
in landfi lled material. The second factor is that of the mandated recycling rate. Though 65% is relaƟ vely 
high compared to other ciƟ es, it does infl uence the total amount of material being recovered, and eﬀ ec-
Ɵ vely that which is being dumped as nonreusable waste.
Given the gravity of these two rates on total landfi ll accumulaƟ on, it is important to verify overall 
outcomes through sensiƟ vity analyses. Mandated recyclability has been experimented with in SecƟ on 
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5.1.1, while “Policy for DeconstrucƟ on” has been tested and graphed in Figure 5.1.2B. For intenƟ ons of 
reducing total landfi lled material, a higher recyclability rate must be established, provided more units are 
deconstructed rather than demolished along with an enhanced capacity at Material Recovery FaciliƟ es in 
and near the San Francisco Bay Area. 
It is important to note the choice of exclusivity of the above menƟ oned results in the overall 
driving model and baseline results (chapter 4). The more scrupulous defi niƟ ons of landfi lled materials 
versus recovered materials in this secƟ on are a means to understand total impact of factors that are be-
yond pure disaster debris management. While it is important to run these simulaƟ ons, they are consid-
ered outside of the scope of the central hypothesis, and prove to have greater uncertainty at this point 
of compleƟ on, which aﬀ ects the overall validity of the research. Future work will provide a more in-
depth understanding of deconstrucƟ on and demoliƟ on waste streams throughout the recovery period, 
while simultaneously honing landfi ll and recovered material stream models.
5.1.3 Transfer StaƟ on / Materials Recycling Facility SimulaƟ on
Transfer staƟ ons as embedded in this model are simulated as expandable or contracƟ ble tons 
of processing capacity, dependent on debris collected on site. When debris on site is increased beyond 
capacity, the feedback structure in the simulaƟ on increases processing bandwidth at the MRF, with ap-
propriate delays. RealisƟ cally, this capacity would be based on a variety of aspects, including but not lim-
ited to facility square footage, labor, funding and available land.  For purposes of this research, transfer 
staƟ on capacity has been simplifi ed to be correlated with square footage alone.2 
If, for any reason, capacity and square footage are not expendable and total C&D processing ca-
pacity cannot be increased, repercussions on the global system may take place. For this reason, a simula-
Ɵ on has been conducted which caps the total capacity of the MRFs to 375,000 tons/month. The eﬀ ects 
2 See Chapter 3; 1 acre provides staging/processing capacity for 200 tons per day
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of this simulaƟ on are shown in Figures 5.1.3A and 5.1.3B. 
Results from this simulaƟ on reveal an interesƟ ng system-based phenomenon. That is, transfer 
staƟ on capacity does not signifi cantly slow the overall recovery of housing. This is shown with the slight 
skewing of the housing recovery by a month aŌ er transfer staƟ on capacity has been locked. What is af-
fected in this scenario is the amount of total recovered material at the end of the recovery period. As can 
be seen in Figure 5.1.3C, at the mid-point of the suggested recovery Ɵ me frame (month 40), recovered 
material in the case with fl exible capacity is far greater than that with the locked capacity case. There-
fore, in a situaƟ on with fi xed capacity, less processing of disaster debris is likely for recovered material, 
aƩ enuaƟ ng total recovered material. AddiƟ onally, landfi lled material is also somewhat lower due to
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greater general impedance of roads by debris. Therefore, the system faces a holisƟ c delay with capped 
MRF processing power, but that which does not impinge on housing recovery criƟ cally. 
5.1.4 Retrofi t Policy
This parƟ cular policy scenario diﬀ ers from the four described previously in that it applies a pre-
earthquake, miƟ gaƟ ve eﬀ ort to retrofi t housing prior to assessing eﬀ ects from the earthquake shock. 
The causal loop diagram in Figure 5.1.4A demonstrates how retrofi ƫ  ng homes becomes dually benefi -
cial if enough homes are retrofi Ʃ ed to at least a minimum standard.3 This retrofi t scheme is a minimal 
retrofi t approach intended to reduce harm to those who live or frequent the building. Collapse would 
be prevented, and occupants should be able to escape the building safely, but the building might not be 
repairable or fi t for occupancy aŌ er an earthquake.4 This is determined as the least costly method of ret-
rofi t, at an average of $6.60/ sq. Ō ., adding to around $11,0005 per housing unit.6 The retrofi ƫ  ng would 
result in a 57% reducƟ on of damaged housing; a drop to 49,000 damaged or collapsed residenƟ al units 
versus 85,000 units. 
The diagram shows that as retrofi t policy is implemented, uninhabitable units are consequently 
decreased following an earthquake. If more homes are rendered habitable, either green-tagged or 
yellow-tagged, more shelter-in-place is possible. Shelter-in-place is described as a “resident’s ability to 
remain in his or her home while it is being repaired aŌ er an earthquake – not just for hours or days aŌ er 
3 Appendix B
4 ATC 52-3, 24-25
5 Ibid
6 ATC 52-3, 28
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an event, but for the months it may take to get back to normal. For a building to have shelter-in-place 
capacity, it must be strong enough to withstand a major earthquake without substanƟ al structural dam-
age. This is a diﬀ erent standard than that employed by the current building code, which promises only 
that a building meets Life Safety standards (i.e., the building will not collapse but may be so damaged as 
to be unusable).”7 The San Francisco Planning and Urban Research  AssociaƟ on esƟ mates that only 75% 
of the city’s current housing stock will provide adequate shelter for residents aŌ er a large earthquake, 
slowing city recovery. SPUR’s goal for resilience is that the housing stock reaches a 95% shelter-in-place 
standard.8 This goal is augmented by substanƟ al retrofi ƫ  ng, which helps to retain the San Franciscan 
populaƟ on aŌ er an earthquake. A resilient city can facilitate recovery and increase housing construcƟ on 
to restore uninhabitable residences to livable standards so as to regain any displaced residents. This is 
shown by the right-hand reinforcing loop in the diagram. 
An added loop of infl uence is the amount of disaster debris that would be miƟ gated as more 
housing is retrofi Ʃ ed, and is demonstrated by the leŌ -side of the causal loop diagram. That is, a pre-
disaster retrofi ƫ  ng policy can decrease the number of uninhabitable units aŌ er an earthquake, reducing 
overall destrucƟ on and thereby speeding debris clearance oﬀ  of lifeline routes, consequently accelerat-
ing housing and city-wide reconstrucƟ on.
SimulaƟ ng the retrofi Ʃ ed scenario yields a much faster recovery Ɵ me, as expected with a 57% 
reducƟ on in damaged housing units. Retrofi ƫ  ng all units would allow housing recovery in about 51 
months, or 4.25 years (Figure 5.1.4B), as well as a substanƟ al drop in uninhabitable units9. This recovery 
Ɵ me is more than 2 years faster than the base case of 6.8 years for recovery. In addiƟ on, impacts on re-
covered and landfi lled material are apparent as less debris is generated, indicated by the balancing loop 
in the causal loop diagram (Figure 5.1.4C and 5.1.4D). 
7  SPUR, Safe Enough to Stay, 5
8  Ibid, 2
9  Appendix A
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RealisƟ cally, retrofi ƫ  ng all housing units even to the most basic standard becomes unlikely 
given the general lack of incenƟ ve to retrofi t in many counƟ es within the Bay Area. Many homeowners 
underesƟ mate the severity of the next big quake, and its potenƟ al consequences on their homes. Cost 
of retrofi t also outweighs near future risk for many residents, limiƟ ng the actual number of completed 
retrofi ts and countering goals for a resilient SF. Studies within the Bay Area have shown that two-thirds 
of retrofi ts are not being done properly and prove liƩ le to no benefi ts10  Lack of housing retrofi t is not 
only burdened by home owners, but also by the State of California. The recently passed standard for 
single-family homes (IBC, Chapter A3) only applies to very specifi c housing types and excludes adopted 
standard for mulƟ -family buildings. This lack of standard means that permits are issued for voluntary 
10  Shaken Awake, ABAG, 2010
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seismic retrofi ts and may not be adequate.11  
Following the Sendai earthquake of 2011, homeowner requests for retrofi t work increased signif-
icantly as people became fearful that their home would be damaged by an earthquake. Although a hope-
ful fi rst step to resiliency, there are many more ways to moƟ vate miƟ gaƟ on other than earthquakes. The 
Associated Bay Area Governments have suggested the following to local governments in providing more 
incenƟ ve for earthquake preparedness through housing damage miƟ gaƟ on12:
 Disclosing building vulnerabiliƟ es to tenants and homeowners
 Waiving permit fees
 Providing low cost loans for retrofi ƫ  ng with long repayment periods
 ReducƟ on of business taxes
 Servicing free consultaƟ on to walk owners through retrofi ƫ  ng process
The discussion for making San Francisco more resilient through retrofi ƫ  ng vulnerable housing, 
especially soŌ -story mulƟ -family housing with more than 5 units, is an ongoing dialogue between various 
parƟ es within a city; these include oﬃ  cials, not-for-profi t groups as plaƞ orms for miƟ gaƟ on acƟ vism, 
and homeowners who by and large are uncertain of the durability of their home in the wake of a large 
earthquake. 
For the purposes of this research, however, retrofi ƫ  ng seems to the be the most proacƟ ve 
means of a sustainable and forceful recovery as compared to other policies suggested here which are 
generally reacƟ ve to a potenƟ al disaster. The simulaƟ on in this secƟ on exemplifi es an extreme case of 
retrofi ƫ  ng, that of all wood-frame housing units in San Francisco, which may be improbable but sig-
11 Ibid, 2
12  ABAG, Shaken Awake, 2-10
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nifi cant in understanding the eﬀ ecƟ veness of retrofi ƫ  ng in safeguarding lives and promoƟ ng a more 
expedited recovery phase.  
 The following chapter synthesizes the results and situaƟ onal alternaƟ ves to provide conclusions 
and recommendaƟ ons for applicaƟ on of this thesis to San Francisco and the greater Bay Area. 
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“When a community begins to rebuild aŌ er a natural disaster, demand for recycled materials in 
all areas spike up.”
Fickes, Michael, “CalculaƟ ng Recycling Markets,” World Wastes, 1997
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6.0 Discussion
 The relevance of this research resides in a nuanced vantage of post-disaster, city-wide recovery 
through disaster debris management. Typically, discussions of disaster management prioriƟ ze hous-
ing, infrastructure, and lifeline recovery which are criƟ cal in a reconstrucƟ on context. However, debris 
must be understood as having value if its benefi ts are to be actualized. This research intends to bring 
debris to the forefront and projects its potenƟ al uses for aspects of housing reconstrucƟ on. Its strength 
is in the processes of mapping material fl ow through the city, with linkages to variables which may have 
ostensibly unrelated implicaƟ ons, but prove to be infl uenƟ al to the system results. One of the assets of 
a systems model of this sort is its useful temporal projecƟ ons of variables related to recovery following 
a disaster. This provides empirical informaƟ on to encourage policy makers to rethink disaster debris as a 
catalyst for growth, rather than an impediment to recovery. It allows stakeholders to make sophisƟ cated 
decisions across domains, and to further fl esh out aspects of recovery. AddiƟ onal iteraƟ ons of this work 
will include addiƟ onal factors of vulnerability or risk, and can help strengthen the simulated results. The 
following secƟ ons provide research conclusions, including obstacles for recycling disaster debris, useful 
recommendaƟ ons, and future work uƟ lizing similar methodologies. 
6.1  Conclusions
 Value of material reuse and recycling is inherently evident- it has posiƟ ve social, economic, and 
environmental implicaƟ ons. San Francisco has pushed for high recyclability over the years, which has 
allowed it to become an archetype of an environmentally conscious city. This provides more reason to 
promote and conƟ nue waste recyclability following a disastrous scenario. Sustainable waste manage-
ment is a product of rigorous pre-disaster planning and policy making, which is then tested for robust-
ness following a large earthquake. “Sustainable waste management encourages the generaƟ on of less 
waste, and the reuse, recycling and recovery of waste. By focusing on long-term debris planning and set-
Ɵ ng measures for ecological and economic sustainability, it is possible to improve a regions’ resilience to 
future disasters. Furthermore, the expansion of recycling capabiliƟ es and eco-industrial planning results 
in more job creaƟ on and promotes partnerships.”1 
Not to be underesƟ mated is the noƟ on of pre-disaster communicaƟ on and dialogue. In aƩ empt-
ing to promote sustainable waste management, key logjams must be resolved prior to a disaster event. 
Phillips suggests that “normal operaƟ ons represent the opƟ mal Ɵ me period to conduct planning [for 
debris management]. Local planners should look for and encourage a variety of partners to join the plan-
ning process, as more perspecƟ ves bring a wider view of opƟ ons, encourage partnerships, provide more 
realisƟ c assessments of what can be done, and encourage pre-event communicaƟ ons. In short, face-to-
face interacƟ on among all key partners makes for a more eﬀ ecƟ ve post-event recovery. IdenƟ fi caƟ on 
of temporary storage and permanent disposal sites should occur during normal operaƟ ons, as well as 
designing appropriate types of contracts and procedures to monitor contracts. Further, this Ɵ me period 
1  Yahya and Boussabaine, 2006; Blakely, 2007; Duetz and Gibbs, 2004 As cited by Karunasena, 251-255
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can serve as an opportunity to spur local recycling, reducƟ on, and reuse eﬀ orts.”2 Further descripƟ on of 
means for enhanced landfi ll divertability following a disaster are described in the following secƟ ons. 
6.1.1 Obstacles
 While the benefi ts of sustainable waste management following a disaster have many implica-
Ɵ ons for recovery, it does not come without challenges to the City when managing large volumes of 
waste. “Enabling property owners to return to an area following a disaster and assist with cleaning up, 
separaƟ ng and managing hazardous and non-hazardous waste”3 prove to be problemaƟ c when con-
fl ict of interest arises in quality and quanƟ ty of recovery. “In addiƟ on, deconstrucƟ on, establishment 
of permanent recycling infrastructure and enhancement of eco-industrial networks through strategic 
planning have been idenƟ fi ed as some of the key barriers in C&D debris management that need to be 
addressed.”4
 For San Francisco specifi cally, capacity for material staging and processing is the largest obstacle 
in promoƟ ng debris recycling.  Transfer staƟ ons used will not be able to manage all the debris that will 
be generated in San Francisco, since the earthquake will not be isolated to the City and the produced 
debris will include more than C&D materials. These and other regional faciliƟ es will be inundated with 
debris from all over the Bay Area, which must be accounted for when draŌ ing a debris management 
plan. PossibiliƟ es of temporary staging sites may also prove diﬃ  cult in a post-disaster context, since 
space is severely limited in San Francisco. 
 Researchers have suggested other obstacles municipaliƟ es may face when assessing disaster 
debris management. Some of these are listed in the following:
 The cost associated with separaƟ on of recyclable material adds to the total project cost
 PoliƟ cally necessary expedience of recovery reduces priority given to recycling
 Recycling requires the support of local debris management contractors
 PossibiliƟ es of large quanƟ Ɵ es of recycled products may overwhelm local market5
 PotenƟ al for lack of funds to acquire required technology and equipment
 Inadequacies in resources to deconstruct
 Lack of knowledge in a relaƟ vely new pracƟ ce (disaster debris reprocessing)
 LimitaƟ ons of recycling markets and limited market awareness6
The overarching obstacle is that of poliƟ cal and social will. In a Ɵ me of chaos, the best soluƟ ons are 
eclipsed by nearsighted decisions because fast acƟ on is required. Therefore, a community must decide 
on what is important and necessary to them, and realize that compromises must be made if posiƟ ve 
2 Swan, 2000. As cited by Phillips, 112
3  Luther, 2008 as cited by Karunasena, 251-255
4  Baycan and Petersen, 2002; Zeilinga and Sanders, 2004; Ardani et al., 2009. As cited by Karunsena, 260
5  Reinhart, Planning Tools for Disaster Debris Management. 
6  Ardani et al., 2009; UNEP, 2005; Srinivas and Nakagawa, 2007; Arslana and Cosgunb, 2008; Raufdeen, 
2009 as cited by Karunasena, 260-263
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outcomes are desired. Issues of disaster management tend to be undervalued, removing potenƟ al for 
creaƟ ve ideologies in handling massive amounts of disaster debris. This can be overcome with intenƟ ons 
by the City and its ciƟ zens to weigh their costs and benefi ts, and to abide by these decisions. As with any 
major recovery decision, pushback from various stakeholders and groups should be expected, since long-
term benefi ts may not be unanimously foreseeable in the immediate aŌ ermath of the disaster. 
6.1.2 RecommendaƟ ons
 Numerous case studies beyond California and the United States have made clear the necessity 
of discipline within a community following a disaster. Discipline in this sense means the strict regard for 
policy mandates, housing statues, and obsƟ nate “building-back-beƩ er” which should not be relaxed in 
a post-disaster scenario. This entails decision making through community dialogue with policy makers 
who can subsequently acknowledge pressing issues prior to a disaster. In this research, a factor requiring 
resolute decision is that of a mandated policy for material recovery from all construcƟ on and demoliƟ on 
sites. ImplementaƟ on of this strategy following a disaster needs city-wide parƟ cipaƟ on, from disaster 
managers to stake holders to community members, who must understand the necessary trade-oﬀ s 
required for a sustainable recovery. Without such discipline, great value is lost not only in recyclable ma-
terials, but that of the City’s tried and true recycling operaƟ ons prior to a disaster. Out of such discipline 
can come resilience, which in this case means the vigor of pre-disaster systems, methods and funcƟ ons 
that remain staunch in a disaster scenario. Encouragingly, San Francisco has garnered success in meth-
ods of material diversion, which can hopefully remain true given that policy mandates are not relaxed 
proceeding an earthquake.
 Research and results from the simulaƟ on model provide insight on suggesƟ ons for disaster de-
bris recycling as new material for refurbishing lost housing. These include:
 Stabilizing or increasing mandated material recovery rate from C&D sites. Relaxing of strin-
gent ordinances provide short-term panacea, but prove to have grave repercussions in the 
long-run, as menƟ oned previously. 
 Establishing relaƟ onships with local Material Recycling FaciliƟ es, foundries, contractors and 
waste managers to be key drivers in recovery of disaster debris material. This includes eco-
industrial partnerships necessary for staging and processing material. Eco-industrial planning 
is the “matchmaking of adjacent industries around shared or exchanged resources which can 
result in job creaƟ on, foster a more diversifi ed web of entrepreneurship and facilitate rapid 
and eﬃ  cient recovery from future disasters.”7 In other words, local industries that would 
typically be unrelated to disaster management can assist in progressing material diversion 
and reprocessing by adjusƟ ng their respecƟ ve business plans following a disaster event.  
For example, a large scale foundry can provide services to reprocess rebar metal found in 
concrete buildings that have been dismantled by the earthquake. This new material can be 
input into the construcƟ on material stream for restoraƟ on of housing units. In this way, local 
7  Duetz and Gibbs, 2004
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eco-industrial collaboraƟ ons can promote sustainable recovery. Eco-industrial partnerships 
also foster local supplies of material, and curb oﬀ -shoring of material processing for reuse. 
These partnerships require pre-disaster communicaƟ on and dialogue such that post-disaster 
processes are streamlined and expedited. 
 Encouraging deconstrucƟ on over demoliƟ on with building contractors prior to the earth-
quake. A result of this would be red-tagged units being hand-demolished rather than con-
venƟ onally demolished to provide more recovered material for processing, further diverƟ ng 
from landfi lls. Although deconstrucƟ on requires twice the labor and Ɵ me, it provides returns 
that are economically and environmentally benefi cial. Table 6.1.1A describes the diﬀ erences 
between deconstrucƟ on and demoliƟ on. 
 AdvocaƟ ng for city- and region- wide prescience for housing retrofi t and homeowner incen-
Ɵ ve for miƟ gaƟ ve acƟ viƟ es. Research and results from this thesis aƩ est to the advantages 
of retrofi ƫ  ng housing in San Francisco. Currently, only 10% of the housing stock is retrofi t-
ted, under which only a small percent have been retrofi Ʃ ed suﬃ  ciently. This means that 
many single- and mulƟ - family units are extremely vulnerable to shaking impacts during an 
earthquake event. Retrofi ƫ  ng is primarily for life-safety purposes, but mandates can im-
pel building code requirements for some level of building-life safety as well. Since every $1 
of miƟ gaƟ on acƟ vity equals $4 of recovery acƟ vity, retrofi ƫ  ng is an appropriate means of 
safeguarding vulnerable populaƟ ons in and around San Francisco. AddiƟ onally, if a home 
is retrofi Ʃ ed suitably, it is likely to be useful as shelter-in-place. This means that populace 
can reside in their homes following a disaster, since the housing has suﬀ ered liƩ le damage, 
deeming it shelter-in-place. Retaining ciƟ zens following a disaster is imperaƟ ve for recovery, 
especially if San Francisco wants to reach pre-disaster operaƟ on levels and economies fol-
lowing a large-scale event.  
 IniƟ aƟ ng preempƟ ve and regional conversaƟ ons that must take place in order that various 
ciƟ es can manage debris staging and processing corroboraƟ vely, since disasters cross juris-
dicƟ onal boundaries. Such conversaƟ ons should reach populaƟ ons as well, if eco-industrial 
partnerships are to be formed and linkages to be drawn. CiƟ zens must be aware of their role 
and responsibility in material recovery and overall restructuring of their city for comprehen-
sive recovery. 
 Campaigning for public educaƟ on. “By educaƟ ng the public about disaster debris, we can 
DeconstrucƟon DemoliƟon
Cost
Man-Hours
$3.6ϰͬƐƋ͘Ō͘ $1.7ϰͬƐƋ͘Ō͘
Labor 12 people 5 people
Time 5 days
480 hours
3 days 
120 hours 
DECONSTRUCTION VS. DEMOLITION
Table 6.1.1A. DeconstrucƟ on versus DemoliƟ on
Source: DeconstrucƟ on InsƟ tute, GreenHalo Systems. Note: For a typical 2000 square foot home
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reduce materials placed into landfi lls and raise cash to oﬀ set costs. Involving the public 
requires a pre-planned educaƟ onal program that starts, ideally, even before the disaster 
strikes. CiƟ zens should know where to fi nd informaƟ on about debris management. The me-
dia can prepare public informaƟ on messages, send reports to cover debris sites, and encour-
age residents to parƟ cipate.”8  
Researchers have also posed viable recommendaƟ ons regarding disaster debris recycling. These 
include:
 Recycling as part of the community disaster debris management plan. Historically, planning 
for recycling “aŌ er-the-fact” has not been wholly successful
 Planning that ensures that recycling is cost-eﬀ ecƟ ve and the approach is streamlined to 
avoid delaying cleanup
 Planners who must work with recycling coaliƟ ons to idenƟ fy available recycling infrastruc-
ture
 The poliƟ cal and regulatory environment must also support creaƟ on of the infrastructure 
necessary to recycle disaster debris9
 Predefi ning of prospecƟ ve roles and funcƟ on of the stakeholder’s involvement in debris 
management
 Establishing of a hierarchy of debris management, such as controlling, reuse, recycling and 
landfi lling
 Enhancing of the insƟ tuƟ onal capaciƟ es
 IdenƟ fying local resources; plant, equipment, budget, experƟ se and material processing op-
Ɵ ons
 Establishing of commercial relaƟ onships for resource recovery acƟ viƟ es10
These recommendaƟ ons beg for greater understanding and invesƟ gaƟ on of the economic 
streams of disaster debris recyclability and recycled content products, described in the following secƟ on. 
6.1.3 Economizing Recyclability of Disaster Debris
 AŌ er a disaster, specifi c value shiŌ s of materials will occur. ConstrucƟ on materials will be in high 
demand, and markets for reprocessed debris can fi ll needs for new construcƟ on material.  Although 
econometrics is grazed in the scope of this research, E.K. Lauritzen provides a fi nancial perspecƟ ve 
on recycling of construcƟ on and demoliƟ on waste relevant to this work. Lauritzen states that “from a 
purely economical point of view, recycling of building waste is only aƩ racƟ ve when recycled products are 
compeƟ Ɵ ve with natural resources for what concerns cost and quality. Recycled materials will normally 
be compeƟ Ɵ ve where there is a shortage of both raw materials and suitable deposit sites. With the use 
of recycled materials, economical savings in transportaƟ on of building waste and raw materials can be 
8 Friesen, Harder and Rifer, 1994, as cited by Phillips, 125
9 Reinhart, Planning tools for Disaster Debris Management
10 Ardani et al. as cited by Karunasena
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obtained [Figure 6.1.3A].”11
 In larger post-disaster reconstrucƟ on projects, (such as Kobe, Japan) the economy will be domi-
nated by the transportaƟ on costs. These transportaƟ on costs involve the removal of demoliƟ on products 
and the supply of new building materials. In these cases, the use of recycled materials becomes very 
aƩ racƟ ve.12 
 Localizing supply chains in northern California can increase demands for Recycled Content 
Products (RCP) used in reconstrucƟ on. The suggesƟ on here is to establish the framework for local RCP 
suppliers prior to a large-scale disaster such that the learning curve is reduced and local materials remain 
compeƟ Ɵ ve throughout the recovery process. With the same sense, Transfer StaƟ ons or Material Recy-
cling FaciliƟ es (MRFs) must be instated and operaƟ onal on a broader, Bay Area level in a pre-earthquake, 
equilibrium state, for supply chains to be eﬀ ecƟ ve following a disaster. SimulaƟ on results aƩ est to the 
benefi ts of increased Transfer StaƟ on/MRF capacity to the overall recyclability of disaster debris. They 
provide a staging, recovery, and processing ground such that useful material is diverted from landfi lls. 
Physical capacity has been discussed as being an obstacle for MRF prospectus; however, economic feasi-
bility of these transfer staƟ ons must also be assessed. For MRFs to be economically viable, construcƟ on 
and demoliƟ on recycling should be a rouƟ ne measure, which in San Francisco has been proven to be a 
successful means to recovering construcƟ on and demoliƟ on waste. If MRFs become compeƟ Ɵ ve with 
landfi lls, with equal or less expensive Ɵ pping fees, then contractors will have no reason to give prefer-
ence to landfi lling rather than to deposiƟ ng material to a recycling facility. Such incenƟ ves should be con-
ceptualized and implemented before an imposing event, such that post-disaster operaƟ ons are eﬃ  cient.  
 ProducƟ on and supply for RCP building materials depends on suﬃ  cient demand within the 
11  E.K. Lauritzen, Emergency ConstrucƟ on Waste Management, 1998, 9-11
12  De Pauw and Lauritzen, 1994; Lauritzen, 1994 as referenced by E.K. Lauritzen 1998
Figure 6.1.3A. Economic model of (I) tradiƟ onal demoliƟ on and waste handling without recycling and (II) de-
moliƟ on and waste handling including recycling of materials. A; amount of natural materials and transporta-
Ɵ on; B; amount of transportaƟ on and disposal of waste materials; X; amount of recycled materials. 
Source: E.K. Lauritzen, 1998. 
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region. Various actors can promote RCP demand based on their specifi ed role to the recycling or rebuild-
ing process. The type of reuse and recycling will establish demand from one of the following:
 Government department procurement direcƟ ves
 The building owner, developer, client
 Members of the design team
 Persons who write specifi caƟ ons
 Main or specialist contractors
 These actors will only specify RCPs if there is a good reason to do so. As always, “the foremost 
reason in many stakeholders’ perspecƟ ve is that of cost. There are already many examples of reclaimed 
or recondiƟ oned goods and RCPs that are most cost eﬀ ecƟ ve than virgin material, especially if they are 
locally processed. Cost alone, however, is not the only aspect that aﬀ ects decisions about building design 
and construcƟ on. Other infl uences can also determine the demand for RCP processing and supplying. 
Some of these include:
 LegislaƟ on, especially related to the responsibility for and the cost of waste disposal
 Planning policy at the local authority level, which infl uences planning condiƟ ons, environ-
mental design guidelines and waste targets
 Achieving credits in environmental assessment tools (such as LEED)
 The wishes of the client, perhaps encouraged by members of the project team
 Such factors yet again jusƟ fy the need for a broader city or regional based dialogue on usage of 
RCPs in the Bay Area. Many infl uenƟ al players can help make disaster debris recycling a viable opƟ on, 
including policy makers, disaster managers, and eco-industrial collaborators.”13
6.2 Future Work
 Applying system dynamics to a pre- or post-disaster framework has been a largely untapped 
method to assessing potenƟ al impacts to vulnerable communiƟ es. This methodology can present fi nd-
ings of relaƟ ons and feedback loops that were not formerly anƟ cipated or factored into the broader 
perspecƟ ve of disaster management. For this reason, employing such a strategy for interpreƟ ng miƟ ga-
Ɵ on measures, humanitarian logisƟ cs, and recovery goals can be valuable for many hazard communiƟ es 
around the globe. The intent is to extend this type of research to ciƟ es that have faced a disaster and are 
in a reconstrucƟ on period, or ciƟ es that may require amplifi ed miƟ gaƟ ve acƟ ons. 
 Furthermore, this research will eventually conƟ nue to understand holisƟ c Bay Area risks, and 
understand behavior of various factors aƩ ribuƟ ng to recovery. Expansion of the model boundaries will 
require addiƟ onal data mining, case studies, and consideraƟ on of built vulnerabiliƟ es.
13  Addis, 35-37
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6.3 Vision
 The overriding goal for this research is to unpack the variables infl uencing post-disaster eﬀ ects. 
It bounds the research on aspects of disaster debris and housing, but could explore beyond these factors 
in the future. This research anƟ cipates iteraƟ ve evoluƟ on, and hopes that readers and stakeholders can 
contribute to data used for this work to foster understanding of the Bay Area’s vulnerabiliƟ es. System 
models reveal great insight about processes that take place within a specifi ed domain, and can infl uence 
policy decisions due to its temporal qualiƟ es. Applying such modeling to the San Francisco Bay Area can 
provide discernment to promote sustainable miƟ gaƟ ve and recovery acƟ ons, and moreover, to encour-
age communiƟ es to parƟ cipate in their resilience. 
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APPENDIX A - DYNAMICS & RESULTS
A1. Driving Model EquaƟ ons
Refer to 4B and 4C
“AnƟ cipated Red-Tags” = 0.64
 Units: Dmnl
 64% of all red-tagged buildings are esƟ mated to be damaged beyond habitaƟ on. These 
 homes must go through the demoliƟ on/deconstrucƟ on line.
ConstrucƟ on = IF THEN ELSE ( Housing Units >= 330000, ( ( ConstrucƟ on Halt * Units Under ConstrucƟ on
                ) / Time to Construct ) , ( ( ( ( ( Local RCP use Policy * Imported Materials ) + ( 
                ( 1 - Local RCP use Policy ) * Recycled Content Building Materials ) ) * “Unit/Ton” 
           ) + Units Under ConstrucƟ on ) / Time to Construct ) * ConstrucƟ on Halt ) 
 Units: Units/Month
 ConverƟ ng recycled building material into constructed housing stock.
ConstrucƟ on Halt = 1 + STEP ( -1, 12) + RAMP ( ( 1 / 60) , 15, 75) + STEP ( -0.005, 75) 
 Units: Dmnl
 The halt in construcƟ on up to 3 months aŌ er earthquake.
Deconstructed Units = INTEG( MAX ( 0, DeconstrucƟ on Rate ) , 0) 
 Units: Units
 The number of deconstructed units over a specifi c Ɵ me period.
DeconstrucƟ on Rate = IF THEN ELSE ( Units to be Demolished Deconstructed <= 0, 0, ( ( ( 500 + Post 
Earthquake Eﬀ ects on Rate
                * Policy for DeconstrucƟ on * Units to be Demolished Deconstructed ) / Delay in DeconstrucƟ ng
                ) ) ) 
 Units: Units/Month
 The number of units per month that are destroyed via deconstrucƟ on. An esƟ mated 30% of 
 all building units are deconstructed.
Delay in DeconstrucƟ ng = 4
 Units: Month
 About 4 months for processing and physically deconstrucƟ ng unit .Typically twice the Ɵ me of 
 demoliƟ on.
Delay in Demolishing = 2
 Units: Month
 About 2 months for processing and physically demolishing a unit.
Demolish Rate = IF THEN ELSE ( Units to be Demolished Deconstructed <= 0, 0, ( ( ( 500 + Post Earth-
quake Eﬀ ects on Rate
                * Percent Demolished * Units to be Demolished Deconstructed ) / Delay in Demolishing
                ) ) ) 
 Units: Units/Month
 On Average, it is esƟ mated that it takes 0.6 months (or 18 days) to demolish a building 
 in an urban environment. The reciprocal of this is 1.64 units/month. An approximated 60% 
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 of all units are demolished.
Demolished Units = INTEG( MAX ( 0, Demolish Rate ) , 0) 
 Units: Units
 The number of demolished units over a specifi ed Ɵ me frame.
Earthquake = ( Pulse QuanƟ ty / TIME STEP ) * PULSE ( Pulse Time , TIME STEP ) 
 Units: Units/Month
 Eﬀ ect of earthquake on system.
End of Life Rate = 4.167 + STEP ( -4.167, 12) 
 Units: Units/Month
 50 units per year (As per San Francisco Dept. of Building InspecƟ on)
Housing Units = INTEG( ConstrucƟ on - End of Life Rate - Units destroyed by Earthquake , 330000) 
 Units: Units
 Number of exisƟ ng units in San Francisco is about 330,000 residenƟ al. (CAPSS, ATC 52-1, 
 page 9)
Import Delay = 2
 Units: Month
 From local foundry in Oakland, it takes about 2 months to ship recovered and processed 
 materials back to the states upon order. These are bulk orders, and as such, must have 
 enough of an order for it to be worthwhile to import to the Bay Area.
Imported Materials = INTEG( Rate of Import , 0) 
 Units: tons
 The rate of import is esƟ mated to be 10,000 tons for all material.
Local RCP use Policy = 0.25
 Units: Dmnl
 The percent of local RCP vs. Imported material used in construcƟ on. Value above is 
 mulƟ plier for Imported product use.
Percent Demolished = 1 - Policy for DeconstrucƟ on 
 Units: Dmnl
 100%- the percent of homes deconstructed equals the number of homes demolished per month.
Policy for DeconstrucƟ on = 0.001
 Units: Dmnl
 EsƟ mated that 40% of buildings are deconstructed per month.
Post Earthquake Eﬀ ects on Rate = Lookup for Unit DestrucƟ on ( Time ) 
 Units: Dmnl
 DeconstrucƟ on and DemoliƟ on processes aﬀ ected Post-Earthquake.
Pulse QuanƟ ty = 85000
 Units: Units
 Number of units destroyed by 7.2M earthquake (projected by ATC 52-1)
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Pulse Time = 12
 Units: Months
 Time in simulaƟ on at which earthquake strikes.
Rate of Import = IF THEN ELSE ( Housing Units >= 330000, 0, ( 10000 / Import Delay ) ) 
 Units: tons/Month
 10,000 tons imported per month (approximate) and aﬀ ected by delay Ɵ me.
Rate to Deem Unsafe = IF THEN ELSE ( Uninhabitable Units <= 500, 0, 1000 * Surveying ) 
 Units: Units/Month
 Surveying process to deem a building unsafe.
Recycled Content Building Materials = Recycled Building Materials * “Pre-EQ” * Eﬀ ect of Lookup on 
Increased RCP Use
 Units: tons
 It is assumed that prior to the EQ, no recycled building products are used.
SF Housing Start Rate = 18.425 * ConstrucƟ on Halt 
 Units: Units/Month
 Number of Units started Per Month, Federal Reserve StaƟ sƟ cs. This means 8.375 housing 
 starts x 2.2 units/housing (average) = 18.425 .
Surveying = 1 + STEP ( 1, 12) + RAMP ( - ( 1 / 21) , 15, 36) 
 Units: Dmnl
 This value shows the acceleraƟ on of the surveying process aŌ er the earthquake to deem 
 buildings safe/unsafe.
TIME STEP = 1
 Units: Month
 The Ɵ me step for the simulaƟ on.
Time to Construct = 3.4 + STEP ( 2, 12) + RAMP ( - ( 2 / 15) , 25, 40) 
 Units: Months
 6 to 9 months for construcƟ on, average of 7.5 months. 7.5/2.2 units per home (Census 2010)   
 about 3.4 months per unit.
Uninhabitable Units = INTEG( Units destroyed by Earthquake + End of Life Rate - Rate to Deem Unsafe 
           , 0) 
 Units: Units
 Number of Uninhabitable Units needing some method of deconstrucƟ on/demoliƟ on.
“Unit/Ton” = 1 / 34.5
 Units: unit/ton
 As per calculaƟ ons, one unit uses 34.5 tons/unit.
Units destroyed by Earthquake = Earthquake * “AnƟ cipated Red-Tags” 
 Units: Units/Month
 Housing Units destroyed by earthquake, but not collapsed. These units are considered 
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 “uninhabitable”
Units to be Demolished Deconstructed = INTEG( Rate to Deem Unsafe - Demolish Rate - DeconstrucƟ on 
Rate
                , 0) 
 Units: Units
 Number of Uninhabitable Units needing some method of deconstrucƟ on/demoliƟ on.
Units Under ConstrucƟ on = INTEG( MAX ( 0.001, SF Housing Start Rate - ConstrucƟ on ) , 0) 
 Units: Units
 Units under ConstrucƟ on is an accumulaƟ on stock from San Francisco Housing Start Rate.
“Amount of C&D Recyclable (Avg.)” = 0.725
 Units: Dmnl
 Percentage of Classifi ed DemoliƟ on/DeconstrucƟ on Waste that is recyclable. See Appendix D.
“C&D from Destructed Buildings” = IF THEN ELSE ( Housing Units >= 330000, 1, ( ( DeconstrucƟ on Rate
           + Demolish Rate ) * Tons per Unit ) ) 
 Units: tons/Month
 The amount of material generated from deconstrucƟ on and demoliƟ on pracƟ ces.
“C&D from EQ” = Tons per Unit * ( Units Collapsed by Earthquake ) 
 Units: tons/Month
 Units collapsed by earthquake mulƟ plied by tons per unit gives the amount of CD debris 
 generated from buildings that have immediately collapsed.
“C&D MRF Capacity” = INTEG( Capacity Growth - Decline , 367500) 
 Units: tons
 WIP of Transfer StaƟ on sites in/near SF. 
“C&D on Site” = INTEG( “Rate of C&D AccumulaƟ on” - Transfer , 0) 
 Units: tons
“C&D to be Reused/Sorted” = INTEG( Transfer - Rate of SeparaƟ on - To Landfi ll , 0) 
 Units: tons
 This stock represents the material that is ready to be sorted. It includes all materials 
 that are not Hazardous Houshold Wastes that are discarded via incineraƟ on, etc.
Capacity Growth = IF THEN ELSE ( “C&D MRF Capacity” >= 700000, 0, ( 10000 * Eﬀ ect of Capacity on 
Growth Rate
                * Normal FracƟ onal Growth Rate ) / “Delay in C&D Capacity Growth” ) 
 Units: tons/Month
 Number of Tons in capacity growth per month with a constant 10 ton increase per month, 
 and a maximum allowable of 700,000 tons.
Decline = “C&D MRF Capacity” * Normal FracƟ onal Decline Rate 
 Units: tons/Month
 The natural decline rate of C&D Capacity.
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“Delay in C&D Capacity Growth” = 9
 Units: Months
 9 months to increase capacity growth by at least 10,000.
Delay in Processing = 6
 Units: Month
 Delay in processing C&D materials into recycled, See Appendix D. 
Eﬀ ect of Capacity on Growth Rate = Lookup for Transfer StaƟ on Capacity Increase ( FracƟ on Used ) 
 Units: Dmnl
 FracƟ on Used gives the eﬀ ect of Capacity Increase on the Transfer StaƟ on growth.
“Eﬀ ect of Debris De/AcceleraƟ on” = “Rate De/AcceleraƟ on” ( Time ) 
 Units: Dmnl
 Eﬀ ect of Debris De/AcceleraƟ on as per federal help (Army Corps of Engineers).
Eﬀ ect of TS Capacity = “C&D MRF Capacity” / Maximum TS Capacity 
 Units: Dmnl
 RaƟ o of TS capacity to rate of separaƟ on.
Eﬀ ect on Transfer Rate = Look up for Transfer Rate ( Time ) 
 Units: Dmnl
 Look up for eﬀ ects on Transfer Rate.
FracƟ on Used = IF THEN ELSE ( “C&D on Site” <= 0, 0, ( “C&D on Site” / “C&D MRF Capacity” ) ) 
 Units: Dmnl
 FracƟ on of Transfer StaƟ on Capacity indicates the amount of C&D materials/total Transfer Sta  
 Ɵ on capacity. 367,500 tons is esƟ mated equilibrium capacity of Transfer StaƟ ons. 
Landfi ll AccumulaƟ on = INTEG( To Landfi ll , 0) 
 Units: tons
 SF Gate quotes 5 million tons to Yuba City in 10 years. This is about 500,000 tons of 
 material that is expected to be generated each year.
Lookup for Transfer StaƟ on Capacity Increase ( [(0,0)-(10,20),(0,1),(0.5,1),(0.75,1.5),(0.978593,2)
            ,(1.1,4),(1.5,6),(2,8),(3,9),(4,10),(4,12),(5,14),(6,16),(7,16),(8,16),(9,16),(10,16),(11,16)
            ,(12,16),(12.844,16),(120,16),(150,16)],(0,1),(0.397554,1.31579),(0.636086,1.92982),(1.03364,3.3
3333)
            ,(1.23242,4.73684),(1.43119,6.40351),(1.59021,8.33333),(1.70948,10.5263),(2.02752,12.5439)
            ,(2.66361,14.386),(3.61774,15.7018),(4.77064,15.8772),(6.16208,16.0526),(6.24159,16.1404)
            ,(6.59939,15.9649),(7.51376,15.9649),(8,16),(9,16),(10,16),(11,16),(12,16),(12.844,16),(250,16)
            )
 Units: Dmnl
 Table Lookup for capacity vs. number of Transfer StaƟ ons.
Maximum TS Capacity = 367500
 Units: tons
 367500 tons/month
120 // Appendix
Normal FracƟ onal Decline Rate = 0.005
 Units: 1/Month
 Half a percent of the Transfer StaƟ on capacity declines each month due to normal degradaƟ on.
Normal FracƟ onal Growth Rate = 0.2
 Units: 1/Month
 Normal fracƟ onal growth rate of each Transfer StaƟ on to start as 1/5 months or 0.2
“Percent C&D Recovered (Mandated)” = 0.65
 Units: Dmnl
 Per San Francisco Environmental Code Ch 14 and C&D Debris Recovery Ordinance, a minimum of  
 65% of C&D waste must be recovered.
“Percent C&D to Landfi ll” = MAX ( 0.2, 1 - “Percent C&D Recovered (Mandated)” ) 
 Units: Dmnl
 Per SF Environmental Code Ch 14 and C&D Debris Recovery Ordinance, a minimum of 65% of 
 C&D waste must be recovered. The rest will presumably go to landfi ll. 
Policy for Amount Processed Per Month = 0.4
 Units: Dmnl
 Minimum amount of recycling per month, esƟ mated at 40% for liƩ le demand of recycled 
 building products from local C&D demoliƟ on sources (SF has few demoliƟ on projects per 
 month, therefore, recycling as building material may not iniƟ ally have much demand).
“Rate of C&D AccumulaƟ on” = “Tons/Month of C&D from source” + “C&D from EQ” + “C&D from De-
structed Buildings”
           
 Units: tons/Month
 From HDMT, 2008 data shows that SF generates 1600 tons of C&D waste, out of a nearly 
 5,400 ton solid waste transfer each day.
Rate of Recycling = IF THEN ELSE ( Recovered Materials <= 0, 100, ( ( Recovered Materials * “Amount of 
C&D Recyclable (Avg.)”
                * Policy for Amount Processed Per Month ) - ( 0.1 * “Amount of C&D Recyclable (Avg.)”
                     * Recovered Materials * Policy for Amount Processed Per Month ) ) / Delay in Processing
                ) 
 Units: tons/Month
 The rate of recycling is dependant on the Recovered Materials diverted from landfi ll, the 
 amount of C&D recyclable, the percent of Recovered Material that actually becomes 
 building materials, the delay in processing of this material, and a nominal amount of 
 material lost in processing (0.074).
Rate of SeparaƟ on = IF THEN ELSE ( “C&D to be Reused/Sorted” <= 0, 0, ( ( ( ( “C&D to be Reused/Sorted”
           ) - ( 0.1 * ( “C&D to be Reused/Sorted” ) ) ) / “Time to Separate C&D” ) * “Percent C&D Recovered 
(Mandated)”
                * Eﬀ ect of TS Capacity * “Eﬀ ect of Debris De/AcceleraƟ on” ) ) 
 Units: tons/Month
 Approximate tonnage separated at SF C&D mixed recycling site. Quoted at 75 tons/hour or 
 1200 tons/day. SubtracƟ on of 0.1 x C&D to be Reused/Sorted is to show that some material is 
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 lost in process of separaƟ on.
Recovered Materials = INTEG( Rate of SeparaƟ on - Rate of Recycling - Unrecyclable , 0) 
 Units: tons
 Amount of C&D material recovered from Transfer StaƟ ons.
Recycled Building Materials = INTEG( Rate of Recycling - Sold to Market , 0) 
 Units: tons
 Tons of Building Materials produced from recycled C&D material.
Road Clearance = 1 + STEP ( -0.5, 12) + RAMP ( ( 1 / 24) , 13, 25) 
 Units: Dmnl
 This is the value of the amount of roads that may be impeded aŌ er an earthquake. In its 
 equilibrium state, the RC = 1. Based oﬀ  of GIS calculaƟ ons and ABAG data, the number of 
 miles of road that are aﬀ ected due to the earthquake are about 25% of the total mileage. 
 From the Loma Prieta earthquake, it is noted that on average, it took 134 days to clear 
 the roads (rounded to one year for simulaƟ on). 
Sold to Market = IF THEN ELSE ( Recycled Building Materials <= 2000, 0, 1000) 
 Units: tons/Month
 The amount of recovered building materials that are sold per month. 
“Time to Separate C&D” = 1.23
 Units: Month
 Takes 5 weeks or 1.23 month to separate one month’s worth of C&D. ApproximaƟ on.
To Landfi ll = IF THEN ELSE ( “C&D to be Reused/Sorted” <= 0, 0, ( ( “Percent C&D to Landfi ll” ) * ( 
                ( “C&D to be Reused/Sorted” ) / Transfer Delay to LF ) * “Eﬀ ect of Debris De/AcceleraƟ on”
                ) ) 
 Units: tons/Month
 1057 x 30 = 31 710
Tons per Unit = 34.5
 Units: tons/unit
 600 sq Ō  and 750 sq Ō  footprint Single Family and MulƟ family Homes, 
 respecƟ vely. See Appendix B. 
“Tons/Month of C&D from source” = 5760 + STEP ( -5670, 12) + RAMP ( ( 5670 / 66) , 14, 80) 
 Units: tons/Month
 5760 Tons of C&D created on site per month: (1600-1800 tons of refuse/day x 30 day/month, 
 with 12-30% C&D; lower bound represented. 5760 = 1600 x .12 x 30 CD in SF waste stream.
Transfer = IF THEN ELSE ( “C&D on Site” <= 20000, 5000, ( 20000 * Road Clearance * Eﬀ ect on Transfer 
Rate
                * Eﬀ ect of TS Capacity ) / Transfer Delay ) 
 Units: tons/Month
 As per calculaƟ ons from Tri-Ced recycling CEO Richard Valle, about 20 large trucks in SF 
 working at 15 tons/truck over one month is nearly 10,000 tons. Over 2 months will be 
 20,000 tons.
122 // Appendix
Transfer Delay = 1 + STEP ( -0.99, 12) + RAMP ( ( 1 / 12) , 13, 25) 
 Units: Month
 Two Months to move 20,000 tons of debris.
Transfer Delay to LF = 1.1 + STEP ( 1, 12) + RAMP ( - ( 1 / 35) , 15, 50) 
 Units: Month
 About 1.1 month to transfer 1 months worth of landfi ll (to Livermore).
Units Collapsed by Earthquake = Earthquake * 0.36
 Units: Units/Month
 36% of units will collapse on onset of earthquake.
Unrecyclable = Recovered Materials * ( 1 - “Amount of C&D Recyclable (Avg.)” ) 
 Units: tons/Month
 Assume the material that is not recovered each month is sent to landfi ll.
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GRAPHICAL SNAPSHOTS OF STOCKS
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Figure A2. Various Behaviors of Stocks
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Figure A3. Environmental System Systems Model, Taichung City Earthquake.
Source: Ho, Lu and Wang, 2006
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Retrofi t Cost
 The following equaƟ on provides homeowners with a basic calculaƟ on when deciding for housing 
retrofi t. It compares the cost of retrofi ƫ  ng to the associated risk of housing, as well as the risk of dam-
age even aŌ er a retrofi t has been completed. Since only 6% of retrofi ts are done accurately and thor-
oughly, chances of damage following housing retrofi t is a possibility. 
 If 
 Then
  Don’t retrofi t
Example (data from ATC 52-1, 52-3)
Cost to retrofi t Scheme 1 ($6.60/sq Ō )
Cost to rebuild (approx.) $250/sqŌ )
If all units were to be retrofi Ʃ ed to scheme 1
 Percentage collapse would go down to 8% from 31%
Assume a unit is 1500 sq Ō 
 Then
1500 x 6.60 + (1500 x 250 x 0.08) = 40,000
1500 x 250 x 0.31 = 116,250
40k < 116.3K therefore, this homeowner should retrofi t. 
Cost 
of 
Retrofi t
Cost 
of 
Rebuild
% chance
Rebuild 
following
Retrofi t
>+ x( ) Cost of Rebuild % chanceRebuild without
Retrofi t
x( )
A4- Retrofi t CalculaƟ on
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Hauling and CO2 Emissions
 The following calculaƟ ons esƟ mate the number of round trips trucks would need to make from 
landfi ll, and the total emission that would be released from these trips. It is assumed that trucks start 
in San Francisco and return back to San Francisco. Note that these are very simplifi ed results that may 
exclude other variables that also generate emissions. 
Altamont Landfi ll is about 60 miles one way. To calculate emissions, reduce 10 miles for transfer that 
is near San Francisco. Therefore, the round trip for one truck 100 miles (50mi x 2)
CNG like LNG has 90% less air polluƟ on than diesel gas, and is what Recology trucks are using in San 
Francisco. 
Diesel produces 22.3 lbs of CO2/gallon (EPA)
Calculate the CO2 emissions for diesel, then reduce per CNG  raƟ ngs:
The average garbage truck travels about 25,000 annually, gets about 3 miles/gallon, and uses 8,600 
gallons of fuel. 
For 100 mile round trip to/from Altamont Landfi ll in Livermore
 100 miles/3 miles/gallon = 34 gallons per truck
 34 gallons per truck X 22.3 lbs CO2/gallon = 758.2 lbs CO2/truck
Using the base case scenario for RCP 25%, we get about 1.096M tons of landfi ll:
From informaƟ on from Richard Valle, each truck can carry 10-15 tons. Using the higher range:
1.096M tons LANDFILLED / 15 tons/truck = 73,066 trucks
73,066 trucks x 758.2 lbs CO2/truck = 55,399,147 lbs CO2 = 27,700 tons CO2 for diesel fuel
Reduce by 90% for CNG esƟ mate:
 2770 tons CO2 WITH RECOVERY
Account for recovered material added to landfi ll material:
1.096M+1.5M = 2.596M
 2.596M tons / 15 tons/truck = 173066.67 trucks
 17,3067 trucks x 758.2 lbs CO2/truck = 131219399.4 lbs = 65609.6997 tons
 Reduce by 90% = 65,610 tons CO2 if NO RECOVERY 
65,610-2770 CO2 = 62,839 tons CO2 SAVED if recovery implemented over 6.8 years
Source: www.informinc.org/fact_ggt.php
A5- Hauling and C02 Emissions
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APPENDIX B - HOUSING
Simulated Housing starts versus Projected 
 Using a 18.425 housing unit start per month from Federal Reserve StaƟ sƟ cs1 for driving model 
and comparing it to data from California Building Industry AssociaƟ on2, we fi nd that the 2010 data proj-
ects an esƟ mated 18 housing unit starts per month, showing negligible diﬀ erence to the esƟ maƟ on used 
for this research. 
1 “hƩ p://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/staƟ sƟ csdata.htm
2  “Housing Starts,” California Building Industry AssociaƟ on, 2010, California Building Industry AssociaƟ on, 
11 Nov. 2011 < hƩ p://www.cbia.org/go/newsroom/housing-staƟ sƟ cs/housing-starts/>.
Figure B1. Total single family and mulƟ -family housing starts for San Francisco, San Mateo 
and Redwood City
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 Using the above graph, an extrapolaƟ on of data using the regression equaƟ on yields nearly 18 
housing unit starts per month, reinforcing the value used for simulaƟ on modeling.
Month
Total, San Francisco, 
Redwood City, San 
Mateo
2010 San 
Francisco
Jan 18 10.8
Feb 35 21
Mar 63 37.8
Apr 36 21.6
May 44 26.4
Jun 240 144
Jul 54 32.4
Aug 64 38.4
Sep 187 112.2
Oct 46 27.6
Nov 35 21
Dec 302 181.2
AVE 56.2
Housing Starts, 2010, CBIA
CBIA, California Building Industry Assoc.
Table B2. Disaggregated Housing Start Data for San Francisco City
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Figure B3. 2010 Housing Starts with Regression Analysis
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MONTH
Permits for DestrucƟon 
(Units)
January 8
February 4
March 12
April 2
May 16
June 1
July 2
August 1
September 3
October 0
November 0
December 1
Total Destructed
50
Average Destructed
4.17
Table B4. DestrucƟ on Permits Issued, 2011. 
Source: San Francisco Department of Building InspecƟ on
DestrucƟ on Permits Issued, 2011, San Francisco
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Vulnerable Structures, as defi ned by California AcƟ on Plan for Seismic Safety, Report 52-1, 2010
Concrete Buildings Built Before 1980
 Older reinforced concrete buildings can experience dramaƟ c and deadly collapses during earth-
quakes. Such collapses are responsible for many of the casualƟ es in earthquakes around the world. 
However, any older concrete buildings might remain standing but suﬀ er a great amount of damage. In-
side the columns,beams, walls and fl oor slabs of reinforced concrete buildings lay steel reinforcing bars. 
Ideally, these bars allow reinforced concrete buildings to not only carry loads from gravity, but also to 
withstand the side-to-side shaking caused by earthquakes. Older reinforced concrete buildings may not 
have enough steel inside them or may not have steel in adequate confi guraƟ ons to survive the level of 
shaking that will occur in San Francisco earthquakes.
 The design and construcƟ on of Californian reinforced concrete buildings improved signifi cantly in 
the mid-to-late 1970’s. Engineers learned from dramaƟ c failures of these buildings during the 1971 San 
Fernando earthquake in Southern California and other earthquakes. It took some years for these lessons 
to be refl ected in building codes and new construcƟ on projects. This study assumes that all reinforced 
concrete buildings constructed before 1980 may have design problems. This date was chosen to be con-
sistent with a focused earthquake hazard reducƟ on program—the Concrete CoaliƟ on—that is working to 
study this type of building. 
 Many older concrete-frame buildings have unreinforced masonry walls fi lling the space between 
columns and fl oors to form walls for the exterior, elevator shaŌ s, and stairwells. The masonry can help 
these buildings to remain standing during earthquakes, but the walls, being briƩ le, can crack and fall into 
or out of the building, creaƟ ng signifi cant dangers to those on sidewalks and causing damage that would 
be expensive and Ɵ me-consuming to repair. Some of these buildings also have a soŌ story at the ground 
level, and could collapse. It is costly and diﬃ  cult to reinforce these buildings before an earthquake and to 
repair them when they are damaged. There are older reinforced concrete buildings in San Francisco be-
ing used as apartment buildings, private schools, oﬃ  ce buildings and warehouses. Thousands of people 
use these buildings daily. What is not known is which specifi c concrete buildings are most dangerous, 
and idenƟ fying the dangerous ones is challenging. Typically, it requires engineers with specifi c skills to 
conduct invasive and costly tests and analyze performance.
Unreinforced Masonry Bearing Wall Buildings
Unreinforced masonry bearing wall buildings have long been recognized as one of the most 
dangerous types of buildings in earthquakes. These buildings are constructed with brick walls that bear 
the weight of the building. They typically have six or fewer stories and were built before the mid-1930’s, 
when building codes were changed to prevent this type of construcƟ on. They perform very poorly in 
earthquakes. Building parapets and secƟ ons of walls can fall outward, and some buildings can collapse in 
even moderate shaking. This building type has been responsible for many deaths in past earthquakes.
 San Francisco has been working to improve the safety of its unreinforced masonry bearing wall 
buildings for decades, fi rst through an ordinance requiring parapets to be anchored, and later through an 
ordinance requiring most of these buildings to be retrofi Ʃ ed. As of the wriƟ ng of this report, 90 per-
cent (1,526 out of 1,699) of the buildings on the City’s list of unreinforced masonry buildings had been 
retrofi Ʃ ed or demolished, and a remaining 10 percent were in process of becoming compliant with the 
ordinance, or were referred to the City AƩ orney’s
Oﬃ  ce for enforcement. It is important to note that retrofi Ʃ ed unreinforced masonry buildings remain 
highly vulnerable to earthquakes. When exposed to strong shaking, it is likely that retrofi Ʃ ed buildings 
would cause signifi cantly fewer casualƟ es than those that have not been retrofi Ʃ ed, but many buildings 
could be damaged beyond repair, displacing their occupants and requiring demoliƟ on. A few hundred 
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masonry buildings were exempted from the City’s retrofi t ordinance, including buildings used only as 
residences with four or fewer units. It is likely that many of these remain unretrofi Ʃ ed.
Welded steel moment frame buildings
 The welds connecƟ ng columns and beams in steel moment frame buildings built before 1994 
can crack in earthquake shaking, leading to a reducƟ on in their capacity to support the building. Before 
this vulnerability was discovered, this construcƟ on type was thought to have
excellent seismic performance and, therefore, was popular for large oﬃ  ce buildings. The 1994 southern 
California Northridge earthquake revealed this weakness. A number of San Francisco’s downtown high-
rises are welded steel moment frames.
Concrete Ɵ lt-up buildings
These buildings have precast concrete panels that are raised in place to form the building walls. If the 
walls are not adequately connected to each other and to the roof, they can separate when shaken by an 
earthquake, causing the roof to collapse on the occupants and contents of the building. This structure 
type is oŌ en used for industrial purposes, but may also be used for some grocery stores or other com-
mercial purposes. There are an esƟ mated 200 of these buildings in San Francisco.
Older steel buildings with masonry infi ll walls
San Francisco has many steelframe buildings from the early part of the last century with masonry walls 
fi lling the space between columns and fl oors to form walls for the exterior, elevator shaŌ s, and stair-
wells. The steel is oŌ en encased in concrete for fi reproofi ng purposes, making the building appear to be 
a concrete frame to a casual observer. The masonry walls in these buildings can crack up and fall into or 
out of the building, creaƟ ng signifi cant dangers to those on sidewalks and causing damage that would be 
expensive and Ɵ me-consuming to repair. These buildings are used as residences and oﬃ  ces, and many 
have beauƟ ful period architectural detailing. 
Hillside Buildings 
San Francisco’s characterisƟ c hills have led to many buildings that have more stories on one side than the 
other. For example, it is common to see buildings with one or two stories of street frontage, but three 
or four stories when seen from the back. Structurally, buildings with irregular heights can be especially 
vulnerable to earthquake shaking, parƟ cularly if the lower levels have a soŌ -story or other structurally 
defi cient condiƟ on.
Cladding, Finishes and Chimneys
Buildings of all structural types have elements that can fall oﬀ  during earthquakes, parƟ cularly if their 
connecƟ ons have deteriorated due to age or corrosion. These elements can hurt people or aﬀ ect the 
funcƟ onality of a building. They include cladding (outside fi nishes of glass, brick, stone, or other mate-
rials), and decoraƟ ve elements. Masonry chimneys are briƩ le and oŌ en lack reinforcing steel. During 
earthquakes they can snap at the roof or pull away from a building. Falling bricks can crash through roofs 
or onto the ground below.
B5- Vulnerable Housing Type DescripƟ on
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Falling hazards and uƟ lity failure 
There are a variety of non-structural issues that can lead to deaths and injuries, or make buildings unus-
able. These include Ɵ pping of heavy furniture and equipment and falling light fi xtures or objects on  
shelves. Falling hazards can be serious, even in buildings that are structurally sound. For example, studies 
following the 1999 Kocaeli earthquake near Istanbul, Turkey found that nearly half of the casualƟ es were 
caused by non structural elements rather than damage to the building structure. A variety of non-struc-
tural issues can also make buildings unusable, such as inoperable elevators or destrucƟ on of furniture 
due to water damage.
EsƟ mated Damage to Wood-Frame SoŌ -Story Buildings in Various Earthquake Scenarios
Table B6. Red-Tag EsƟ mates 
64% damaged beyond repair is an average of high values between columns 3 and 4; 31/85 = 36% collapse on 
impact and 54/85 = 64% are red tagged for demoliƟ on/repair. Source: California AcƟ on Plan for Seismic Safety, 
2010. 
Scenario 
Dollar 
Loss* 
($Billions) 
Estimated Distribution of 2,800 Buildings with Large 
Openings by Post-earthquake Safety Tagging Category 
Green Tag 
(% of 
Buildings) 
Yellow Tag 
(% of 
Buildings) 
Red Tag – 
No Collapse
(% of 
Buildings) 
Red Tag – 
Collapse 
(% of 
Buildings) 
Magnitude 6.9 
Hayward Fault 
$3.2 33 - 49 19 - 27 18 - 30 6 - 18 
Magnitude 6.5  
San Andreas Fault 
$3.6 22 - 42 17 - 27 23 - 39 8 - 23 
Magnitude 7.2  
San Andreas Fault 
$4.1 6 - 35 9 - 23 32 - 54 11 - 31 
Magnitude 7.9  
San Andreas Fault 
$4.4 1 - 33 2 - 18 37 - 62 12 - 35 
* The total estimated value of these buildings and their contents is approximately $14 billion.  This 
excludes the value of the land. 
M:  Magnitude 
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EsƟ mated Damage to Housing, HAZUS Study
Table B7. Housing Damage by Earthquake Magnitude.
Source: California AcƟ on Plan for Seismic Safety, 2010
Scenario Retrofit 
SPUR Performance Level Among 2,800 Buildings (%) 
A B C D E 
Magnitude 6.9 
Hayward Fault 
As-is 15% 18% 19% 30% 18% 
 1 50% 22% 18% 8% 2% 
 2 68% 16% 10% 6% 0.3% 
 3 72% 16% 9% 3% 0.2% 
Magnitude 6.5 
San Andreas 
Fault 
As-is 9% 13% 17% 39% 22% 
 1 38% 23% 23% 13% 4% 
 2 56% 20% 15% 9% 1% 
 3 59% 20% 15% 6% 0.3% 
Magnitude 7.2 
San Andreas 
Fault 
As-is 2% 5% 9% 54% 31% 
 1 17% 19% 28% 28% 8% 
 2 35% 22% 24% 18% 1% 
 3 44% 23% 21% 12% 0.7% 
Magnitude 7.9 
San Andreas 
Fault 
As-is 0% 1% 2% 62% 35% 
 1 4% 8% 21% 52% 14% 
 2 10% 14% 26% 47% 3% 
 3 13% 15% 26% 44% 3% 
Note: SPUR performance levels are color-coded to indicate an equivalency with the 
ATC-20 UNSAFE placard/tag (red), RESTRICTED USE placard/tag (yellow), 
and INSPECTED (apparently safe) placard/tag (green). 
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g y
Size of Building Number of Buildingsa 
Number of Dwelling 
Unitsb 
Valuec  
($ Billions) 
Single-Family 
houses  
112,000 112,000 $53 
Two unit residences 19,000 38,000 $22 
Three or more unit 
residencesd 
23,000 180,000 $45 
Totale 150,000 330,000 $120 
a. These numbers are estimates for 2009. 
b. Note that dwelling unit counts may vary from what is presented in other tables due to 
different source materials. The counts presented in this table represent a best effort using 
all available data sources to match building counts with unit counts. 
c. These figures represent an estimate of the cost to replace or reconstruct a building in 
2009. They do not include the value of the land the building sits on or a building’s 
contents. Replacement values are significantly different than real estate prices or 
assessed valuation. Building value is based on square footage from the San Francisco 
Assessor’s Tax Roll, not the estimated number of buildings.  
d. Note that wood-frame residences with three or more stories and five or more units, 
discussed in the companion CAPSS report Earthquake Safety for Soft-Story Buildings 
(ATC 52-3 Report), are a subset of these buildings. That report discusses that there are 
an estimated 4,400 of those buildings built before May 1973, with 45,000 units, valued at 
about $14 billion. Many, but not all, have a soft-story condition. 
e. Numbers in table have been rounded, which can make totals differ from sum of columns 
or rows. 
Sources:  This study, San Francisco Assessor’s Tax Roll, Census data, San Francisco 
Planning Department, and San Francisco Department of Building Inspection. 
Table B8. ResidenƟ al Building and Dwelling Units and Value. Source: California AcƟ on 
Plan for Seismic Safety, 2010
ResidenƟ al Building and Dwelling Units and Value Used in CAPSS Report
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Material In Housing Percentage (%)
Concrete 78.25
Drywall 2.42
Wood 17.28
Asphalt 0.7
Steel 1.35
100
^/DW>/&/DdZ/>
KDWK^/d/KE/E,Kh^/E'hE/d^
Table B11. Material in Housing. Simplifi ed and average calculaƟ on from RS Means
calculaƟ on of single-family and mulƟ -family units. 
BED
LIVING
BATH
KITCHEN
GARAGE
DINING
LIVING DINING
BED BATH KITCHEN
Average Housing Unit, San Francisco
Figure B9. Average Housing Unit, Floor Plan
Note: Dimensions are 21.2’ x 63.6’ and is typically within a 4 storey building. Assumed four units per fl oor. 
Scale 1/128” = 1’-0”
Figure B10. Example MulƟ -Family Unit. Source California AcƟ on Plan for Seismic Safety, 2010
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RetroĮt Scheme DescripƟon
1
RetroĮt 1 targeted SPUR Level D as the intended performance. This was 
approached by idenƟfying and retroĮƫng the speciĮc exterior wall lines that 
were clearlyvulnerable. This approach assumed that by addressing the obvious 
vulnerability, the performance of the building would increase to match the 
performance of similar buildings without the obvious vulnerability. Typical retroĮt 
measures included steel moment frames and oriented strand board (OSB) shear 
walls being added in the ground story.
2
RetroĮt 2, like RetroĮt 1, typically involved use of steel moment frames and
OSB shear walls. A greater extent of OSB shear wall was provided in RetroĮt 2 than
in RetroĮt 1.
3
This was approached by replacing the steel moment frames with steel 
canƟlevered columns, while maintaining the seismic force level used for 
proporƟoning the system. Because the canƟlevered columns are designed using 
an R factor of 2.5 rather than the moment frame R of 8, their use led to lower 
deŇecƟons, which should translate to a lower cost of repair.
Retrofi ts Examined, CAPSS
Table B14. Retrofi t Schemes. Source: California AcƟ on Plan for Seismic Safety, 2010
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
As-is Retrofit 1 Retrofit 2 Retrofit 3
%
 o
f b
ui
ld
in
gs
Green Tag
Yellow Tag
Red Tag - No Collapse
Red Tag - Collapsed
Figure B15. DistribuƟ on of Damage Tags Before and AŌ er Retrofi t Schemes. Mag-
nitude 7.2 earthquake on San Andreas Fault. Corresponding to schemes described 
in Table B14. Source: California AcƟ on Plan for Seismic Safety, 2010
Damage Tag DistribuƟ on, CAPSS 
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APPENDIX C - DEBRIS & WASTE
Defi niƟ ons of ConstrucƟ on and DemoliƟ on Waste
by California Integrated Waste Management Board, Waste CharacterizaƟ on Study, 2008, 117-118.
Concrete means a hard material made from sand, aggregate, gravel, cement mix and water. Examples 
include pieces of building foundaƟ ons, concrete paving, and concrete/cinder blocks.
Asphalt Paving means a black or brown, tar-like material mixed with aggregate used as a paving material.
Asphalt ComposiƟ on Shingles means composite shingles composed of fi berglass or organic felts saturat-
ed with asphalt and covered with inert aggregates. Does not include built-up roofi ng. Commonly known 
as three tab roofi ng.
Roofi ng Tar Paper/Felt means a heavy paper impregnated with tar or a fi berglass or polyester fl eece 
impregnated with tar and used as part of a roof for waterproofi ng.
Roofi ng MasƟ c means a paste-like material used as an adhesive or seal in roofi ng applicaƟ ons.
Built-up Roofi ng means other roofi ng material made with layers of felt, asphalt, aggregates, and aƩ ached 
roofi ng tar and tar paper normally used on fl at/low pitched roofs usually on commercial buildings.
Other Asphalt Roofi ng Material means any other roofi ng material containing asphalt that cannot be put 
into any of the other roofi ng material types.
Clean Dimensional Lumber means unpainted new or demoliƟ on dimensional lumber. Includes materials 
such as 2x4s, 2x6s, 2x12s, and other residual materials from framing and related construcƟ on acƟ viƟ es. 
May contain nails or other trace contaminants.
Clean Engineered Wood means unpainted new or demoliƟ on scrap from sheeted goods such as ply-
wood, parƟ cleboard, wafer board, oriented strand board, and other residual materials used for sheath-
ing and related construcƟ on uses. May contain nails or other trace contaminants.
Clean Pallets and Crates means unpainted wood pallets, crates, and packaging made of lumber/engi-
neered wood.
Other Wood Waste means wood waste that cannot be put into any other material type. This type may 
include untreated/unpainted scrap from producƟ on of prefabricated wood products such as wood furni-
ture or cabinets, untreated or unpainted wood roofi ng and siding, painted or stained wood, and treated 
wood.
Clean Gypsum Board means unpainted gypsum wallboard or interior wall covering made of a sheet of 
gypsum sandwiched between paper layers. Examples include used or unused, broken or whole sheets. 
Gypsum board may also be called Sheetrock, drywall, plasterboard, gypboard, Gyproc, or wallboard.
Painted/DemoliƟ on Gypsum Board means painted gypsum wallboard or interior wall covering made of a 
sheet of gypsum sandwiched between paper layers. Examples: This type includes used or unused, broken 
or whole sheets. Gypsum board may also be called Sheetrock, drywall, plasterboard, gypboard, Gyproc, 
or wallboard.
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Rock, Soil and Fines means rock pieces of any size and soil, dirt, and other maƩ er. Examples include rock, 
stones, sand, clay, soil, and other fi nes. This type also includes non-hazardous contaminated soil.
Remainder/Composite Inerts and Other means inerts and other material that cannot be put in any other 
type. This type may include items from diﬀ erent types combined, which would be very hard to separate. 
Examples include brick, ceramics, Ɵ les, toilets, sinks, and fi berglass insulaƟ on. This type may also include 
demoliƟ on debris that is a mixture of items such as plate glass, wood, Ɵ les, gypsum board, and alumi-
num scrap.
Materials Recovery Facility Cost versus Landfi lling Cost
TABLE C2. Adapted from Handbook: Material Recovery FaciliƟ es for Municipal Solid Waste, Peer Consultants, P.C. 
and CalRecovery, Inc., 1991.
Note: Values for MRF construcƟ on cost are not including variable cost or equipment cost; an increase of 70,000 
tons/month will result in up to $2.2M in construcƟ on costs. Landfi ll contract cost is based on a $22 M contract 
for 10 years, 3 landfi ll years equals $6.6 M. Source: Material Recovery Facility, TN, 2003.
MRF LandĮll
ConstrucƟon Cost Contract Cost
$1.4M - $2.2M $6.6M
Savings up to $4.4 Million
C1- Defi niƟ ons of C&D Waste
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Wood/Brick/Other Amount/Area x1000
Area (mi) Low (Tons) (Tons/Sq Mi) (Tons)
0.19 120.00 120
3.06 50.00 16.34
16.59 20.00 1.21
17.83 5.00 0.28
5.38 0.00 0
dŽƚĂů^ƋDŝůĞƐīĞĐƚĞĚ
43.05
5,933.40 tons 5,933,402.46
Concrete/Steel x 1000
Area (mi) Low (Tons) (Tons)
2.062 210.00 101.84
1.73 120.00 69.36
7.79 50.00 6.42
29.07 5.00 0.17
5.1 0.00 0
Total Sq Miles Aīected
45.75
8,134.59 tons 8,134,591.98
Total 14,067,994.44
Average 195.00 137.83
385.00 177.8Average
Avg. x Total Sq Mi
Avg. x Total Sq Mi
SF Debris Management Guide 
(Debris from buildings due to 
shaking and liquefacƟon of 7.9M)
Low 
average
Normalized to 
7.2M earthquake 
generaƟng 6.8M 
tons generated
(tons)
Percentage Material 
Needed for Recovery
Debris Generated 
ResidenƟal Wood 
Frame Only: 
Number of Units 
destroyed x 
tons/unit = 85k x 
34.5 (tons)
Brick/Wood/Other Debris tons 5,900,000 2,400,000 0.358
Concrete & Steel Debris tons 8,100,000 4,400,000 0.647
Total 14,000,000 6,800,000 1 2932500
Type of Debris Amount of Debris in Million Tons 
San Andreas 
M6.5 
Hayward 
M6.9 
San Andreas 
M7.2 
San Andreas 
M7.9 
Light Debris: Brick, Wood 
and Other Debris 1.5 1.2 2.4 4.1 
Heavy Debris: Concrete 
and Steel 2.4 2.2 4.4 8.7 
Total 3.9 3.4 6.8 12.8 
Debris Generated and Material Required for ReconstrucƟ on
Table C4. Debris Generated and Material Required for ReconstrucƟ on. 
Debris Generated by 7.9 Magnitude San Andreas Earthquake
Table C3. Debris Generated by 7.9 Magnitude San Andreas Earthquake.
Source: San Francisco Disaster Debris Management, 2010
Table C5. Debris EsƟ mates for San Francisco.
Source: California AcƟ on Plan for Seismic Safety, 2010
Debris EsƟ mates for the Four CAPSS Scenarios
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Tons of Brick/Wood and Other Debris from 7.9 San Andreas Earthquake 
Figure C6. Tons of Brick/Wood and Other Debris. 
Source, San Francisco Debris Management Plan, 2011
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Figure C7. Tons of Concrete/Steel Debris. 
Source: San Francisco Debris Management Plan , 2011
Tons of Concrete/Steel Debris from 7.9 San Andreas Earthquake
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Material
%age oĨ waste 
stream bǇ weight
Timber/Wood/ 
Lumber Waste 43
Brick
5
Asphalt Paving 1
Asphalt RooĮng 6
Concrete 10
Gypsum 10
Remainder/Composite C&D 6
Rock soil  and Įnes 11
Steel 8
Clay Tile RooĮng
PlasƟc
GreenWaste
Mixed Debris
White Goods
Treated Wood
Urban Wood Waste
Cardboard
Total 100
DdZ/>^^WZEd'
K&t^d^dZD
Table C8. C&D Materials in California Waste Stream. Adapted from California Integrated Waste Man-
agement Board Waste CharacterizaƟ on Study, 2004
Note: Dark shaded materials are not included in simplifi ed waste stream composiƟ on for this re-
search. 
Key Issues in Emergency ConstrucƟ on Waste Management
Principle of Ɵ me-priority of the work
• Rescue demoliƟ on in order to rescue trapped persons
• Emergency demoliƟ on and protecƟ on work in order to re-establish supplies and infra  
  structures, save historic buildings, and secure unstable buildings
• Clearance and demoliƟ on work related to the planned reconstrucƟ on programs
Principle of resources
• SelecƟ ve demoliƟ on and separaƟ on of waste
• SorƟ ng of waste in main fracƟ ons with respect to recycling or disposal
• OpƟ mal uƟ lizaƟ on of available waste treatment faciliƟ es and disposal sites
• OpƟ mal use of natural and re-useable resources
• Minimum transport of materials for construcƟ on and wastes for disposal 
Principle of execuƟ on- demoliƟ on and waste planning and control
• Damage and waste assessment and classifi caƟ on of damaged buildings
• Planning and implementaƟ on of demoliƟ on work and recycling faciliƟ es 
• Waste stream control including assignment of suitable disposal sites
• Traﬃ  c planning and control
• ProtecƟ on of buildings, etc., of historic or cultural value
Source: Adapted from Lauritzen 1998, Table 3, pp. 51
C9- Key Issues in Emergency ConstrucƟ on Waste Management
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Disaster Types Debris Streams 
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Wildfires X X X X X X X X X X
Floods X X X X X X X X X X X
Earthquakes X X X X X X X X X
Tsunamis X X X X X X X X X X X
Hurricanes/Typhoons X X X X X X X X X X X
Tornadoes X X X X X X X X X
Severe Storms/High 
Winds X X X X  X  X X  X X X X
Acts of Terrorism* X X X X X
Ice Storms X X
Debris by Event Type
Table C10. Debris by Event Type
Source: Debris Management Overview, California Emergency Management Agency, 2010
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APPENDIX D - RECYCLABILITY
ap C-3: Tons of Concrete/Steel from a M 7.9 San Andreas Fault Earthquake
PermiƩ ed AcƟ ve Volume Transfer Sites near San Francisco
Figure D1. PermiƩ ed AcƟ ve Large-Volume Transfer/Processing FaciliƟ es, SF Debris Management Guide
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Material
WĞƌĐĞŶƚZĞĐǇĐůĂďůĞ
(%)
Timber/Wood/ 
/Lumber 
Waste 50
Brick 95
Asphalt Paving 75
Asphalt RooĮng 75
Concrete 80
Cardboard
Gypsum 95
Remainder/
Composite C&D
Rock soil  and Įnes
Steel 85
Clay Tile RooĮng
PlasƟc
GreenWaste
Mixed Debris
White Goods
Treated Wood 25
Urban Wood Waste
Total 72.5
^h''^dZz>/>/dz
K&DdZ/>^
Cardboard
Table D2. Simplifi ed Recyclability Rates per Material. 
Note: Materials with recyclability values are used for this research model. For 
an expanded list of material recyclability, see Table D3.
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-Wood waste generated during site work can be ground up and recycled with greenwaste
ͲtŽŽĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĚĞŵŽůŝƟŽŶƉƌŽĐĞƐƐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐŵŽƌĞůĂďŽƌͲŝŶƚĞƐŝǀĞĚŝƐĂƐƐĞŵďůǇŽĨŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůƐƚŽ
ƌĞŵŽǀĞĨĂƐƚĞŶĞƌƐĂŶĚĮŶŝƐŚĞƐĂŶĚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞƐĐƌĞĞŶĞĚĨŽƌůĞĂĚƉĂŝŶƚ
ͲZĞĐǇĐůĞĚǁŽŽĚĐĂŶďĞŐƌŽƵŶĚŝŶƚŽǁŽŽĚĐŚŝƉƐŽƌǁŽŽĚŇŽƵƌĂŶĚƵƐĞĚƚŽŵĂŬĞĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚĞ
or engineered lumber products, mulch or composted
ͲhŶƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞĚǁĂƐƚĞǁŽŽĚŝƐƐŽŵĞƟĞŵƐďƵƌŶĞĚƚŽƉƌŽĚƵĐĞǁĂƐƚĞĞůĞĐƚƌŝĐŝƚǇ
-Clean wood waste can be more easily used as feedstock for engineered lumber
-Lumber and other wood products can be directly reused or gound and used for boiler fuel, 
mulch and engineered lumber. Care should be taken to separate leadbased paint coated 
wood and chemically treated lumber
Ͳ>ĂƌŐĞƟŵďĞƌƐĂŶĚĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶĂůůƵŵďĞƌƌĞŵŽǀĞĚĨƌŽŵĚĞŵŽůŝƟŽŶŽƉĞƌĂƟŽŶƐĐĂŶďĞƌĞƵƐĞĚ
ŽƌƌĞĐƵƚĨŽƌĐŽŶƐƌƵĐƟŽŶƉƌŽũĞĐƚƐ͘,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ ŝŶŵĂŶǇĐĂƐĞƐ͕ƚŚĞůƵŵďĞƌǁŝůůŶĞĞĚƚŽďĞ
ƌĞŐƌĂĚĞĚďǇĂĐĞƌƟĮĞĚŐƌĂĚĞƌŝĨŝƚŝƐƵƐĞĚĨŽƌĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐŽƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶŽƌŶĂŵĞŶƚĂůƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐ
ͲŽŵƉŽƐŝƚĞǁŽŽĚďĂƐĞĚƚŚĞƌŵŽƉůĂƐƟĐƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƐ
ͲƌŝĐŬŚĂƐĂƐĂůǀĂŐĞǀĂůƵĞŽĨΨϰϬϬƉĞƌƚŽŶ͕ĐůĞĂŶĂŶĚƐƚĂĐŬĞĚŽŶĂƉĂůůĞƚ͘
ͲdŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨĐůĞĂŶŝŶŐŵŽƌƚĂƌĨƌŽŵďƌŝĐŬ͕ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ ĐĂŶďĞůĂďŽƌŝŶƚĞŶƐŝǀĞ͕ƌĞŵŽǀŝŶŐŵƵĐŚ
ŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŽĮƚĨƌŽŵƚŚŝƐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ͘
ͲƌŝĐŬƌĞŵĂŝŶƐ͕ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ ĂǀĞƌǇƌĞĐǇĐůĂďůĞŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůƚŚĂƚƌĞĐǇĐůĞƌƐǁŝůůŽŌĞŶĂĐĐĞƉƚĂƚŶŽ
ĐŽƐƚ͘EŽŶͲƐĂůǀĂŐĞďĂďůĞďƌŝĐŬĐĂŶďĞĐƌƵƐŚĞĚĂŶĚƵƐĞĚĂƐĂŐŐƌĞŐĂƚĞďĂƐĞŽƌďĂĐŬĮůůŵĂƚĞƌŝĂů
ͲƌŝĐŬƐĐĂŶďĞƌĞĐǇĐůĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂĐƌƵƐŚŝŶŐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ͕ĐƌĞĂƟŶŐ͞ďƌŝĐŬĐŚŝƉƐ͘͟ dŚŽƐĞďƌŝĐŬĐŚŝƉƐ
can be used as a landscape material, or can be reground through the manufacturing process 
ƚŽĐƌĞĂƚĞŶĞǁ͕ƋƵĂůŝƚǇďƌŝĐŬ͘
ͲƐƉŚĂůƚŝƐŽŌĞŶŐƌŽƵŶĚƵƉĂŶĚƵƐĞĚĂƐƌŽĂĚͲďĂƐĞƵŶĚĞƌŶĞǁƌŽĂĚǁĂǇƐŽƌƉĂƌŬŝŶŐůŽƚƐ͘KŶ
ůĂƌŐĞƌƉƌŽũĞĐƚƐƚŚŝƐƌĞĐǇĐůŝŶŐŽĨĂƐƉŚĂůƚĐĂŶďĞĂĐĐŽŵƉůŝƐŚĞĚŽŶͲƐŝƚĞƵƟůŝǌŝŶŐŵŽďŝůĞ
ŐƌŝŶĚŝŶŐĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚ͘dŚŝƐĐĂŶǇŝĞůĚƐƵďƐƚĂŶƟĂůƐĂǀŝŶŐƐďǇĞůŝŵŝŶĂƟŶŐƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚĂƟŽŶĐŽƐƚƐ
ĂŶĚƟƉƉŝŶŐĨĞĞƐǁŚŝůĞƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐƌĂǁŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůƐĂŶĚƌŽĂĚͲďĂƐĞƚŚĂƚǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞŶĞĞĚĞĚƚŽďĞ
purchhased.
ͲZĞĐǇĐůŝŶŐŽĨƐƉŚĂůƚĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƟŽŶƌŽŽĮŶŐƌĞƐƵůƚƐŝŶĂŐŐƌĞŐĂƚĞďĂƐĞ͕ĂƐƉŚĂůƚƉĂǀĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚ
ƉĂǀĞŵĞŶƚĐŽůĚƉĂƚĐŚ
ͲƐƉŚĂůƚƐŚŝŶŐůĞƐĐĂŶďĞƌĞǇĐůĞĚŝŶƚŽŶĞǁĂƐƉŚĂůƚƉĂǀĞŵĞŶƚŵŝǆĞƐ͘dŚĞǇĐĂŶĂůƐŽƐĞƌǀĞƚǁŽ
ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐĂƚĂĐĞŵĞŶƚŬŝůŶ͗ĐŽŶďƵƐƟŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐŚŝŶŐůĞƐƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚĞŶĞƌŐǇŝŶƚŚĞŬŝůŶĂŶĚƚŚĞ
ƌĞŵĂŝŶŝŶŐŵŝŶĞƌĂůĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚƐĐŽŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞůŝŵĞƐƚŽŶĞŐƌĂŶƵůĞƐ͕ƐĞƌǀĞĂƐƌĂǁŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůĨŽƌ
cement
ͲƌƵƐŚĞĚ͕ƐĐƌĞĞŶĞĚĂŶĚƵƐĞĚĂƐƌŽĂĚďĂƐĞ͘ŐŐƌĞŐĂƚĞƐĐĂŶďĞƌĞĐŽǀĞƌĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚŝƐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ
ĂŶĚƵƐĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƟŽŶŽĨŶĞǁĐŶŽĐƌĞƚĞ͕ŝŶƌĞŐŝŽŶƐǁŚĞƌĞĂŐŐƌĞŐĂƚĞƐĂƌĞŶŽƚƌĞĂĚŝůǇ
ĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞ
ͲZĞĐǇĐůĞĚĐŽŶĐƌĞƚĞŵƵƐƚďĞƵƐĞĚǁŝƚŚĐĂƵƟŽŶĚƵĞƚŽƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚƉĂƌĂŵĞƚĞƌƐ
ͲƉƌĞĨĞƌĂďůǇĨŽƌĨŽƵŶĚĂƟŽŶĂŶĚƐŝƚĞǁŽƌŬ
-Gypsum dry wall can be reycled into new drywall, cement and agricultural uses.
ͲƌǇǁĂůůŐǇƉƐƵŵĐĂŶďĞƌĞǇĐůĞĚďĂĐŬŝŶƚŽŶĞǁĚƌǇǁĂůůŝĨŵŽƐƚŽĨƚŚĞƉĂƉĞƌŝƐƌĞŵŽǀĞĚ͘
The paper limits the amount of recycled gypsum allowed in new drywall, because the 
ƉĂƉĞƌĐŽŶƚĞŶƚĂīĞĐƚƐŝƚƐĮƌĞƌĂƟŶŐ
ͲWŽƚĞŶƟĂůŵĂƌŬĞƚƐĨŽƌĚƌǇǁĂůůǁĂƐƚĞ͗ĐĞŵĞŶƚƉůĂŶƚƐƵƐĞůĂƌŐĞƋƵĂŶƟƟĞƐŽĨǀŝƌŐŝŶ
ŐǇƉƐƵŵƚŽĐůŝŶŬĞƌ͕ ƐƚƵĐĐŽĂĚĚŝƟǀĞ͕͖ĚƌǇǁĂůůǁĂƐƚĞƐĨƌŽŵĚĞŵŽůŝƟŽŶǁĂƐƚĞĐĂŶďĞ
ƌĞǇĐůĐĞĚĨŽƌŶŽŶĂŐƌŝĐƵůƚƵƌĂůŵĂƌŬĞƚƐ͖
Ͳ^ƚĞĞůΘŝƐǀĞƌǇƌĞĐǇĐůĂďůĞĚƵĞƚŽŝƐůĂĐŬŽĨĐŽŶƚĂŝŵŶĂƟŽŶďǇĚŝƐƐŝŵŝůĂƌŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůƐ͘
ͲϴϱйŽĨΘƐƚĞĞůŝƐĐƵƌƌĞŶƚůǇƌĞĐǇĐůĞĚďǇƌĞĐǇĐůĞƌƐ
Ͳ'ŽŽĚŵĂƌŬĞƚƐĞǆŝƐƚĨŽƌĨĞƌƌŽƵƐŵĞƚĂůƐƐƵĐŚĂƐŝƌŽŶĂŶĚƐƚĞĞů͕ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐŽƚŚĞƌ
non-ferrous metals such as copper, brass and aluminum. 
-Metal is almost always recycled back into other metal products and recycling 
ŽƉƉŽƌƵŶŝƟĞƐĂƌĞĂǀŝĂůĂďůĞŝŶǀŝƌƚƵĂůůǇĞǀĞƌǇĂƌĞĂĂƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ
ͲdƌĞĂƚĞĚǁŽŽĚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞŚĂŶĚůĞĚƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞůǇĨƌŽŵǀĞŐĞƚĂƟǀĞĚĞďƌŝƐďĞŝŶŐ
recycled
ͲĞƐŝĚĞƐǁŽŽĚĞŶƵƟůŝƚǇƉŽůĞƐ͕ŽƚŚĞƌůƵŵďĞƌƚŚĂƚŵĂǇďĞĐŚĞŵŝĐĂůůǇƚƌĞĂƚĞĚ
ŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐĚĞĐŬƐ͕ĨĞŶĐĞƐůĂŶĚƐĐĂƉŝŶŐŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůƐ͕ǁŽŽĚďƌŝĚŐĞƐĂŶĚƌĂŝůƌŽĂĚƟĞƐ͘
dƌĞĂƚĞĚǁŽŽĚĐŽŶƚĂŝŶƐĐŚĞŵŝĐĂůƉĞƌƐĞƌǀĂƟǀĞƐƚŚĂƚĐĂŶĐŽŶƚĂŵŝŶĂƚĞƌĞĐǇĐůĞĚ
ǁŽŽĚƉƌŽĚƵĐĐƚƐ͖ƚŚĞƐĞǁŽŽĚƐĐĂŶďĞĐŽŵďƵƐĞĚŝŶǁĂƐƚĞƚŽĞŶĞƌŐǇĨĂĐŝůŝƟĞƐ͘
ϱϬй
95%
75%
75%
ϴϬй
95%
85%
25&
Recycl-
ability (%) Second-life Uses
Timber/ Wood/ Lumber Waste
Brick
ƐƉŚĂůƚWĂǀŝŶŐ
ƐƉŚĂůƚZŽŽĮŶŐ
Concrete
Gypsum
Steel
Treated Wood
Material
METHODS OF RECYCLABILITY OF DEBRIS MATERIAL
Table D3. Material Recyclability Methods
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DEMOLITION DEBRIS RECYCLING OPTIONS
Table D4. DemoliƟ on Debris Recycling OpƟ ons. 
Adapted from Burgess and Giroux, 1997, Cited in Ardani, Table 3, 1999
y g g
Demolition Material Disposal/Recycling Options 
Asphalt (paving and shingles) Recycle into new asphalt pavement, disposal in bulky waste landfill, or use 
as clean fill on or off site if local and state regulations allow. 
Earth/Soil Recycle by incorporation into new asphalt pavement, disposal in bulky waste 
landfill, or use as clean fill on or off site if allowed by local and state 
regulations. 
Electrical (fixtures and wiring) Recycle metal components and dispose of remaining components in solid 
waste disposal area. 
Insulation (non-asbestos, rigid 
polystyrene, fiberglass bat and 
roofing) 
Disposal in bulky waste or solid waste disposal area as allowed by state and 
local regulations. 
Masonry and Rubble (bricks, cinder 
blocks, concrete and mortar, 
porcelain, rock, stone, and tile) 
Bulky waste landfill.  May be used as clean fill and/or recycled if allowed by 
regulations; processing such as crushing may be required. 
Metal (plumbing, electrical, gutters, 
sheet metal, structural steel, rebar 
and studs) 
Recycle by selling to scrap metal dealer who will, in turn, sell the scrap to a 
smelter to be recycled. 
Plastics (pipes, styrofoam, vinyl 
siding and laminate) 
Dispose in bulky waste landfill or send to a recycler if local market exists. 
Roof Materials ((non-asbestos 
shingles, built up roofing and tar 
paper) 
Dispose in bulky waste landfill or recycle by use as an aggregate in asphalt 
pavements. 
Vinyl (siding, flooring, doors, and 
windows) 
Reuse if removed intact or dispose in bulky waste or solid waste disposal 
area as allowed by regulations. 
Wood (treated and non-treated 
lumber) 
Dispose in bulky waste landfill, reuse as structural timber as is or after 
remilling, recycle by processing and use as boiler fuel, landscaping, 
compost, animal bedding, or for engineered building products. 
Wall Coverings (drywall and 
plaster) 
Dispose in bulky waste landfill or grind up for use as a soil amendment or a 
substitute for lime on lawns (if regulations allow). 
Glass Dispose in a bulky waste landfill or collect and send to a glass recycling 
facility. 
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